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ABSTRACT
The aim of causal effect estimation is to find the true impact of a treatment or exposure.
Observational data is employed in social sciences to estimate causal effect but is susceptible to
self-selection and unobserved confounding biases. Covariates included in analysis should strive
to address these biases. This research focuses on investigating covariate selection approaches––
common cause criterion (CC), Disjunctive Cause Criterion (DCC), Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (MDCC), and modified cause criterion (MCC)––in linear regression (LR) and
propensity score methods (PSM) causal effect estimation in the presence of unmeasured
confounding. Realistic social science scenarios such as––inclusion of proxy variables with
varying degrees of strength, misidentification of the unmeasured covariate as a confounder, small
sample sizes, and measurement error in proxy covariates—were investigated. For LR and PSM,
five causal effect estimation models were built using different covariate selection approaches and
compared on three performance metrics––bias, coverage, and empirical SE. Results showed that
in the presence of an unmeasured confounder, the causal effect estimate is biased. Study 1 results
indicate that MDCC approach resulted in more consistent and efficient causal effect estimates in
the presence of unmeasured confounders. Studies 2a and 2b indicate that the MDCC approach is
robust to the unobserved variable being a confounder and can be employed even if the
unmeasured covariate is not a confounder without adversely impacting the performance
measures. Studies 3 and 4 showed including a proxy of the unmeasured confounder, even a weak
proxy (r ~ 0.20) or one with measurement error, results in an improvement in the consistency of
the causal effect estimate and in the efficiency of the causal effect estimator. As the correlation
between the proxy covariate and the unmeasured confounder gets smaller the causal effect
estimator becomes less efficient and the causal effect estimate becomes less consistent.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview
This chapter begins with a brief description of the Simpson’s Paradox, a dilemma that
has stumped many statisticians for decades (Pearl et al., 2016), and one that inspired me to study
causation. It motivated me to explore select literature from different scientific disciplines,
beyond education, such as epidemiology, philosophy, sociology, economics, and computer
science, to better understand the Potential Outcomes (PO) framework and discover novel tools
such as Structed Causal Models (SCMs) and causal graphs to better articulate causal
relationships and causal queries. I encountered different definitions of causation developed in
different scientific disciplines partially driven by the field-specific oddities and in part due to the
scarcity of statistical and probabilistic tools to define causation succinctly and effectively. The
Ladder of Causation proposed by Judea Pearl (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018) clearly states the
distinctions and limitations of each rung of a causal ladder – seeing (observing), doing
(intervening), and imagining (counterfactuals) – and provides a better understanding of what is
needed to answer causal queries – the why question – at each rung of the ladder.
This research was shaped by the motivation to identify the “causal effect” of an
education policy or a programmatic treatment on an outcome of interest while acknowledging
the reliance on observational data. The reliance on observational data is the key limitation within
social science disciplines as randomized control trials (RCTs) – often considered the gold
standard to ascertain and estimate causal effect as it achieves balance on observed and
unobserved covariates between the two groups – cannot be performed, due to justifiable ethical,
economical, practical, and other considerations resulting in a growing reliance on observational
data. What motivated this research was the vexing issue: how can causation be estimated using
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observational data and what factors should be considered to accurately estimate the causal
effect?
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the theoretical backgrounds of
Counterfactual framework and the two approaches: Potential Outcomes (PO) approach and the
Structural Causal Models (SCM) approach, particularly Causal Graphs, employed in different
social science disciplines. A section in this chapter briefly discusses the adage “association is not
causation” that is so often repeated in statistics courses so as to become second nature for
researchers and practitioners. I delve into why association (correlation) is not causation due to
confounding variables before summarizing how causation is formally and mathematically
defined. The three rungs of Pearl’s Ladder of Causation and the Counterfactual framework are
summarized next. The following section summarizes the Potential Outcomes approach,
particularly the propensity score method (PSM) proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The
section after briefly describes the Structural Causal Models approach and the associated
graphical system of depicting current scientific knowledge using nodes and directed edges. The
section describes what Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) are and the benefits to causal
identification that graphical tools provide. In the section titled Problem Statement, I identify the
central issue of interest to this research, which is the lack of clear, sometimes conflicting,
guidelines with respect to covariate selection in regression and the propensity score methods.
The focus of this research is to evaluate the DAG-based covariate selection criteria proposed by
VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) known as the disjunctive cause criterion and later modified by
VanderWeele (2019) to include recommendations related to instrumental and proxy variables. As
proxy variables are quite prevalent in social science research, the focus of this research updated
recommendation to include proxy variable of an unmeasured true confounder covariate. The
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efficacy of this recommendation as well as the practical utility of dealing with proxy variables
that are plagued with issues such as ambiguous relationship with the unmeasured covariate,
weaker correlation with the unmeasured covariate, and measurement error in the proxy variable
was investigated. The chapter concludes with the section titled Purpose of the study that
summarizes these topics in further detail.

Motivating Problem: Simpson’s Paradox in Educational Settings
This section presents a hypothetical example to illustrate Simpson’s Paradox based on an
everyday policy example encountered at an institution of higher education. This example is
adapted from Simpson’s Paradox examples in the healthcare industry (Pearl et al., 2016). Prior
research has shown the importance of math competency in determining success at a university.
Let us assume that at a university, the decision-makers have limited resources and want to
determine the best developmental course between two approaches that require vastly different
resource requirements and result in different levels of improvement of the incoming freshman
class’s math competency. The task is to recommend between two treatment conditions
(Treatment received, T): recitation lecture courses or one-on-one tutoring courses. The recitation
lecture courses can accommodate more students, but the instructor cannot customize the
pedagogy according to individual student needs. The recitation lecture courses also cost less as
the costs are defrayed over a greater number of students. Conversely, one-on-one tutoring
sessions cost a lot more but allow the instructors to provide individual attention to the students.
Although one-on-one tutoring can be more effective in shoring up student competencies, this
model is not as efficient in terms of getting the most use out of scarce resources like personnel,
money, and time. Let us assume that in an imaginary university there are 2,050 freshmen
matriculating during the beginning of the academic year and the only piece of information
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known about these students to the university administrators is their incoming math competency
(Condition, C). Based on the math competency, students are grouped into either a “lowcompetency” group or a “high-competency” group. The goal is to provide each student with a
developmental treatment within the resource constraints of dollars and personnel, so that the
desired outcome (Y) of low fail rate in a post-treatment evaluation is achieved. Table 1 shows the
hypothetical number and percentage of students of low and high competencies who were
assigned to the two treatment conditions and the respective fail rates in the post-treatment
evaluation.
For incoming students in the treatment with low-competency (C = 0), one-on-one
tutoring (T = 1) is more effective as it yields a lower fail rate (fail rate: 100 of 500; Y = 20%)
compared to low-competency (C = 0) student performance in recitation class (T = 0) (fail rate: 30
of 100; Y = 30%) fail rate. Similarly, for students enrolled in the treatment with higher
competency (C = 1), one-on-one tutoring (T = 1) seems to be more effective as it has a lower
fail rate (fail rate: 5 of 50; Y = 10%) compared to recitation class (T = 0) (fail rate: 210 of 1400;
Y = 15%) fail rate.
Hence, a decision-maker is likely to recommend one-on-one tutoring (T = 1) for students
with high competency (C = 1) as well as for students with low competency (C = 0) as it seems
that the metric of interest, fail rate in post-treatment assessment, is lower for one-on-one tutoring
(T = 1) irrespective of the competency-level of the student. However, a look at the aggregate
results for the class shows that of the 550 students who were assigned to one-on-one tutoring (T
= 1), the fail rate is at 19.1% compared to 16% of the recitation class (T = 0). This would
suggest that the recitation class (T = 0) is more effective at an aggregate level. An aggregate look
at the data would lead the decision-maker to draw a different conclusion as opposed to the
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disaggregated data by math-competency subgroups. This paradoxical conclusion is known as
Simpson’s Paradox.

Table 1. Simpson’s Paradox: A Hypothetical Scenario
Treatment ( T )

Condition ( C )
High Competency
Low Competency
(C = 1)
(C = 0)

Total by Condition

Recitation Class (T = 0)

210 / 1400 = 15%

30 / 100 = 30%

240 / 1500 = 16%

5 / 50 = 10%

100 / 500 = 20%

105 / 550 = 19.1%

215 / 1450 = 14.8%

130 / 600 = 21.7%

345 / 2050 = 16.8%

E[Y|T, C = 1]

E[Y|T, C = 0]

E [Y|T]

One-on-one Tutoring (T = 1)
Total by Treatment

Note. The percentages and counts in the table are fail rates on a posttest after the treatment.

Re-writing the data in Table 1 as weighting, we have:
1400
100
(0.15) +
(0.30) = 0.16
1500
1500
50
500
(0.10) +
(0.20) = 0.191
550
550
Of the 600 students with low-competency, 500 were assigned to one-on-one tutoring
sessions whereas 1,400 of the 1,450 high-competency students were assigned to recitation
classes. For recitation classes (T = 0), the overall fail rate of 16% is disproportionately impacted
by the high weighting on the high-competency (C = 1) group with a 15% fail rate and a low
weighting on the low-competency (C = 0) group with a 30% fail rate. This pulls the overall fail
rate towards the fail rate of the high-competency group. Similarly, the disproportionate
weighting skews the overall fail rate for one-on-one tutoring (T = 1), due to the high fail-rate of
low-competency students (C = 0). Simpson’s Paradox is largely due to these unequal weightings.
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But the question remains, which students should be assigned to which treatment group?
The answer to this question is dependent on the underlying causal structure that generates the
data. In scenario 1, the knowledge about math competency (C) is used for assigning students to
the two treatment conditions (T) and it is assumed that prior math competency has some
confounding effect on the outcome of interest (Y). Additionally, it is assumed that the treatment
has a causal effect on the outcome of interest. The underlying causal structure being evaluated is
shown in Figure 1.
When treatment assignment is impacted by a pre-existing condition (e.g., competency in
this example impacts treatment such that students with high match competency are likely to be
motivated to attend the one-on-one tutoring), it is better to look at disaggregated sub-group data
to make the decision. A closer look at Table 1 shows that the overall fail rate of people with lowcompetency (C = 0) is 21.7% (130 of 600), whereas the fail rate of low-competency students
assigned to one-on-one tutoring (T = 1, C = 0) is only 20%, which shows an improvement from
the overall fail-rate.

Figure 1. Causal graph showing condition as the cause of the treatment
Note. The outcome for scenario 1 where the pre-existing condition, C, impacts the treatment assignment, T.

In scenario 2, shown in Figure 2, the treatment (T) is assumed to be a cause of the
condition (C) and both T and C have a causal impact on the outcome of interest (Y). Say the 50
students with high competency (C = 1) who have been assigned to one-on-one tutoring (T = 1)
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become complacent and stop putting in the effort needed to keep up with their math
competencies. This would result in a scenario where treatment assignment influences the
student’s competency (condition) which in turn has an impact on the outcome of interest (Y).

Figure 2. Causal graph showing treatment as the cause of the condition
Note. The outcome for scenario 2 where the treatment assignment, T, impacts the condition, C.

When the condition has been impacted by the treatment assignment, it is better to look at
the aggregated population data to make the decision. This example illustrates the importance of
accurately identifying the underlying causal structure that generates the data. Identifying
causation requires a better understanding of the underlying causal model that generated the data
used in the analysis. In practice, often only the statistical properties of the data, such as
associations, are explored by analyzing the data without any consideration to the underlying data
generating structure. Let’s turn to the definitions of association, causation, and why they are not
the same due to factors such as confounding or self-selection into different treatments.
Association Does not Imply Causation
Since the advent of modern science, researchers have been intensely curious in finding
patterns in data and relationships between variables. Early astronomers were interested in
predicting when a certain planet would be visible, or a comet would appear in the sky. In the late
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nineteenth century, statistician and anthropologist Sir Francis Galton and his disciple Karl
Pearson were interested in finding association between the heights of a parent and their child, a
person’s height and forearm length, person’s height, and skull size, among many things related to
human anatomy to relate physical and mental characteristics to familial inheritance as cited in
the Book of Why (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Even though the underlying curiosity was fueled by
the desire to find causal relationships between superior mental and physical attributes and
familial inheritance, the data collected and the statistical understanding at that time could only
provide information about relationships between the variables, short of the causal relationships
sought.
The father of modern-day statistics, Sir Ronald Fisher, developed design of experiment
methodology to systematically block out the extraneous effect of variables other than fertilizer
on plant growth. After years of work, he concluded that the best way to systematically block
these extraneous effects was to randomly assign the plan seeds to different agricultural plots,
thereby laying the foundation of Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).
In this section, I briefly explore questions such as––what an association between variables is and
how it is typically represented. Next, I explore as to what causation is and the different biases
that prevents associational relationships from being deemed causal relationships and how RCTs
are used to draw causal conclusions.

What is Association?
Statistically, the association between two variables is typically defined as the strength of
their linear relationship. Usually for continuous variables this linear relationship is represented
by Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) which ranges from +1 to -1. Correlation coefficient
values close to +1 or -1 indicate stronger linear relationships and given the value of a variable,
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say X, lets us predict the value of a variable, say Y, with high degree of confidence. The slope of
the regression line of best fit that passes through the bivariate scatter plot of the variables also
shows the strength of relationship between two variables. The two variables covarying could be
because one is the cause of the other or because they both are impacted by a third variable, a
common cause also known as a confounder (Pearl, 2013). Pearl notes that Pearson’s take on
causation and correlation was that causation was nothing more than a limiting case of correlation
i.e., cases where the relationship between two variables is deterministic (r = +1 or -1). Much has
changed since this early understanding of correlation and causation.

What is Causation?
Halpern (2016) summarizes different definitions and types of causality in his book,
Actual Causality, dedicated to the topic of causation. He notes that the definition of causality has
evolved and has been influenced by the language and syntax used in different scientific
disciplines. He makes a distinction between inductive or forward-looking causality that is used
for prediction and generalization and deductive or backward-looking causality that is typically
used to investigative purposes to understand a specific event. The forward-looking causality is
also known as “effect of causes” or type causality, whereas the backward-looking causality is
known as “cause of an effect” or actual causality. Halpern notes that counterfactuals reasoning is
necessary to conclusively deduce and identify causes of an effect a sentiment echoed by Pearl
(Halpern, 2016; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).
Halpern chronicles the history of causality and notes that the modern view of causality
dates to eighteenth century philosophers like Hume who wrote, “We may define a cause to be an
object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects
similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never
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had existed” (as cited in Halpern, 2016, p. 2). This definition combines two notions of regularity
(A comes before B) and counterfactuals (B would happen if A did not happen). Pearl defines
causality in a more metaphorical manner where he states that, “if a variable Y, ‘listens to’ to
another variable X to determine its own value, then X is a cause of Y” (Pearl & Mackenzie,
2018). Several causal researchers such as Pearl (2018) and Hernan use the analogy of a causal
flow between the cause variable and effect variable while modeling causality. Hernan and Cole
(2009) define causation as the difference in the outcome Y when an action A is taken as opposed
to when action A is withheld. If the two outcomes differ then action A is said to have a causal
effect, a causative or preventative effect, on outcome Y. If the two outcomes don’t differ then we
conclude that action A does not have any causal effect on outcome Y. The action A can be an
intervention, treatment, or exposure. The action A could take two states (dichotomous) – treated
versus untreated – or could have multiple states – different levels of treatment and untreated.
Similarly, the outcome of interest could be dichotomous or take multiple states. For simplicity,
this research exclusively only considered dichotomous states of the treatment T and groups the
population into two groups, the treated group, and the untreated group. In summary, a variable X
is said to be a cause of a variable Y, if Y can change in response to a deliberate, specific change
in X.

Pearl’s Ladder of Causation
Inspired by his research in machine learning and Bayesian networks that provided the
understanding that the causal learner should clearly master three distinct levels of cognitive
ability – seeing, doing, and imagining – Pearl proposed a ladder of causation with three levels
that answer causal queries that gets progressively more abstract (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).
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The first rung of this ladder is the association or observational rung which comprises of
seeing and observing patterns or association in the data between variables of interest. This rung
is based on data and relies on statistical and mathematical operations such as probabilities P(Y)
and conditional probabilities P(Y|X) to find associations between variables. This rung lets us
answer basic questions such as, “If we observe the value of X = x, what does it tell us about the
value of Y?” We say that one variable is associated with another variable if observing one
variable gives us a strong likelihood of what we would observe in the other variable. However,
as Judea Pearl notes, statistical measures such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient and slope of
the regression line alone cannot tell us which is the cause and which is the effect, only that the
two variables are influenced by each other. We usually rely on expert judgement, understanding
of the subject matter, or existing scientific knowledge to make the judgement of which one is the
cause, and which one is the effect. As Pearl writes in The Book of Why, “Good prediction does
not need to have good explanations” (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 30). Statistical metrics like
correlation are artifacts of the data itself and not the underlying causal model that generated the
data set. Additionally, even the notation used to represent the associational relations between
variables are agnostic of the direction of causal flow from the cause to the effect (e.g., “=” sign
used in regression is bidirectional.) Also, it should be noted that statistically, we could regress X
on Y, irrespective of not knowing if X is the cause or the effect. Morgan and Winship note that
usually researchers rely on the temporal order of regression analysis to specify causal order
(Morgan & Winship, 2013). This lack of understanding of causal flow between variables
prevents us from knowing the impact on the effect variable if the cause variable was deliberately
manipulated. To answer these questions, Pearl suggests that we need to move up the ladder of
causation to the second rung (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019).
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The second rung of the ladder of causation is the intervention or experimental rung and
lets the researcher respond to queries such as, “What will happen to the value of Y, if I do this to
X?” or “How can I make the value of Y = y?” Fisher’s famous design of experiments setup was
another example of deliberately manipulating one variable (X) to elicit a response in the effect
variable (Y). Several scientific disciplines like physics and chemistry regularly rely on
experiments, e.g., deliberately manipulating one variable to observe the impact on another
variable. Pearl notes that this is a higher rung in the ladder as through the process of intervention
the researcher is deliberately taking actions to generate data to confirm or refute the hypothesis
that X causes Y or to study the causal effect of X on Y. Though in social science disciplines such
experiments are not prevalent, outside of certain pockets such as psychology and behavioral
economics, Imbens (2020) notes that most of the econometrics research happens in the second
rung of the causal ladder. Though sufficiently strong causal models built based on rung one data
can help us respond to rung two queries, Pearl states that it is almost impossible to answer the
question, “What will happen to the value of Y, if I do this to X?” based on prior observations
because several other factors that may be relevant and impacts Y, either may not have been
considered or may take a different value over time (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Furthermore, it is
impossible to go from the first rung to the second rung of the causal ladder without a robust
causal model. The cornerstone of the queries asked in the second rung of the causal ladder –
What will happen to the value of Y if I do this to X? – is the do operator. The do operator can be
considered the cornerstone of Pearl’s Structural Causal Models (SCM) and is essentially defined
as a deliberate action that the researcher does on a variable, say cause variable X, and is depicted
as do(X). It drives the new “language of queries” that Pearl proposes in the SCM approach. The
probability of observing variable Y, under do(X) is written as P(Y | do(X)) and stated as
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probability of Y, given that we do(X), and is different than probability of Y, given X which is
written as P(Y | X). The difference is that in the do(X) case we are “compelling” hypothetically
every participant to take a particular action, say enroll in a treatment, whereas in the latter the
participant takes the action if they choose to. Correspondingly, P (Y | not-do (X)) means that
every participant is hypothetically compelled to not take a particular action. Pearl notes that the
do operator signifies that we are dealing with an intervention and not just a passive observation.
Pearl has shown that the do operator can be used for causes that are manipulatable as well as
ones that are not manipulatable like gender and ethnicity and argues that the do operator helps
predict the effects of an intervention without actually performing it (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018;
Pearl, 2019). The second rung of the causal ladder, as powerful and versatile as it is, fails when
searching for causes of an effect, i.e., it is done retrospectively with the effects known
beforehand, buts its causes remain unknown. To answer causal queries such as, “What would
have happened, had I done that instead of this?” or “Why did Y take the value it did, when we
deliberately set the value of X?” requires the researcher to climb to the third rung of the causal
ladder.
The third rung of the causal ladder is the counterfactual or imagining rung and lets the
researcher respond to the why and what if questions. Nothing can exist in two dimensions
simultaneously. The same study participant who experienced a treatment cannot also exist in an
imaginary world where they did not experience the treatment, and vice versa. If that were
possible, then it would be straightforward to calculate the impact of the treatment on the study
participants. As it is not possible to observe the imaginary world, such scenarios are referred to
as counterfactuals, i.e., the outcomes in this imaginary world are counter to the fact.
Counterfactuals, by definition, are theoretical and hence are devoid of data (i.e., observed or
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measured outcomes). Pearl states that, “The advantage we gained from imagining
counterfactuals was the same then [through human evolution] as it is today: flexibility, the ability
to reflect and improve on past actions, and perhaps even more significant, our willingness to take
responsibility for past and current actions.” (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 36).
I end the section on ladder of causation with Pearl’s words, “While rung one deals with
the seen world, and rung two deals with a brave new world that is seeable, rung three deals with
a world that cannot be seen. To bridge that gap, we need a model of the underlying causal
process.” (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 36).

Why is Association not Causation?
Associational differences between two variables are a statistical quantity [P(Y | T=1) –
P(Y | T=0)], which is an artifact of the data. It is in the first rung in the ladder of causation. It is
different from the causal effect, which is a causal quantity [P(Y | do(T=1)) – P (Y | do(T=0))] and
an artifact of the data generating causal model. Note that for simplicity, P(Y | do(T=1)) is
denoted as Y(1) which is the potential outcome under treatment T = 1, and P(Y | do(T=0)) is
denoted as Y(0) which is the potential outcome under treatment T = 0, respectively. So, the
causal effect can be simplified as the difference in the outcome under treatment and no treatment
i.e., Y(1) – Y(0). The statistical quantity – conditional probability – is different from the causal
quantity – interventional probability – calculated using the do operator. The difference between
conditioning and intervention is pictorially depicted in Figure 3.
The associational difference is composed of the causal effects of treatment (T) and
outcome (Y) and any additional differences due to confounding variable (Z). Figure 4 shows a
simple causal model with three variables, where the arrow from T to Y, the causal effect, is of
interest. The confounding variable Z effects both the treatment T and outcome Y. The blue dotted
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arc depicts the total associational effect of T on Y. It consists of the causal effect flowing from
𝑇 → 𝑌 as well as any non-casual effect, (spurious effect or lurking effect), 𝑇 ← 𝑍 → 𝑌 flowing
between T and Y through the confounding variable Z. Variable Z confounds the effect of
treatment T on outcome Y. As the two effects are intricately bound, the resulting bias is known as
the confounding bias, meaning “mixing”, and it occurs when a variable influence both the
treatment and the outcome. Both observed and unobserved covariates could result in
confounding bias (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). In the field of epidemiology, Clarice Weinberg
mathematically and graphically showed that the estimated causal effect of a treatment can be
biased if the confounding factors are not accounted for when analyzing prospective or
retrospective studies (as cited in Howards et al., 2012). She illustrated that bias could result when
adjustment is made for any factor which is caused in part by the treatment T and is correlated to
the outcome Y.

Figure 3. Pictorial depiction of the difference between conditioning and intervening.
Note. Adapted, with permission, from an online course, A brief introduction to causal inference, by Brady Neal.
Source: Causalcourse.com (see, Appendix C)
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Figure 4. Depicts confounded effect of confounder (Z) on treatment (T) and outcome (Y).

Based on such work, in the field of epidemiology, a confounder Z is defined as any
covariate that meet all these three criteria: a) the confounder Z is associated with the treatment T
in the population at large; b) the confounder Z is associated with the outcome Y among people
who have not been exposed to the treatment T; and c) the confounder Z is not on the causal
pathway between T and Y (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).
Another reason associational difference is not considered as causal effects is because the
two groups – the treated and the untreated groups – may not be comparable as the distribution of
observed and unobserved covariates may be different. A random assignment on average achieves
balance on observed and unobserved covariates between the two groups.
Assumptions to make the average treatment effect (ATE) equal to associational difference.
1) Ignorability: [𝑌(1), 𝑌(0)] ⊥ T - The potential outcome Y(1) and Y(0) are independent of the
treatment T. Unless Ignorability assumption is met we cannot condition on treatment i.e.,
E[𝑌(1)] − E[𝑌(0)] ≠ E[𝑌(1)| 𝑇 = 1] − E[𝑌(0) | 𝑇 = 0] where E is the expected value
If Ignorability assumption is met, we can condition on treatment T as both potential outcomes are
independent of the treatment.
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Then,
E[𝑌(1)] − E[𝑌(0)] = E[𝑌(1)| 𝑇 = 1] − E[𝑌(0) | 𝑇 = 0]
= E[𝑌 | 𝑇 = 1] − E[𝑌 | 𝑇 = 0]
If Ignorability assumption is met, then the expected difference between treatment
conditions is the same as the associational difference i.e., the causal difference calculated using
the conditional do operator (interventional probability) is same as the statistical difference
calculated using conditional probability.
The Ignorability and Exchangeability assumptions are essentially the same from different
perspectives. Exchangeability indicates that the units in the treatment and control groups can be
freely exchanged with one another as the expected value of the outcome of interest is the same
irrespective of the treatment. Mathematically, Exchangeability can be summarized as below:
E[𝑌(1) | 𝑇 = 1] = E[𝑌(1) | 𝑇 = 0] = E[𝑌(1)]
E[𝑌(0) | 𝑇 = 0] = E[𝑌(0) | 𝑇 = 1] = E[𝑌(0)]

Counterfactuals and Potential Outcomes Framework
Proposed by Holland in 1986 and formalized and advocated by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), the Potential Outcome (PO) framework, also known as the Counterfactual framework, is
a statistical method that relies on creating conditions that support causal claims primarily in
observational studies. The framework is flexible and includes several methods such as the
propensity score method (PSM) to balance the groups of comparison, the Instrumental Variable
Method (IVM) to control confounding, and the Marginal Structural Models (MSM) to create
“pseudo” populations that can be employed to compare the effect of the cause variable on an
outcome variable for groups at different levels of treatment. These methods within the PO
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framework strives to make the two groups “similar” or comparable on the confounders that
impact the treatment, T, and outcome, Y.
The counterfactual framework of causal modeling presupposes that each unit i within the
population of interest has a potential outcome. The counterfactual framework requires that the
two states being compared, say treatment and no treatment, are carefully defined so that the
causal estimation based on mathematical operation can be precisely specified. Pearl and his team
provide a specific definition of term counterfactual as a question that starts with “if” e.g., “If I
had taken the freeway, would I have gotten home earlier?” (Pearl et al., 2016). In this example
the two alternate states being compared are “taking freeway” as opposed to “not taking freeway.”
This is comparable to the do-operator that was described earlier i.e., do(freeway). Building on
prior work from several early pioneers like Neyman, Fisher, Cochran and Cox, Rubin formalized
the Potential Outcomes (PO) framework through a series of paper in the 1970s and 1980s
(Morgan & Winship, 2013). In an interview with Hand, professor in Statistics in the Imperial
College in London and former president of the Royal Statistical Society, Pearl suggests that
Potential Outcome and Structural Causal Models are different approaches or frameworks within
the same Counterfactual tradition (Hand & Pearl, 2020).

What are Potential Outcomes?
Say we are interested in the causal effect of a dichotomous treatment variable T
(participated in an intervention = 1; did not participate in an intervention = 0) on an outcome
variable Y (pass = 1; fail = 0). I denote the value of the outcome Y for each individual i as Yi. If
the individual participated in the intervention (T = 1) then outcome is denoted as 𝑌𝑖𝑡=1 , or 𝑌𝑖1 for
simplicity, and if the individual did not participate in the intervention (T = 0) then outcome is
denoted as 𝑌𝑖𝑡=0 , or 𝑌𝑖0 for simplicity. Mathematically, the causal effect for an individual i is
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defined as 𝑌𝑖1 ≠ 𝑌𝑖0 i.e., the same person could potentially have different values for Y depending
on the treatment assignment t = 1 or t = 0. Typically, the causal effect for an individual i is
mathematically defined as the difference between the two outcomes, 𝑌𝑖1 and 𝑌𝑖0 , though in some
fields like epidemiology the ratio of the two would make more intuitive sense (Morgan &
Winship, 2013). It should be noted that both 𝑌𝑖1 and 𝑌𝑖0 could potentially take values of 0 (fail) or
1 (pass). The discussion so far assumes that an individual i can exist in two states of treatment T
at the same time, which is absurd. Thus, the primarily challenge in estimating causal effect at an
individual-level is that the data under both the conditions, 𝑌𝑖1 or 𝑌𝑖0 , does not exist
simultaneously and hence, it is a missing data problem.

The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (CI)
The two states values of the outcome Y could take under T = 1 or T = 0, cannot be
simultaneously observed and are hence referred to as counterfactuals, i.e., both outcomes don’t
simultaneously exist, or potential outcomes, i.e., both outcomes could potentially exist depending
on individual i's assignment. This is also referred to as the fundamental problem of causal
inference. The causal effect at an individual-level cannot be calculated and is only estimated
based on average treatment effect (ATE) or average causal effect of other individuals in the
treated and untreated groups. Hence, outcome Y can be summarized by the equation below
(Morgan & Winship, 2013):
𝑌 = 𝑇𝑌1 + (1 − 𝑇)𝑌 0
Here, treatment T can take values 1 or 0 and Y1 and Y0 represent potential outcomes under
T = 1 and T = 0, respectively. The participant assignment into different treatment conditions is
either driven by the participant’s or researcher’s motivation to assign the participant to the
treatment condition or a random assignment process like in Randomized Control Trials (RCTs).
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Propensity Score Methods: A Brief Overview
Drawing causal inference from observational data is beset with problems such as
confounding bias and selection bias. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed a statistical method,
propensity score method (PSM), to control for confounding in research involving observational
data. Observed confounders are controlled by means of a propensity score. The propensity score
method is used to control for differences in pre-treatment covariate distributions between the
treated and the untreated groups. The propensity score – the probability of treatment assignment
– is a balancing score, a scalar quantity replacing a vector of covariates, that essentially has
aggregated information to match different units in the population of interest (Austin, 2011). Once
conditioned on the propensity score, the distribution of baseline observed pre-treatment
covariates are comparable between the treated and the untreated units based on sample
characteristics. Note that the treated and the untreated groups could still differ on covariates that
are not included to calculate the propensity score such as unmeasured variables. This is not a
cause of concern if the unmeasured covariates do not affect the outcome, as the ignorability
assumption is then met. However, if the unmeasured covariates affect the treatment and the
outcome (i.e., it is a confounder), then leaving out such covariates could be problematic.
The four steps of propensity score methods are:
1. Estimating the propensity score based on pre-treatment covariates
2. In propensity score matching, the participants of the study are matched from the treated
and untreated groups that have similar propensity scores which in turn would balance the
pre-treatment observed covariates between the two groups. There are other ways in
propensity score methods, such as stratification that accomplishes similar tasks.
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3. In propensity score matching, the quality of matching is evaluated by testing covariate
balance by comparing the pre-treatment covariates between the treatment groups using
only the matched units.
4. Estimating the effect of the treatment
The propensity score e (Xi) for a unit i is often estimated using logistic regression on the
covariate vector Xi using the formula given below (Pan & Bai, 2015):
1. Conditional Ignorability: The actual outcome of a treatment on a unit i (Y1i) or the
potential outcome of a treatment on a unit (Y0i) are both independent of the treatment
assignment Ai, given the covariate set Xi. Mathematically, 𝑌1𝑖 , 𝑌0𝑖 ⊥ 𝐴𝑖 | 𝑋𝑖 .
2. Stable Unit Treatment Value Assignment (SUTVA): The assignment of units should not
impact the outcome of other units.
𝑙𝑛 (

𝑒(𝑋𝑖 )
) = 𝛽𝑋𝑖
1 − 𝑒(𝑋𝑖 )

In a systematic review of PSM application in social sciences (79 studies), Thoemmes and
Kim (2011) showed that the average number of covariates considered by researchers to include
in the propensity score estimation model was 31.3 (lower quartile: 9, median: 16, upper quartile:
29), whereas the mean number of covariates that remained in the final model was 18.8 (lower
quartile: 8, median: 16, upper quartile: 24). Though various propensity score estimation
techniques are available, almost the vast majority (more than 75%) rely on logistic regression for
the first step to estimate the propensity score. Similarly, though several conditioning strategies
are available, almost two-thirds (64%) relied on matching techniques while 22% relied on
stratification, followed by weighting (7%). Within matching techniques, one-to-one matching
without replacement was most commonly employed (Thoemmes & Kim, 2011).
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Structural Causal Models Framework
The first published work to link correlation and causation using graphical tools was by
Sewall Wright, an American animal geneticist who worked for United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), in the early twentieth century. In his seminal work, aptly titled Correlation
and Causation, Wright (1921) proposed path models to link association between variables,
artifacts of the data, and causation, built on scientific knowledge(Wright, 1921). He suggested
the need to link the quantitative data with the prior knowledge, gained by experience or
experiment, that drives causal queries and proposed path coefficients distinct from correlation
coefficients. However, graphical linkage between correlation and causation did not get wider
acceptance at that time, as evidenced by a lack of substantive research in the area of causation. In
the later part of the twentieth century, Pearl proposed the Structural Causal Models (SCMs)
(Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019; Pearl, 1995) based on Wright’s path models and clearly
enumerated the existing domain knowledge in a graphical format. Pearl points out the inability of
the field of statistics to answer causal queries or even meaningfully articulate them (Pearl et al.,
2016). He reasons that the current statistical education has been influenced by how early
forefathers of the field, namely Galton, Pearson, Fisher, and others, thought.
Statistics, Pearl notes, does a fantastic job in describing the data, but lacks tools to clearly
enumerate the underlying data generation process. The field does not articulate the assumptions
of the data generating model clearly and succinctly. Causal inference depends critically on the
accuracy of the theoretical assumptions that are made by the researcher (Hand & Pearl, 2020)
and SCM allows these assumptions to be transparent and clearly communicated so that anyone
can challenge and scrutinize the veracity of these assumptions. The SCM approach combines the
strengths of the graphical modeling and potential outcomes logic so that there is a visual
representation of the assumptions in the form of nodes and arrows. The graphs encode what we
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know, and the logic encodes what we wish to know (Hand & Pearl, 2020). The central idea of
the SCM approach is to verify if the data is compatible with the causal model that is assumed to
have generated the data using mathematical tools.
Formally, a Structural Causal Model consists of two sets of variables, set U, and set V,
and a set of functions that assign all variables in set V, a value based on values of other variables
in the model. The variables in set U are exogenous to the causal model and variables in set V are
endogenous to the causal model, 𝓜. The variables in the set U are not included in the model 𝓜
but are acknowledged to exist and have an association with variables in set V. The model 𝓜
does not explain the causes of exogenous variables in set U. It should be noted that exogenous
variables in set U cannot be descendants of other exogenous variables in the model. The
variables in set V are endogenous to the model and is a descendant of at least one exogenous
variable. If the true value of every exogenous variable is known then it can be used to determine,
with perfect certainty, the value of the endogenous variables using function f. The function f
takes the values of exogenous and other endogenous variables that are parents of the endogenous
variable of interest and assigns it a value.

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Brief Overview
Pearl (1995) used graph theory to develop a graphical tool – Directed Acyclic Graphs
(DAGs) – to represent underlying causal structure and assumptions. Causal relationships are
typically asymmetric i.e., if A causes B, then typically B does not cause A. This acyclic nature is
captured by DAGs. In the graphical model, if B is a child of A i.e., there is a directed arrow
pointing from A to B (A → B) then A is the direct cause of B. Graphical models contain less
information than the structural causal models (SCMs) as the causal relationships depicted are
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qualitative in nature and not quantitative as required in SCM. However, it is easier to interpret
and communicate causal relationships using graphical models.

𝐴 = 𝑓1 (ε1 )
𝐵 = 𝑓5 (ε5 )
𝐶 = 𝑓6 (ε6 )
𝑍 = 𝑓4 (𝐵, ε4 )
𝑋 = 𝑓2 (𝐴, Z, ε2 )
𝑌 = 𝑓3 (𝑋, 𝑍, 𝐶, ε3 )

Figure 5. DAGs and associated SCM equations.
Note. Example of chain, fork, and collider type relationships. The DAG showing a chain (A → X →Y), a fork (X ←
Z →Y), and a collider (A → X ←Z). The error terms are omitted on purpose.

Where ε𝑖𝑠 represent unobserved disturbances (error terms) and 𝑓𝑖𝑠 are arbitrary functions that
don’t have to be linear.
DAGs are like Structural Equation Models (SEM) in that they both rely on graphical
representation to understand the overall causal structure. However, unlike SEM, DAGs don’t
make distribution assumptions and hence are completely non-parametric. DAGs consist of nodes
(representing variables or events) and directed edges (representing the causal flow between
them). Irrespective of the complexity of the causal graph, three nodes can be connected in any of
the forms stated below:
a) Chain: A → B → C [in Figure 5., A → X → Y; B → Z → Y] (i.e., B is the mediator of
A’s effect on C)
b) Fork: A ← B → C [in Figure 5., X ← Z → Y] (i.e., B is the common cause of both A and
C)
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c) Collider: A → B ← C [in Figure 5., X → Y ← C] (i.e., both A and C are common causes
of B)

Direction Separation (d-separation) Rules
As explained in the previous section, the causal model is made of arrows and nodes. Th
arrows represent the causal flow, and the nodes represent the observed variable, unobserved
variable, or an unobservable trait. Direction separation or d-separation refers to the ability to
surgically remove arrows from the causal model, such that the causal flow between two
variables, two nodes, is cut off. There are several ways to accomplish this which has been
mathematically proven by Pearl et al. (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019; Pearl et al., 2016). The
process of d-separation is based on three basic rules: a) the conditional independence in chains;
b) the conditional independence in forks; and c) the conditional independence in collider
structures. The rules are stated below (Pearl et al., 2016):
•

Rule 1: Conditional independence in chains: Say we have a three-node causal structure A
→ B → C (B mediates relationship of A and C), then C and B are dependent, B and A are
dependent, C and A are likely dependent, and C and A are conditionally independent
given B, if there is only one unidirectional path between A and B and C in any set of
variables that intercepts that path. Said differently, for each level of variable B in the data
set, variables A and C were independent.

•

Rule 2: Conditional independence in forks: Say we have a three-node causal structure A
← B → C (B impacts both variables A and C), then A and B are dependent, B and C are
dependent, A and C are likely dependent, and C and A are conditionally independent
given B. If a variable B is a common cause of variables A and C, and there is only one
path between A and C, then A and C are independent conditional on B.

25

•

Rule 3: Conditional independence in colliders: Say we have a three-node causal structure
A → B ← C (A and C are common causes of variable B), then A and B are dependent, C
and B are dependent, A and C are likely independent, and A and C are conditionally
dependent given B. If B is the collision node of variables A and C, and there is only one
path between A and C, then A and C are independent unconditional on B but are
dependent conditional on B and any descendants of B.
Based on these three rules, Pearl et al. define d-separation as follows, “A path 𝓅 is

blocked by a set of nodes in ℤ if and only if: 1) 𝓅 contains a chain of nodes A → B → C or a fork
A ← B → C such that the middle node B is in ℤ (i.e., B is conditioned on), or 2) 𝓅 contains a
collider A → B ← C such that the collision node B is not in Z, and no descendant of B is in ℤ. If ℤ
blocks every path between two variables A and C, then A and C are d-separated, conditional on
ℤ, and thus are independent conditional on ℤ.” To state it differently, no causal effect flows
between variables A and C once they are d-separated. It should be noted that a minimal
sufficiency set of ℤ is all that is required and the causal flow for complicated causal structures
does not have to be blocked at every chain, fork, or collider nodes (Hünermund & Bareinboim,
2019; Morgan & Winship, 2013; Pearl et al., 2016). DAGs and d-separation rules are
foundational cornerstones upon which do-calculus was built and provides two fundamental
benefits: a) formulates critical assumptions in a way that aligns with how the investigator
hypothesis the causal relationships; and b) allows the investigator to answer particular causal
queries in a systematic way. Additionally, d-separation helps identify the sufficiency set of
variables that is needed to block to ensure no causal flow exists between two variables.
However, the question remains on which variables should be included in the analysis to
begin with for which the graphical causal model should be evaluated and the do-calculus tools
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applied. This important consideration has often been given scant attention. The scholarship on
this topic has contradictory recommendations and is the main focus of this research.

Problem of Interest
This research reviews and critiques the research and scholarship on the topic of covariate
selection in regression analysis and in the propensity score estimation modeling step in the
propensity score method (PSM). Among the steps to conduct the propensity score method,
covariates included in estimating the propensity scores have not been adequately studied
(Brookhart et al., 2006), though there is much attention provided to this topic recently (Ding et
al., 2017; Ding & Miratrix, 2014; Steiner et al., 2010; VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele &
Robins, 2007; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). Steiner et al. (2010), note that the covariates that
impact both the treatment assignment and the outcome of interest, confounders, are often
included while acknowledging the difficulty in identifying true confounders with certainty.
VanderWeele and Shpitser note the difference between a confounder variable and the process of
confounding that leads to bias (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2013). Another set of covariates that
are often controlled for, to address selection bias, are the ones that are highly correlated with the
treatment assignment (Steiner et al., 2010). They note that to effectively address selection bias in
observational studies, the true confounders have to be controlled for in propensity score
estimation modeling to satisfy the strong ignorability assumption. Contrary to variable inclusion
criteria used in statistical modeling techniques, which tends to advocate for parsimony so as to
not over-fit the model, the methods for estimating propensity scores generally have relied on
including all available pre-treatment covariates strategy so as to get the most information into the
estimated propensity score and to balance the treated and untreated groups on observed
covariates. This has resulted in a non-prudent approach of covariate inclusion in the logistic
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regression models to estimating propensity score. This is consistent with what Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) initially proposed and since has been advocated by Rubin (2009) who stated there
is no reasonable justification of not including measured pre-treatment covariates while
estimating the propensity score.

Is it Necessary to Control for Everything we can Control for?
As such, this literature review provides additional insight into criteria that should be
employed while selecting covariates to be included in regression analysis or in the propensity
score estimation model in PSM. The analytic focus on causal graphs developed by Pearl (1995)
provides another approach to studying causal inferences. Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and the
application of direction separation (d-separation) rules have shown that depending on the causal
flow, certain confounders (i.e., colliders), when included in the propensity score estimation
process or regression analysis, introduce bias and impact the consistency and efficiency of the
causal effect estimates (Lübke et al., 2020). However, not including these covariates results in
consistent causal effect estimate (Pearl, 2009b; Shrier, 2008; Sjölander, 2009). Using examples
from various social science fields, Morgan and Winship (2013) show that once the investigator
has a hypothetical causal graph, d-separation rules can be applied to the graph to identify a
minimal set ℤ that ought to be sufficient to estimate the causal flow of interest. The causal graph
shown in Figure 6 is from Morgan and Winship (2013).
In Figure 6, covariate C can be considered an instrumental variable. Covariates A and B
impact treatment D and have a common exogenous confounder U1. Similarly, Covariates A and
F impact the outcome variable Y and have a common exogenous confounder U2. Now, to
estimate the causal effect of D on Y, all other direct and indirect, forward and backward causal
flows between D and Y have to be blocked. Note, that, we cannot do anything about U1 and U2 as
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they are not observed in the data. The different causal pathways in this diagram between D and Y
are listed here: 1) D ← A ← U1 → F → Y ; 2) D ← B ← U2 → A ← U1 → F → Y; and 3) D ← C →
H → Y. Now, based on d-separation rules stated previously both these backdoor paths can be
blocked by controlling for (or conditioning on) either A and B or by condition on F. However,
we will always have to condition either on variable C or variable H to block the D ← C → H → Y
pathway. Now, even if data is available on all the observed covariates {A, B, C, F, G, H}, any set
ℤ that contains the following subsets of nodes ought to be sufficient to block the extraneous noncausal flow between D and Y: {A, B} or {F} can block paths D ← A ← U1 → F → Y and ) D ← B
← U2 → A ← U1 → F → Y, whereas {C}, {H} can block the path D ← C → H → Y. Hence, there
are four sufficient sets ℤ that can accomplish this: {A, B, C}, {A, B, H}, {F, C}, {F, H}.

Figure 6. Causal Graph example from Morgan and Winship
Note: U1 and U2 are unmeasured covariates while A, B, F, G, C, and H are measured covariates. We are interested in
estimating the causal effect of D → Y.

Controlling for a "broader set of covariates", {A, B, C, F, G, H} in our example, makes
sense when measurements have zero cost, and the researcher has unlimited time to measure the
covariates. Additionally, there is an assumption that the covariates are recorded without any
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measurement error and with a broader set of covariates there are more opportunities for
measurement error for the covariates. These considerations are not realistic and result in biasamplification of causal estimates and increased variability of the causal estimates. In practice,
one cannot afford to control for everything that can possibly be measured, and cost-sufficiency
and efficiency considerations demand some domain models. As Pearl states, “Controls give the
feeling of specificity, of precision…But sometimes you can control for too much. If you have
identified a sufficient set of de-confounders in your diagram, gathered data on them, and
properly adjusted for them, then you have every right to say that you have computed the causal
effect estimate (provided, of course, that you can defend your causal diagram on scientific
grounds.)” (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 139).
Tremendous progress has been made in the past two decades in the field of causal
inference with the infusion of DAGs and other potential outcome framework methods.
Numerous studies in the fields of economics and epidemiology have adopted DAGs for various
purposes such as addressing measurement bias (Hernan & Cole, 2009), recognizing limitations
of traditional regression approaches in longitudinal studies (Moodie & Stephens, 2010),
detecting direction of unmeasured confounding bias (VanderWeele et al., 2008), identifying
confounding variables (Howards et al., 2012), and developing synergism in the sufficientcomponent-cause framework (VanderWeele & Robins, 2007). However, a preliminary literature
search suggests that little analytic attention has been paid to DAGs in education research and the
lack of DAGs application in the education setting has been conspicuous.
This may be due to the fact that, though DAGs can help in causal framework
communication and are robust as they do not assume a functional form, the main drawback of
this approach is that the underlying causal structure has to be known, through theory or expert
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judgement, which sometimes can be challenging. Also, in social science research based on prior
research or theoretical considerations, there could be variables that the investigator knows is vital
to the model but are not measured and hence not available to be included in the causal graph, in
regression analysis, or while computing the propensity score. The causal graph approach, though
very useful when the underlying causal structure is known, can be challenging to apply when the
subject matter knowledge is limited or there are data limitations on various variables.
VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) proposed a novel method, known as the disjunctive cause
criterion, for covariate selection that is based on DAGs but can be used when the underlying
causal structure is unknown or when the investigator has limited subject matter knowledge. The
approach assumes that the researcher knows if the covariate is a cause of a treatment or that of
the outcome, and if the answer to either of the questions is “yes,” then recommends including the
confounder in the analysis. This recommendation was further updated by VanderWeele (2019)
when he proposed the modified disjunctive cause criterion. The updated recommendations
addressed instrumental variables and proxy variables for the unmeasured variable.
The following section enumerates the purpose of this research in further detail.

Purpose of This Study
The purpose of this study is to extend the growing research tradition of employing causal
graphs to identify a parsimonious, yet sufficient, set of covariates in regression analysis, and
while estimating the propensity score in PSM, that would yield the most efficient and consistent
causal effect estimate. As discussed before, DAGs were developed in the field of computer
science (Pearl, 1995; Shpitser, 2020) but since have been championed by an increasing number
of epidemiologists (Ding et al., 2017; Hernan & Cole, 2009; VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele
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et al., 2008; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011) and a small, but rising, number of economists in
their own disciplines (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019).
Analyses based on five systematic reviews (Ali et al., 2015; Lonjon et al., 2017;
Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018) that studied application of PSM
across the medical and social science domains (888 individual studies included in the five
systematic review studies) indicated that many systematic reviews did not report descriptive
statistics on the number of covariates included in the propensity score estimation model. Two
systematic reviews (Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Lonjon et al., 2017) reported descriptive statistics
on the number of covariates included in the PS estimation models in the underlying PSM studies.
They reported that the number of variables in the final model ranged from three to 41 covariates.
The covariates are often classified as: a) instrumental variables – ones that only impact treatment
assignment; b) confounder variables – ones that impact both the treatment assignment and
outcome variable; c) variables that only impact the outcome; and d) variables that do not impact
either one directly.
Unlike regression analysis where parsimony of the model is considered paramount so as
to not over-specify the model and safeguard against multicollinearity and its adverse impact, in
practice the investigators tend to include any variables that are available in the propensity score
estimation model. This approach seems to be predominantly shaped by the champions of the
PSM methods (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) and is followed mainly due to the lack of specific
guidelines on which variables to include in regression analysis or in the propensity score
estimation model in PSM (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). Though the DAG-based variable
selection guidelines are more selective as the underlying data generation structure is considered,
the requirement to successfully implement the DAG-based approach requires the investigator to
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know the underlying data-generation structure, which may be a very high threshold to satisfy in
social science disciplines. This renders DAG-based approaches less practical in social science
fields. To overcome these shortcomings, VanderWeele and Shpitser proposed a new covariate
selection criterion known as the disjunctive cause criterion in 2011. The disjunctive cause
criterion is DAG-based but assumes the investigator does not have a complete understanding of
the underlying data-generation structure. The disjunctive cause criterion is based on the partial
knowledge whether a variable impacts the treatment, the outcome, or both which is a much lower
threshold of domain knowledge expected from an investigator.

Figure 7. Causal Graph considered by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011)
Note: U1 and U2 are unmeasured covariates while C1, C2, and C3 are measured covariates. Causal effect of interest is
A → Y.

This study introduced these novel DAG-based covariate selection methods to the field of
education. Figure 7 shows the causal model that VanderWeele and Shpitser considered in their
original 2011 article introducing the disjunctive cause criterion. They considered instrumental
variables, C3, confounder variable, C1, and a variable C2 that impacts only the outcome Y via
unobserved variables U1 and U2 in the causal model for estimating the impact of A on Y. The C2
confounder covariate forms a “M-structure” with unobserved covariates and can be considered a
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collider per the definition set forth by Pearl (2013) in the SCM. Inclusion of the collider
covariates in the propensity score estimation process or regression analysis results in inconsistent
causal estimates and excluding them results in a more stable causal estimate that is robust
(Shrier, 2008; Sjolander, 2009; Pearl, 2010b). VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) show
mathematically and empirically that the confounder selection based on DAGs can be used when
the underlying causal structure is unknown or when the researcher has limited subject matter
knowledge. The approach assumes the researcher knows with a certain degree of confidence that
the covariate in the causal model is a cause of the treatment, A, or that of the outcome, Y. If the
answer to either of the questions is “yes,” then the disjunctive cause criterion recommends
including the covariate in the analysis. In Figure 7, confounder C1 and instrumental variable C3
would be included in the disjunctive sufficient set, but not C2 as it is not connected to either the
treatment or the outcome.
VanderWeele updated the disjunctive cause criterion recommendation in 2019
(VanderWeele, 2019) to include specific recommendations related to instrumental variables and
proxy variables for the unmeasured true confounder variables. Figure 8 shows the causal model.
The model shows an instrumental variable, Z, a confounder variable, C, and an unmeasured
confounder variable, U1, and a variable, B, that only impacts the outcome variable, Y. The
unmeasured true confounder variable, U1, has a proxy variable, P1. The unmeasured true
confounder variable, U1, impacts only the outcome Y in the causal model for estimating the
impact of treatment, T, on Y. It should be noted that P1 does not directly impact the treatment
variable, T, or the outcome, Y. According to the modified disjunctive cause criterion, caution
must be exercised in controlling for the instrumental variable while the proxy of any unmeasured
true confounder should be controlled for.
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Figure 8. Causal graph showing data generation structure
Note. Causal Graph depicting an instrumental variable, Z, a true confounder, C, an unmeasured true confounder, U1,
a proxy for the unmeasured true confounder, P1, and a variable that only impacts the outcome variable, B. T and Y
are the treatment and outcome variables, respectively.

However, the updated covariate selection recommendations still leave several questions
unanswered. The recommendation to include the proxy variable of a true unmeasured
confounder at the first place has not been empirically investigated, say by a simulation study.
Secondly, the robustness of the recommendation to include the proxy variable of a true
unmeasured confounder when the hypothesized relationship of the unmeasured variable with the
treatment and outcome is false has not been investigated. Prior research suggests that if a
covariate is true confounder, its proxy must be controlled for; otherwise, it should not be
controlled for as that would increase bias (Pearl, 2013; VanderWeele, 2019), thus impacting the
consistency of the causal estimate. What if, based on prior research or theory, the investigator
does not know if an unmeasured variable is truly a confounder but only impacts either the
treatment or the outcome variable, but not both. In such situations, should its proxy still be
controlled in regression analysis or in propensity score estimation modeling? Thirdly, not all
proxy variables are equal, i.e., an unmeasured covariate may have strong and weak proxies. Does
the strength of the relationship of the unmeasured true confounder and its proxy variable have
any impact on the inclusion recommendation? Finally, many variables in social sciences are
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plagued with measurement error, and proxy variables are no exception (Lubotsky & Wittenberg,
2006). The robustness of the recommendation to include proxy variables has not been studied for
proxy variables plagued with different amounts of measurement errors. The sample size of 2,000
units employed by the VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) is quite large and the effectiveness of
the new covariate selection criteria on samples of different sizes, especially small samples have
not been studied. Large sample size essentially rules out any sampling error and the causal
estimate is not impacted by these issues. However, smaller samples are not uncommon in social
science research and the viability of their proposal has not been tested with smaller sample sizes.
De Winter et al. (2016) summarize the findings of various meta-synthesis studies and note that
sample sizes employed by social scientists in various studies vary substantially, with the lower
quartile, median, and upper quartiles also varying wildly. However, the sample sizes in social
science studies typically range in the tens and hundreds and not in thousands. To address all
questions listed above, four Monte Carlo simulation studies will be conducted. The studies will
primarily investigate the modified disjunctive cause criterion recommendations (VanderWeele,
2019).
Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation of various topics that are essential to this
research while making a case for a need for this study. The specifics of the four simulation
studies are provided in chapter 3. The results from the four simulation studies and its
implications are described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 addresses the limitations of this research and
next steps for further research on this topic.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The focus of this research is to critically evaluate covariate selection criteria employed by
practitioners to draw causal inference from observational data. To that effort, this chapter
describes two main frameworks that deal with observational data and causal inferences before
focusing on the covariate selection approach proposed by VanderWeele (2019), the modified
disjunctive cause criterion. The two frameworks are Rubin’s potential outcome (PO) framework
and Pearl’s structural causal model (SCM) framework (Pearl, 1995; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
Each framework is described briefly to provide the reader a working knowledge to understand
this research. Within the PO framework, this research concentrates on the propensity score
method (PSM) which is explained briefly. The first step of PSM, the propensity score estimation,
and primarily the covariate selection step within the first step is of primary interest as cohesive
recommendations for covariate inclusion was lacking till recently (Brookhart et al., 2006). The
chapter also briefly describes Pearl’s SCM framework, including directed acyclic graphs (DAG)
and the d-separation rules. A section is dedicated to cataloguing the different types of biases
common in observational data and the analytic derivations by Pearl (2013) quantifying these
biases. Next section describes the four covariate selection approaches commonly employed by
practitioners – the minimal set approach, outcomes only approach, treatment only approach, and
the union set approach. Finally, VanderWeele and Shpitser’s disjunctive cause criterion
(VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011), which is a union set approach to covariate selection, is
described. The revisions to the disjunctive cause criterion proposed by VanderWeele in 2019,
known as the modified disjunctive cause criterion, had two main updates – one to exclude
instrumental variables to control for a type of bias, Z-bias, and the other to include proxy variable
of an unmeasured true confounder to control for the confounder bias (VanderWeele, 2019). The
primary focus of this research is to critically evaluate the recommendation to include proxy
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variables of unmeasured true confounders. However, I begin with the basics, describing causeand-effect research questions, causal queries, randomized control trials (RCTs), and study
designs associated with observational studies. This is followed by a section which describes the
steps taken to identify and retrieve relevant literature for review. The last section of this chapter
provides a succinct summary of the entire chapter along with a pictorial representation, a concept
map, of the different elements of this research and explains how the elements are interconnected.

The Basics
Causal-and-Effect Research Questions
Cause-and-effect questions are of enormous interest to researchers in social science
disciplines such as economics, epidemiology, education, social work to name a few. In the field
of education these types of questions are omnipresent and of tremendous interest to academic
researchers, school administrators, teachers, instructors, and other practitioners, as well as
county, state, and federal policy makers. Morgan and Winship (2013) note that the casual
questions are of the basic form: a) Does X cause Y? b) If X causes Y, how large is the effect of X
on Y? and c) Is the size of this effect large relative to the effect of other causes of Y?
A few causal questions typically explored in education research are listed here:
Compared to public schools, do private catholic schools cause an increase in student’s reading or
mathematics ability (Noell, 1982)? Is a college degree attributed to an increase in a person’s
life-long earning (James & Alsalam, 1993)? How does a college degree affect a person’s lifelong earning compared to a trade-school diploma (Cappellari, 2012)? Does attending a SATpreparation class impact one’s SAT score (Park & Becks, 2015)? How much of a student’s
success in subsequent mathematics courses can be attributed to a specific developmental-course
(Okimoto & Heck, 2014)? Do educational and political resources influence minority student
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success (Polinard et al., 1995)? The words in bold in these research questions – cause, attributed,
affect, impact, influence – are the causal terms that make them causal questions. It requires
counterfactual thinking on part of the researcher, as the subject of the research cannot exist in
two parallel universes at the same time, one in which they received the treatment (private school
education, college education, SAT-preparation classes, etc.) and one in which they did not.
Another common theme among all these questions is that they can be manipulated. The
manipulation can take the form of enrolling a student in a public school, private school,
university, trade school, SAT-preparation class, a developmental course, or allocating more
resources. This satisfies the basic requirement stated by statistician Holland (1986): “No
causation without manipulation.” It should be noted that recent work in the field of causal
science has expanded beyond this constraint to answer causal queries such as “Is there a genderbased wage gap?” Such discrimination queries are also causal in nature even though the two
groups formed based on gender are not manipulatable. Unlike experimentation, where precise
manipulation of a variable of interest is possible, in social sciences, doing so is often unethical,
impractical, or infeasible. All these result in a fundamental asymmetry in causal queries, where
one variable impacts another variable but not vice-versa, i.e., treatments results in a change in the
outcome and not the other way round. This asymmetry can be thought of as the causal flow from
one entity (treatment) to the other (outcome).

Figure 9. Simple depiction of “X causes Y”
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Causal Queries
The research questions articulated in spoken language must be translated into a
mathematical language so that it can be combined with data to answer causal queries (Pearl,
2018). Pearl notes that most of the language of science till the early twentieth century, till Sewall
Wright proposed path diagrams, were based on algebra, and lacked the specificity to articulate
causal queries. For example, the equal sign “ = ” used in algebra is symmetric by definition i.e.,
𝑌

any relationship depicted by the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎𝑋 also implies that 𝑋 = 𝑎 . Thus, the
fundamental asymmetry required by the causal queries, 𝑌 ← 𝑎𝑋, could not be articulated using
the most prevalent mathematical language, which was one of the main constraints that scientists
encountered (Pearl, 2018; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018) and is the main contributor of the adage,
“correlation is not causation”.
Pearl and his team at UCLA are credited with developing and formalizing the language to
depict causation (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019; Morgan & Winship, 2013; Pearl, 1995,
2009a, 2010a; Pearl et al., 2016; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018), in the 1990s, and have been
instrumental in the resulting causal revolution. This has resulted in an explosion of interest in
causal science across multiple disciplines in the past two decades. One of the features of the
causal language is the clear and concise articulation of the asymmetric causal queries using
graphs. The graph contains nodes, depicting variables or events, directed arrows “ → ”, depicting
assumed causal flows between nodes, and are typically acyclic in nature. Directed Acyclic
Graphs – DAGs in short, are tools to communicate the underlying data-generation process the
researcher believes the nature is relying on to assigns values to the variables. Pearl states, nature
can be considered as a society of listeners, where one variable listens to the other to determine its
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value. Only thing that matters is “who listens to whom” (Pearl, 2018). In Figure 9, the arrows
represent the assignment operator which implies that nature relies on X to assign value to Y.
Chapter 1 introduced some of the basic concept in the Structural Causal Model (SCM)
framework and later in this chapter, I take a more detailed look on various elements of the SCM
framework: 3-level hierarchy of causation, causal graphs, d-separation, back-door criterion,
front-door criterion, and do-calculus, proposed by Pearl and his team. For now I turn to the most
widely accepted tool across scientific disciplines for almost a century, since Ronald Fisher
proposed it in early nineteenth century (as cited Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018), to draw causal
inferences: the randomized control trial (RCT).

Randomized Control Trial (RCT)
As described in chapter 1, the randomized control trial (RCT), proposed by Fisher, is
considered the gold standard for inferring causal relationships between variables. Over multiple
trials, the process of random assignment into treatment and control groups, is thought to, on
average, balance the observed and unobserved covariates that impact the treatment assignment
(X) and the outcome of interest (Y). The random assignment ensures that no observed or
unobserved covariate, other than the treatment itself, is attributed to any changes observed in the
outcome of interest. However, in many situations, RCTs are unethical, impractical, or infeasible.
Additionally, many social science fields such as economics, epidemiology, and education rely
heavily on observational data stored in electronic records and collected using surveys or other
means.
In the past couple of decades many researchers from various disciplines – Donald Rubin
and Guido Imbens in the field of economics (Imbens, 2020; Imbens & Rubin, 2018; Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1983), Pearl in computer sciences (1995), and Hernan and VanderWeele (Hernán et al.,
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2004; VanderWeele et al., 2008) in the field of epidemiology, to name a few – have championed
different methods to make credible causal claims, determine unbiased causal effect estimates,
and represent causal relationships all using observational data. Formalized and advocated by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (as cited in Holland, 1986), the Potential Outcome (PO) framework, also
known as the counterfactual framework, is a statistical method that relies on creating conditions
that support causal claims primarily in observational studies. The framework is flexible enough
to accommodate several methods such as the Propensity Score Method (PSM), to balance control
and comparison groups, the Instrumental Variable Method (IVM) to control confounding, and
the Marginal Structural Models (MSM) to create “pseudo” populations that can be employed to
compare the effect of the cause variable on an outcome variable for groups at different levels of
treatment. These methods within the PO framework strive to make the two groups “similar” or
comparable on the confounders that impact X and Y and thus making members of the two groups
exchangeable with one another. This exchangeability ensures that the treatment assignment is
independent of the outcome. The next section briefly summarizes the different study designs
employed in the field of epidemiology to draw causal inferences.

Study Designs
Figure 10 shows a flowchart of study designs (adapted from Grimes & Schulz, 2002). It
shows the algorithm of classification of type of clinical research employed in the field of
epidemiology. While the flowchart illustrates research classification in the field of epidemiology,
this is equally applicable to other areas of inquiry. The study design is primarily based on four
criteria: a) did the investigator assign study participants to the treatment exposure? b) was the
participant assignment done randomly? c) is there a comparison group to compare to? and d)
what was the order of observation: treatment first, outcome first, or both at the same time?
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If the researcher assigns the study participants into the treatment or control conditions,
then the study is classified as an experimental study, else an observational study. If the
assignment is done based on certain criteria other than a random basis, then the study is
classified as a non-randomized controlled trial. If the participant assignment is done completely
randomly then it is classified as a randomized control trial.
Since the digital revolution in the last decades of the twentieth century, electronic records
(student records in education, patient records in healthcare industry, labor force records in
economics) are ubiquitous. These records are easy to access and contains a wealth of direct
measures (student GPA, SAT scores, demographics, course grades, etc.) and in many instances
vital indirect measures like survey responses or observational recordings. The omnipresence of
digital records combined with powerful statistical software programs, and a push towards more
accountability and documented proof of efficacy of programs have driven renewed interest in
finding answers to causal queries using this data. Studies based on data panels are known as
observational studies. If a comparison group is selected to be analyzed against the treatment or
exposure group the study is classified as an analytical study, or it is just a descriptive study if the
objective of the study is to just describe the data. Within analytical studies the main criterion for
classifying studies is the quantity of interest to the investigator. If the researcher observes the
exposure criterion first and is investigating the outcome i.e., moves forward in time using
inductive logic, then such studies are known as cohort studies. On the other hand, if the
researcher observes the outcome of interest first and to investigate the likely criterion that caused
that outcome i.e., moves backward in time using deductive logic, then such studies are known as
case-control studies. If the exposure and outcome are recorded at the same point in time, then
such studies are known as cross-sectional studies.
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Figure 10. Classification scheme of clinical research.
Note. Adapted from Grimes and Schulz (2002) with permission. (See, Appendix B)

Steps taken to Identify and Retrieve Relevant Literature for Review
The field of causal inference (CI) or causal science is vast and relevant to various social
science disciplines. The growth in the adaptation of causal inference philosophy is deeply
impacted by the traditions and prominent gatekeepers of the discipline. Most of the groundbreaking work that interested me originated in the Cognitive Systems Laboratory under Pearl,
Shpitser, and their team in the field of computer science. The most fascinating aspect of their
work was the transparency of assumptions that could be conveyed by clearly displaying them
using graphs; namely, Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Epidemiologists were early adopters of
DAGs and much of the real-world application and research regarding DAGs stemmed from
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epidemiology. Prominent researchers like Hernan, Robins, VanderWeele, and their team in the
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health have contributed immensely to the growth of DAGs
to draw causal inferences (CI) using observational data (Ding et al., 2017; Hernán et al., 2004;
VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele et al., 2008; VanderWeele & Robins, 2007; VanderWeele &
Shpitser, 2011). The fields of economics and statistics have, by and large, have not been keen to
adopt DAGs and have been fervent supporters of the Potential Outcome framework developed
by Rubin (1990) based on mathematician Neyman’s early proposal. Economists like Imbens
from the Stanford School of Business have been prominent champions of the PO framework.
More recently, researchers like Hünnermund from the Copenhagen Business School are
championing DAGs in the field of economics (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019). The usage of
potential outcomes framework – propensity score methods (PSM) in particular – is prevalent in
the field of education (Hahs-Vaughn & Onwuegbuzie, 2006; Steiner et al., 2010). Several
prominent researchers like Hahs-Vaughn, Fan, Bai, Clark, and others have advanced the
adoption of PSM. However, it should be noted that the adoption of DAGs is in its infancy in the
field of education, though scholars like Morgan and Winship have textbooks that can be
considered as introductory textbooks on this topic from an educational research perspective
(Morgan & Winship, 2013).

Topical Domains of this Research: Unique and Common Attributes
The primary objective of this research is to explore the niche area of DAG application in
covariate selection in observational studies to yield unbiased causal estimates using regression
analysis and propensity score methods. As described in Figure 11, the primary objective of this
literature search was to identify published articles and textbooks that provide a detailed
understanding of the PO and DAG frameworks, the commonalities, and unique attributes of both
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the frameworks and the hurdles in the adaptation of DAGs in various fields. It should be noted
that this is neither a systematic research synthesis nor a meta-analysis and the purpose is not to
conduct an exhaustive literature retrieval and review, but to be comprehensive and representative
of major developments in the identified niche area of covariate selection.

Figure 11. Venn Diagram showing topical domains

With that focus, the literature domains of causal inferences using observational data,
Rubin’s PO framework – Propensity Score Methods, and Pearl’s Causal Graph Framework –
DAGs were explored to find articles.
Within the DAG framework, several books were relied on to develop foundational
understanding of causal graphs and related methods (Halpern, 2016; Pearl et al., 2016; Pearl &
Mackenzie, 2018). Within the PO framework, books and articles such as (Austin, 2011; Imbens
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& Rubin, 2018; Pan & Bai, 2015) helped with getting a better understanding of propensity score
methods. Morgan and Winship’s book assisted with understanding the similarities and
differences between the DAG and PO frameworks (Morgan & Winship, 2013). The Table 2
describes the sources used to identify articles to be included in the body of literature for review.

Information Retrieval
For the sake of reproducibility, this section provides a clear and complete explanation of
the search criterion employed in literature identification, databases searched, and criteria utilized
to include or exclude studies that formed the basis of further review for the present study. Three
broad content areas – a) Drawing Causal Inferences from Observation data; b) Propensity Score
Methods; and c) Directed Acyclic Graphs – were selected to identify and retrieve an appropriate
body of literature for this study. Loosely following the steps summarized by Onwuegbuzie et al.
(2012) key search terms (keywords and phrases) related to the problem of interest were
identified. To be inclusive only the following terms were employed – “Propensity Score*” in the
body AND “Covariate* selection” in the Abstract of the article. The search term “Propensity
Score*” ensured the inclusion of “Propensity Score Methods” and “Propensity Score Analysis”
that is interchangeably used in the literature. Additionally, search term of “Covariate* selection”
ensure inclusion of singular and plural terms and helped restrict the articles to a manageable
number.
Manual search was performed within the retrieved articles to further identify articles that
specifically discussed methodological issues related to covariate selection in Propensity Score
Methods. Key terms related to Causal Graphs, such as – “Causal Graphs,” “Directed Acyclic
Graphs,” “DAGs” “Path Models” etc. – were deemed to be too restrictive for electronic searches
and manual searches were performed to identify these articles. For identifying articles related to
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covariate selection, key words such as “covariate selection*” “covariates + observational
studies,” “causal graphs + covariate selection,” “covariate selection + DAG,” etc. were used.
Reverse citation was found to be a very useful approach in finding relevant articles. Also,
bibliography provided in textbooks listed were a good source and so was chapters in the
handbook available for free download in the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) library web
site.

Electronic Search Strategies
The following electronic databases were identified as being appropriate to retrieve the
body of literature for this study: a) Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) database
using the EBCOHost search engine via UCF; b) American Psychological Association’s
PsycINFO database via UCF; and c) World of Science database via UCF. As most of the
research in the field of covariate selection with application of causal graphs has been conducted
in epidemiology and economics, it was important to include the World of Science database.
Additionally, Google Scholar search engine was also employed. In all the databases, searches
were limited to developments in the last two decades (past circa 2000).
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Table 2. Sources to Identify Articles to be Included in Literature Review
Sources
Academic
Databases
Other Online
Resources
Expert
Recommendations
Books and
Handbooks

Details
ERIC APA PsycInfo databases at UCF via Ebscohost; World of
Science database
Google Scholar
Drs. Hahs-Vaughn, Sivo, and Bai at UCF
The Book of Why by Pearl and Mackenzie
Causal Inference in Statistics - A Primer by Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell
Counterfactuals and Causal Inference by Morgan and Winship
Propensity Score Analysis - Fundamentals and Developments by Pan
and Bai
Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences by
Imbens and Rubin
a) Online discussion between various experts (J. Pearl, P.
Hunermund, M. Hernan) on the Twitter platform.
b) UCLA Cognitive Systems Laboratory
http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/jp_home.html
c) NIH library web site

Other

Other Search Strategies
Additionally, the following search strategies were also employed to identified relevant
literature: a) citation search by scholars in the field – looking for work done by key experts who
have been active in this niche area; b) ancestry searches – identifying additional articles from the
bibliography of a key article – had to be frequently employed because of the varied journals and
disciplines were the articles of interest were published.
Pearl’s structured causal model (SCM) framework is explained briefly in the following
section.

Pearl’s Structured Causal Models (SCM)
As discussed in chapter 1 and the initial part of this chapter, Pearl, and his team of
computer scientists –Shpitser, Barenboim, Tian, and others – at UCLA are credited with
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identifying the need for a formal language to articulate causation. While working on artificial
intelligence (AI) and studying how robots can learn from human cognition and causal reasoning,
the team developed the tools needed to communicate assumptions and articulate causal queries.
Probabilistic hierarchies and graphs were used to formulate the assumptions of underlying data
generation mechanism, and the d-separation rules and postulates, theorems, and lemmas of docalculus were used to articulate the causal queries. The rules and laws developed in the field of
causation were primarily based on well-established Bayesian Network probability rules. All
these elements together are referred to as the Structural Causal Methods (SCM) framework and
developed in the field of causal inference (CI) starting in the 1990s (Pearl, 1995, 2009a, 2010a;
Pearl et al., 2016; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Pearl notes that the SCM framework consists of
three elements: a) graphical models; b) structural equations; and c) counterfactual and
intervention logic (Pearl, 2018). In this section, the SCM framework’s fundamental elements are
summarized to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of this framework and its
application in covariate identification using causal graphs to draw causal inferences from
observational data. The graphical models encode what we know based on theory or prior
experience, while the counterfactuals tell us what we would like to know. The structural
equations form the mathematical language that combines the two. First, we turn to Pearl’s 3-level
hierarchy of causation before further exploring the SCM sections in detail.

Three-level Causal Hierarchy
A brief introduction to Pearl’s ladder of causation was provided in Chapter 1. The three
levels (rungs) of the ladder – association, intervention, and counterfactual – are related to the
three action verbs a researcher could perform, namely observe, or see is related to the first level
of association; do, intervene, or experiment is related to the second level of intervention; and
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imagine is related to the third level of counterfactual. The three levels help us answer different
types of questions, some causal and some noncausal. Pearl states that there exists a sharp
classification of causal information at the different levels of the causal hierarchy (Pearl, 2018).
Any questions at the lower rung of the ladder need information at that level or higher. For
example, to answer “what will happen to Y if I change X?” is an interventional type of question,
one that needs data at least at rung two or higher. Such questions cannot be answered purely by
examining associational data that resides in rung one of the causal ladders. Some of these
questions help us answer causal queries, while others do not.
The first rung of the causal ladder is known as the “association” rung, and there resides
the data. Data-centric questions such as “what observing X tells us about Y?” or “relationship
between X and Y?” can be answered using this rung of the ladder. Statistically, it is depicted by
conditional probability 𝑃 (𝑌 = 𝑦 | 𝑋 = 𝑥), 𝑃 (𝑦 | 𝑥) in short – the probability of observing y
given that x has occurred – the probability of y given x. Research questions such as can be
answered by the first rung of the ladder (Pearl, 2018). What does a symptom tell us about the
disease? What do the survey results tell us about the election results? or what does the purchase
of toothpaste tell us about sales of floss? The conditional probability is comparable to sub-setting
the dataset to account for observations where X = x, i.e., the variable X takes the value x – for
example the variable treatment (T) takes the value “not treated”. Statistical tools such as
regression, neural networks, and machine learning (ML), to name a few, are available to answer
such questions even after accounting for the influence of other covariates 𝑃 (𝑦 | 𝑥, 𝑧1 , 𝑧2 , 𝑧𝑛 ),
where 𝑧1 , 𝑧2 , 𝑧𝑛 are n covariates. If done correctly, the research can draw broader inferences
about the population.
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The second rung of the causal ladder is known as the “intervention” rung, and it helps us
answer the “what if I do…” type of questions. The responses to questions on the second rung
require the researcher to act, comparable to the actual experiments performed to ascertain the
laws in many scientific disciplines like physics and thermodynamics. For example, in physics,
the Ideal Gas Law is a combination of Boyle’s law, Amontons’s law, Charles’s law, and
Avogadro’s law. The Ideal Gas Law states that the relationship of pressure P, volume V, the
amount in moles n, and temperature T of gasses is summarized by the equation 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇,
where R is a constant. These fundamental laws were developed by manipulating one variable and
studying its impact on another variable while holding other variables constant. For example,
Boyle’s law studied the relationship between pressure P and volume V, while holding the amount
of gas in moles n and temperature T constant, and concluded that the pressure of the gas and its
volume are inversely related (𝑃. 𝑉 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡), stated differently, 𝑃(𝑉 | 𝑑𝑜(𝑃), 𝑛, 𝑇). The
do(P) function here depicts the targeted intervention on the pressure P variable to study its
impact on volume V for a given temperature T and amount of gas n. As stated in chapter 1, the
interventional probability given by do(T = t) implies that the entire population was subjected to
the targeted intervention. The interventional probability is different from the conditional
probability obtained by observing records where the T = t condition is met. In many fields, such
targeted intervention or experimentation is not practical or feasible; however, such targeted
intervention is still necessary to answer the question of the form – what will happen to Y if we do
this to X? In education, questions such as the following represent the second rung of the causal
ladder: what would happen to the overall graduation rate if every student enrolled in a remedial
math course? Such questions can be answered by conducting randomized experiments, say, by
randomly assigning a particular incoming cohort of students to take a remedial math course and
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observing their graduation rates. It cannot be inferred from just studying the graduation data
collected of students who self-selected into the remedial math course as there could be
systematic differences between students who choose to enroll in the course compared to those
who did not. The existence of systematic differences implies that there is covariates imbalance
that could impact the outcome, graduation, differently between the two groups. Hence, they are
not comparable to one another, i.e., the two groups are different and are not exchangeable.
The top rung of the causal ladder is known as the “counterfactual” rung, and it requires
retrospective thinking and helps us answer the “what if I had done…” or “what if this would
have happened instead…” type questions. It is commensurate to observing Y and thinking what
might have caused it – was it X? It requires the researcher to indulge in counterfactual thinking
to explore the why question. It could be stated as 𝑃 (𝑦𝑥 | 𝑥 ′ , 𝑦 ′ ), where 𝑃(𝑦𝑥 ) stands for
probability of observing the value Y = y after fixing the value of X = x and given that what we
observed were 𝑥 ′ and 𝑦 ′ . In education, questions such as: what is the probability that Joe would
get a grade “A” in the Calculus I course (y) if he took a remedial math course (x), given that he
got a grade of “B” (𝑦 ′ ) and did not take the remedial math course (𝑥 ′ ). In reality, what happened
is different from what we are interested in, and it requires counterfactual thinking.
The ladder of causation is based on a mathematical foundation. It has been algebraically
proven that one cannot answer a question at a lower rung unless one has information at a higher
rung (Pearl et al., 2016). It is modular and hierarchical, and the impact of the action (do) cannot
be inferred from observation only (conditioning), i.e., 𝑃(𝑦 | 𝑑𝑜 (𝑥) ≠ 𝑃(𝑦 | 𝑥)). This modular
and hierarchical nature prevents us from stating that association is causation. Pearl states that
“Counterfactuals are placed at the top of the causal hierarchy because they subsume
interventional and associational questions. If we have a model that can answer counterfactual
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queries, we can also answer questions about interventions and observations. Likewise,
associational questions can be answered once we can answer interventional questions. The
hierarchy is directional, with the top-level being the most powerful one” (Pearl, 2018, p. 1).
Next, I turn to the causal inference engine, the overall framework that brings different
elements together to get a response to causal queries from the data. The engine encodes the
current data generation hypothesis based on experience using graphical models. It then combines
it with causal queries and data to find a statistical estimate of the causal effect.

Causal Inference Engine
The heart of the SCM is the causal inference engine. The causal inference engine is a set
of inputs and outputs that begins with the theoretical or practical knowledge about the system
being studied. The inputs and outputs are formalized and depicted in the form of graphical
models G. Finally, these graphical models are then combined with causal query Q to derive the
causal estimand (Latin for that which is to be estimated (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). The causal
estimand is the recipe for answering the causal query. The causal estimand has the language in
the second rung of the causal ladder, namely, the causal estimand has the do-operator in its
notation, P (Y | do(X)). As noted earlier, the data D resides in the first rung of the causal ladder.
The causal estimand is converted to the statistical estimand, which is free of the do-operator
through the process of identification. The statistical estimand can be combined with the data
through the process of estimation, as the statistical estimand is expressed in the language of
probability, specifically, the conditional probability P(Y | X), to achieve the causal estimate, an
answer to the causal query. The causal inference engine takes three main inputs – the
assumptions, causal query, and the data – and through the process of identification and
estimation, based on do-calculus, derives the causal estimate of interest. Figure 12 is an
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illustration of how the different entities are combined. More detailed illustrations can be found in
several other sources (Pearl, 2018; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).
Any causal inquiry starts with some existing prior knowledge that resides in the
researcher’s mind. This information is accumulated through practical experiences or by studying
the existing literature on the subject. The current understanding impacts the variables included in
the study, though other considerations such as data availability play a significant role. This
information is implicit in the researcher's mind, denoted in Figure 12 by the dotted oval box, and
typically needs a formal articulation to communicate effectively so that the research is
reproducible by other scientific community members.
Causal models are used to communicate which variable listens to other variables in the
model being studied. It can be done using structural equations, logical statements, or graphical
models. The graphical models developed by Pearl and his team is covered in greater detail in the
next section, are easy to communicate and make the assumptions easier to comprehend due to
their transparency (Pearl et al., 2016). The graphical model G is the formal articulation of the
assumptions, i.e., the items that the researcher deems worthy of including in the study and hence
are endogenous to the model. It also clearly articulates the various paths different effects, causal
and noncausal, can take to reach the treatment or exposure to the outcome of interest. These
paths can be blocked to “separate” the effect of one variable from flowing to the other using dseparation rules and result in what Pearl calls testable implications, so that a set of
independencies are created that should be reflected in the data. If there is no path connecting two
variables, then those two variables should be independent, and the data should reflect that reality.
The causal queries are the research questions of interest and should be formulated on the
second rung of the causal ladder. The causal query is combined with the assumptions articulated
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using the graphical models to provide a causal, a recipe to answer the causal query. The causal
estimand is on the second rung of the causal ladder, and hence it is formulated using the dooperator – interventional probability. Through the process of identification, causal estimands are
converted into statistical estimands by specifying the causal assumptions in the causal model.
The process entails removing the causal query language of the do-operator from the causal
estimand, which is accomplished using the probability axioms as well as the theorems and
lemmas proposed by Pearl et al. in the do-calculus (Pearl et al., 2016).

Figure 12. Illustration of the causal inference engine of SCM

A causal estimate is considered identifiable if we can convert it to a statistical estimate –
if P(Y | do(X)) can be converted into P(Y | X). The goal is to convert the interventional quantity,
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which is typically obtained through experiments by intervening on a particular treatment, to a
conditional quantity obtained through observational data.
It should be noted that some of the causal queries cannot be estimated if the data on
certain variables are not available irrespective of how much data we may have on other variables
and hence may require us to refine our causal model. It should be noted that this step assumes
that the underlying data generation process is accurately represented in the causal graph. The
next step is to combine the statistical estimand with the observational data using rules of
probability through a process known as estimation. The resulting statistical estimate is the
response to the causal query and is a function of the random noise due to sample size and
measurement error. Assuming the underlying data generation process is accurately represented
by the causal graph and adequate data without measurement error is available, the causal effect
can be estimated.
Next, I present the graphical models and their similarities with Bayes’ probability rule,
which Pearl calls the first tool of the seven tools of causal inference.

Graphical Models
Graphical tools were briefly introduced in the first section of chapter 2 and are primarily
used to encode the causal assumptions clearly and compactly to the readers for transparency and
testability. Graphical models provide transparency to what the researcher believes is the
underlying data-generation mechanism, i.e., which variable is listening to which other variable or
variables in nature. The compatibility of the observed patterns in the data – conditional
independence – can be verified against the data-generation mechanism. Pearl’s team was
instrumental in developing Bayesian Networks, which effectively captured the probabilistic
knowledge in graphical form by bringing graphs and probabilities together. Bayes’ probability
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rule connects forward and backward conditional probabilities with event probabilities. For
example, if there are two events A and B, where A is the cause of B, i.e., 𝐴 → 𝐵, and the
probabilities of A and B are provided by P(A) and P(B) and P(A|B) is the conditional probability
of A given that we know B occurred. P(B|A) is the conditional probability of B given we know
that A occurred. Then, Bayes’ rule states that:
𝑃(𝐴)
) (𝑃(𝐵|𝐴))
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) = (
𝑃(𝐵)
The probability of a cause A happened given that we have observed an outcome B, i.e., P(A | B),
can be calculated if we know the other three probabilities. Bayesian networks are nothing but
directed acyclic graphs with nodes representing random variables. Pearl notes that axioms of
conditional independence and the axioms of graph separation shared a common core, and hence
conditional independence could be represented using graphs (Pearl, 2018). He notes that
conditional independence was like graphoids, a term coined by Pearl and Paz (1985) based on
graph theory, that state that a variable x is irrelevant to another variable y, given a set of a third
variable z. They note, “The theory of graphoids uncovers the axiomatic basis of probabilistic
dependencies and ties it to vertex-separation conditions in graphs. The defining axioms can also
be viewed as inference rules for deducing which propositions are relevant to each other, given a
certain state of knowledge” (Pearl & Paz, 1985, p. 2). All assumptions are encoded graphically.
For example, let us assume we have a graphical model, as shown in Figure 13. The nodes, circles
with variable names, depict the variables or events endogenous to the model, i.e., being
considered in the model. Some variables are not included in the model, i.e., they are considered
exogenous to the model and are typically not shown or shown with dotted circles around them as
unmeasured variables, U’s. They are also referred to as unobserved background variables.
Additionally, note that the causal effect flows along the directed edge in the direction of the
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arrowhead (𝑋 → 𝑌). In contrast, the noncausal effect flows in the opposite direction, i.e., in the
opposite direction of the arrowhead (𝑋 ← 𝑌).
The graphical model implies that the investigator assumes the causal flow depicted by the
graph in nature. For the Figure 13 investigator assumes, the variable Y listens to both variables X
and Z to derive its value as it has two incoming arrows. Variable Y is known as the “child” of
“parent” variables X and Z.

Figure 13. Graphical model depicting relationships between X, Y, Z, and W.

Similarly, the variable X listens to the variable Z in this model to derive its value, whereas
the variable W listens to both variables X and Y, but not to variable Z directly to derive its value.
These paths such as 𝑍 → 𝑋, 𝑍 → 𝑌, 𝑋 → 𝑊, 𝑌 → 𝑊, and 𝑋 → 𝑌 are known as causal pathways,
and severing a particular path separates the vertex. Pearl notes that the model's testability stems
from the fact that graphical models' directed edges can be separated using an operation known as
d-separation, which is the fundamental connection between causes and probabilities (Hünermund
& Bareinboim, 2019; Pearl, 2018; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Like in Bayesian networks, if two
nodes are connected, the "child" node's probability depends on that of the "parent" node and
parent node or nodes only. If there are no arrows between nodes, that means that the two
variables are independent. Within the Bayesian network, for each node xi, there is a conditional
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probability distribution P (xi | pai), where pai is the parent of node xi. The Bayesian network
represents a joint distribution using the chain rule of probability, as shown here:
𝑃(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ) = ∏(𝑥𝑖 | 𝑝𝑎𝑖 )
𝑖

Next, I discuss how the graphs can be represented as structural equations.

Structural Equations
As noted, the graphical model is an easier way to communicate a representation of the
researcher’s existing knowledge based on experience or theoretical understanding. The variables
included in the graph represent the variables that the researcher considers endogenous to the
model. The endogenous variables need not necessarily be an exhaustive list of all the variables
impacting the outcome variable. Variables are left out of the model due to several reasons.
Additionally, the endogenous variables in the model are not typically deterministic and have a
random component that is typically not shown but could be shown if the researcher chooses to.
The incoming arrowhead into a node indicates the variable at the edge's arrowhead has a
“parent” or listens to the variable at the tail of the edge to derive its value. The structural
equations underlying the diagram of the causal graph in Figure 13 is as shown below.
𝑍 = 𝑓𝑍 (𝑈𝑧 )
𝑋 = 𝑓𝑋 (𝑍, 𝑈𝑋 )
𝑌 = 𝑓𝑌 (𝑋, 𝑍, 𝑈𝑌 )
𝑊 = 𝑓𝑊 (𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑈𝑊 )
The structural equations can be interpreted as follows: a) nature first assigns the value Uz
to Z based purely on some random value that impacts Z, using the function fz; b) it then takes the
value of Z and combines it with a random component of X, UX, using the function fX; c) next, it
takes the value of Z and X and combines it with a random component, UY, using the function fY;
and d) finally, nature takes the values of Y and X and combines it with a random component, UW,
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using the function fW. If the arrow between X and Z was deleted, i.e., if X and Z were d-separated,
we could “fix” X’s value to say x, and the equations above would be changed from 𝑋 =
𝑓𝑋 (𝑍, 𝑈𝑋 ) to X = x. This process is also known as “wiping out” equations in some fields and is
commensurate to intervening using the do-operator (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019).

d-Separation
As noted in chapter 1, in a graphical model, three vertices can be connected in three
different ways, three nodes or junctions with two directed edges: a) as a chain (𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶); as
a fork (𝐴 ← 𝐵 → 𝐶); or as a collider (𝐴 → 𝐵 ← 𝐶), where the covariate B is also known as the
mediator variable, confounding variable, and the collider variable, respectively. Pearl calls these
junctions, keyholes – they open through the door that separates the first and the second rung of
the causal ladder (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018), and the rules of d-separation help us open the door
to move from the first rung of the ladder to the second rung. Chapter 1 also provides a more
detailed account of how d-separation or conditional independence can be achieved for each of
the three types of joints. To summarize, for the chain setup, d-separation can be achieved by
conditioning on the mediator variable. In our example, conditioning on variable B would result in
marginal independence of A and C, i.e., 𝐴 ⊥ 𝐶 for different levels of B. Conditioning on the
mediator variable, B, blocks the effect of A from flowing to C. Similarly, for a fork-set-up, dseparation can be achieved by conditioning on the confounder variable as well. Variables A and
C have a common cause (parent) B, and without this common cause, both A and C may start with
being independent and locking the effect by conditioning on the common parent blocks statistical
correlation between the two variables. However, for a collider set-up, conditioning on the
collider variable, or descendants of the collider variable, opens a causal pathway, whereas not
conditioning on the collider variable keeps the causal pathway closed. In our example, both A
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and C start as independent from one another, but have a common outcome. Suppose we know
that the outcome happened and the value of either A or C, it is easier to predict the other
variable’s value. Thus, conditioning on the common outcome B induces a spurious correlation
where none existed before inducing a bias known as the “collider bias.”
Additionally, conditioning the descendants (or proxies) of a variable is like “partially
controlling” for the intermediary variable itself and controlling for the descendent of a mediator
or confounding covariate partially closes the flow while controlling for descendants of a collider
partially opens the causal flow (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). For longer chains such as 𝐴 → 𝐵 ←
𝐶 → 𝐷 → 𝐸 ← 𝐹 → 𝐺 → 𝐻, only conditioning on one of the mediator variables (D or G) or
confounding variables (C or F) would stop the causal flow from A to H. In contrast, conditioning
on the collider variables (B or E) would open the causal flow.
As noted in the d-separation section in chapter 1, based on these three rules, Pearl et al.
define d-separation formally as follows, “A path 𝓅 is blocked by a set of nodes in ℤ if and only
if: 1) 𝓅 contains a chain of nodes A → B → C or a fork A ← B → C such that the middle node B
in ℤ (i.e., B is conditioned on), or 2) 𝓅 contains a collider A → B ← C such that the collision
node B is not in Z, and no descendant of B is in ℤ. If ℤ blocks every path between two variables
A and C, then A and C are d-separated, conditional on ℤ, and thus are independent conditional on
ℤ” (Pearl et al., 2016, p. 46).
All causal pathways are blocked between two nodes when they are d-separated. It should
be noted that a minimal sufficiency set of ℤ is all it takes, and the causal flow for complicated
causal structures does not have to be blocked at every chain, fork, or collider node (Hünermund
& Bareinboim, 2019; Morgan & Winship, 2013). DAGs and d-separation rules are foundational
cornerstones upon which the back-door criterion, the front-door criterion, and do-calculus are
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built. Additionally, it helps identify the sufficiency set of variables needed to block all pathways
to ensure that no causal flow exists between two variables.
The nodes in a causal graph (xi) rely on their parents (pai) for their values. This process is
known as the causal mechanism, and it is assumed to be modular, i.e., P(xi | pai) ⊥ P(xj | paj),
where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and all interventions are local. Suppose we intervened on a specific node, i.e., fixed
the value of a particular variable to the desired value. In that case, it is assumed that action does
not impact the causal mechanism of any other node in the causal graph. This assumption is
known as the modularity assumption, invariance assumption, independent mechanism
assumption, or autonomy assumption. Additionally, Pearl notes that graphical models are not
dependent on the distribution of the underlying variables.
Next, I turn to the connection between graphical models and mathematical functions
behind what is included in the graph (arrows and lack of arrows) using the same graph in Figure
13.

Back-door Criterion
Effects, causal and noncausal, flow along the edges connecting nodes irrespective of the
arrowheads’ direction and are the fundamental reason for confounding. The paths from treatment
to outcome along the direction of the arrowhead carry causal effects while the paths that allow
flow opposite to the direction of the arrowheads carry noncausal effects. The former is called the
front-door paths, while the latter is called back-door paths. In essence, the back-door criterion
implies that all paths that carry noncausal information from the treatment variable to the outcome
variable, via the back-door, should be blocked by conditioning on covariates along the back-door
path. It is considered the most straightforward approach to unconfound two variables. The basic
premise is simple: stop back-door paths from the treatment to the outcome that carry the
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noncausal effects so that the only remaining flow between the two variables would be the one
through the front-door, i.e., the causal flow. The back-door criterion is considered sufficient to dseparate the treatment and outcome variables, hence identifying the causal effect (Morgan &
Winship, 2013; Pearl et al., 2016) and is, in essence, all the d-separation rules in action.
Morgan et al. summarize the implementation of the back-door criterion into two steps.
Step 1: if the underlying causal graph, the data-generation process, is known, the first step is to
identify unblocked noncausal back-door paths between the treatment and outcome variables.
Step 2: identify an appropriate candidate set of covariates, ideally a minimal set, that would
block all identified back-door pathways. For example, Figure 14 (A) shows the causal graph, G,
how nature assigns values for the three covariates X, Z, and W and the outcome variable Y. The
causal flow of interest is X → Y and is shown by a darker arrow. The back-doors can be easily
identified by looking at the incoming arrowheads into the treatment covariate and tracing it
forward to the outcome variable. Any pathways between X and Y with arrowheads pointing away
from X (i.e., 𝑋 → 𝑌) is the front-door paths, while the pathway with an arrowhead pointing into
X (i.e., 𝑋 ← 𝑍 → 𝑌) are the back-door paths. Causal effect flows between X and Y through the
causal path (X → Y), and noncausal effects flow through the back-door paths (X ← W → Y, X ←
Z →W → Y). In this example, the back-door pathway X ← Z →W → Y can be blocked by
conditioning on the following covariate set {Z, W} while the back-door pathway X ← W → Y can
be blocked by conditioning on the set {W}. Hence, conditioning or controlling on the minimum
covariate set {W} (in Figure 14 [B], shown by a darker circle) stops any noncausal effect flow
from reaching Y as the link between W→Y is broken by conditioning or controlling for covariate
W. Conditioning or controlling for a covariate implies that the value of that covariate is fixed to
the desired value and is not allowed to vary based on inputs from other variables.
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Figure 14. Illustration of back-door criterion
Formally, Morgan and Winship note the back-door criterion as follows (Morgan & Winship, 2013, p. 109):
If one or more back-door paths connect the causal variable to the outcome variable, the causal effect is
identified by conditioning on a set of variables ℤ if
Condition 1: All back-door paths between the causal variable and the outcome variable are
blocked after conditioning on ℤ, which will always be the case if each back-door path
a) contains a chain of mediation A → B → C, where the middle variable C is in ℤ
b) contains a fork of mutual dependence A ← C → B, where the middle variable C is in ℤ, or
c) contains an inverted fork of mutual causation A → C ← B, where the middle variable C and all of
C’s descendants are not in ℤ;
and
Condition 2: No variable in ℤ are descendants of the causal variable that lie on (or descend from
other variables that lie on) any of the directed paths that begin at the causal variable and reach the
outcome variable.

Figure 15 shows a more complex causal graph, the data generation process for X
and Y and several observed and unobserved covariates. Again, the causal flow of interest
is X → Y and is shown by a darker arrow. There are three noncausal back-door pathways
between X and Y: 1) X ← C→ Y; 2) X →K ← Y; and 3) X ← L →K→ Y that carry noncausal
spurious effects from X to Y. Note that the causal flow is transmitted in the direction of
the arrow, while the noncausal flow when conditioned on a collider, follows the opposite
direction of the arrow. The first back-door pathway can be blocked by conditioning on
covariate C. The second and third back-door pathways are already blocked by the collider
covariate K, so there is no need to condition on any covariate as the pathway is already
blocked. Note that X ← I ← 𝑈1 → A is not a noncausal pathway as no effect flows from
A to Y as they are not connected. The only way A can impact Y is through X.

65

Figure 15. Another illustration of back-door criterion

Consider Figure 15. Suppose there was a causal pathway between A and Y. That pathway
does not need to be blocked as U1 is an exogenous variable and is not included in the model,
which automatically blocks the noncausal flow.
Pearl and Mackenzie (2018) call the back-door criterion the most straightforward path to
climb from the first rung to the second rung of the causal ladder; as long as there is enough
confidence that all the covariates of interest are identified, we have accurate data for all
necessary variables, and the underlying causal graph is accurate. However, there are situations
where the back-door criterion is not applicable. Morgan and Winship (2013) note that
conditioning on a collider or a descendent of a collider covariate, which is just a noisier version
of the collider itself, unintentionally opens up the noncausal back-door pathway. Additionally,
conditioning on a descendant of the treatment itself, the mediator, robs the treatment's total
causal effect on the outcome. Hence, when applying the back-door criterion, care should be
taken to not condition on any descendants of the treatment on the causal pathway or any collider
variable on noncausal pathways as that would inadvertently open a noncausal flow between the
parents of the collider covariate. Additionally, there could be situations where the only covariates
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available are descendants of the treatment or exposure X, and all other confounder covariates are
not measured. Such a causal graph is shown in Figure 16.
Here, U1 is not measured, i.e., we have not collected or cannot collect data on U1, and
hence that covariate cannot be used to block the noncausal pathway X ← 𝑈1 → Y. Additionally,
covariates M and K cannot be conditioned on as they are descendants of the treatment variable X.
For such situations, the back-door criterion fails, and a new principle, the front-door criterion,
must be employed, which I turn to next.

Figure 16. Illustration of a causal graph where back-door criterion cannot be applied

Front-door Criterion
If a set of covariates ℝ satisfies the front-door criterion relative to the treatment X and
outcome Y if all the covariates in the set complete mediate the effect of X on Y, there are no
unblocked paths from the treatment and covariates in ℝ and any back-door path from the
covariates in ℝ to the outcome Y are blocked by the treatment X. In Figure 16, both covariate M
and K satisfy these conditions and are in the set ℝ. First, consider only covariate M. M is in the
causal pathway between X and Y (𝑋 → 𝑀 → 𝑌). There are no back-door pathways between X and
M (𝑀 ← 𝑋). The covariate X can block the back-door pathway from M to Y (𝑀 ← 𝑋 → 𝐾 → 𝑌 ).
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Then to find the causal effect of 𝑋 → 𝑌, we first find the causal effect of 𝑋 → 𝑀 and then the
causal effect of 𝑀 → 𝑌 and multiply it together over all the values of covariate M.
𝑃 (𝑌|𝑑𝑜(𝑋)) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑀|𝑑𝑜(𝑋)) 𝑃(𝑌|𝑑𝑜(𝑀))
𝑀

Thus, the front-door criterion is essentially multiple applications of the back-door criterion.
Similarly, the causal effect of 𝑋 → 𝑌, going through K, can be estimated as well.
It should be noted that the SCM material introduced here is by no means comprehensive.
Other essential elements within the do-calculus help us identify when both back-door and frontdoor criteria cannot be applied are outside the scope of the current literature review. The SCM
framework covered in this chapter should provide the reader with an essential understanding of
how DAGs can identify covariates in observational studies if the underlying causal graph is
known.
Next, I turn to two other frameworks – Rubin's Potential Outcome framework and
Campbell's Validity Typology framework. Though these frameworks are well established and
have several decades' worth of research and associated literature, the fundamental aspects of both
these frameworks for this literature review are summarized here. What is included here is by no
means an exhaustive summary, but merely a representative narrative of these domains as it
intersects with Pearl’s SCM framework from the vantage point of covariate selection to draw
valid causal inferences from observational data.

Rubin’s Counterfactual and Potential Outcomes Framework (PO)
This section of the chapter goes over Rubin's Counterfactual and Potential Outcomes
(PO) framework. Since its introduction in the late twentieth century, the potential outcomes
framework has been adopted in various social science disciplines to draw causal inferences in
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observational data (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). A vast amount of associated literature with the
PO framework exists, and an exhaustive review of literature is outside the scope of this research
project. Instead, the next section summarizes the main features of the PO framework relevant to
this research. It summarizes the Propensity Score Method (PSM), a tool within the PO
framework that plays a central role in various causal inference settings (Imai & Ratkovic, 2020).
The application of PSM in the fields of epidemiology (Austin, 2011), education (Hahs-Vaughn
& Onwuegbuzie, 2006; Pan & Bai, 2015), social work (Rose, 2019), economics (Imbens &
Rubin, 2018; Stuart, 2010), and other social science disciplines (Gangl, 2010) has been
extensively documented. Several systematic reviews in the past decade have also documented
the current status of adoption in epidemiology and social science disciplines and provide
recommendations on reporting of different elements of PSM for reproducibility (Granger et al.,
2020; Grose et al., 2020; Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018).
Propensity Score Methods consists of four main steps: a) estimating the propensity score
by including a rich set of covariates such that strongly ignorable treatment assignment
assumption is satisfied and that will yield an unbiased causal effect estimate; b) conditioning on
the propensity score using either matching, stratification, or inverse probability treatment
weighting or ANCOVA methods; c) verifying the assumptions of covariate balance between the
treated and the untreated groups; and d) estimating the treatment effect.
When conditioned on the propensity score (PS), the observable covariates (Z) distribution
for the two groups are comparable. Several conditioning methods such as PS matching,
stratification on the PS, Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW), and covariate
adjustments using PS are described in the literature (Austin, 2011; Stuart, 2010; Thoemmes &
Kim, 2011).
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I next turn to Rubin’s counterfactual and potential outcomes framework before exploring
the four steps of propensity score methods in further detail and synthesizing the findings from
several systematic reviews conducted in the past decade.

Potential Outcomes Framework
Based on the work of Neyman and other noted statisticians of the early 20th century,
Rubin (1974, 1990), in his 1974 seminal paper, proposed the Potential Outcomes (PO)
framework to draw causal inferences from observational studies. It has since been embraced by
different social disciplines such as education, epidemiology, social work, and economics, to
name a few.
The fundamental premise of the potential outcomes model is elegant in its simplicity. It is
assumed that every individual in the population is expected to have an outcome depending on
exposure to a treatment condition (Morgan & Winship, 2013). Stuart notes that even though it is
common to use the term “individual” to refer to the units receiving treatment, the discussion can
be easily extended to any unit of interest – classrooms, schools, districts, or any other level
(Stuart, 2010). For simplicity, the term “individual” is adopted here. The population is expected
to be exposed to the alternate treatment conditions, and the outcome of interest is noted. Though
typically a treatment with two conditions (1 = treated, 0 = not treated) is assumed, this
framework can be easily extended to treatments with more than two conditions. In treatment with
two conditions, everyone in the population of interest can potentially have two outcomes of
interest 𝑌𝑖𝐴=𝑎 where a = {0,1}and i is for each individual. The treatment’s causal effect can be
calculated as the difference between the individual’s outcome in the treatment condition 𝑌𝑖𝐴=1
(𝑌𝑖1 ) and the non-treatment condition 𝑌𝑖𝐴=0 (𝑌𝑖0 ). The causal effect, ∆𝑖 is the difference between
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𝑌𝑖1 and 𝑌𝑖0 (∆𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0 ). Hence, the causal effect can be considered as the missing data
problem (Rubin, 1976; Stuart, 2010).
The critical assumption of the PO framework is that everyone in the population of interest
has a potential outcome in both treatment conditions. However, these potential outcomes are in
theory only, as in reality, individuals only exist in one of the treatment conditions. At a given
point in time, each individual is in one condition, and we can only observe their outcome in that
condition. The hypothetical potential outcome in the alternate condition only exists in theory, but
it provides a potential counterfactual outcome if anyone could simultaneously exist in two
conditions. Holland (1986) described this as the fundamental problem of causal inference – that
it is impossible to observe an individual in two treatment conditions simultaneously. As a result,
assumptions must be made to estimate the counterfactual condition for each individual. In that
sense, for everyone in the population, one of two values needed, 𝑌𝑖1 and 𝑌𝑖0 , cannot be observed
and is always missing. As only value can be observed, the causal estimate (∆𝑖 ) cannot be
calculated at an individual level, but only at the aggregate group level for the population of
interest. This estimate is called the Average Treatment Effect (ATE).
As causal estimate at the individual is not possible, and we have to rely on ATE causal
estimates, it is essential to ensure that the treated and untreated groups are similar on observed
and unobserved covariates possible (Stuart, 2010). If the two groups are not comparable and look
very different, then the causal estimates would be biased. Stuart summarizes several prominent
authors such as Rubin and Heckman who have shown that if there is covariate imbalance
between the treated and untreated groups, then the causal estimates are biased. On average,
randomized control trials repeated several times, do this automatically as the assignment of an
individual to the treatment group is done on a random basis. Hence, the participants assigned to
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treatment or control conditions are exchangeable between groups without biasing the estimated
causal effect. In observational studies, there is often self-selection into a treatment condition; and
hence, the participants in the two groups are not exchangeable with one another. Consequently,
the distribution of covariates that could impact the treatment assignment and the outcome of
interest, the confounding covariates, may be differ between the two groups. The propensity score
method calculates a balancing score – a propensity score – to be part of the treatment group to
overcome this imbalance. The propensity score helps reduce the impact of the confounding
covariates and helps with obtaining unbiased causal estimates. The assumption is that
irrespective of their actual treatment condition, individuals with similar propensity scores, based
on the covariates included in the modeling, have the same probability of being part of the
treatment group and are comparable to one another.
Next, I summarize the four steps of PSM and summarize the findings from several
systematic reviews conducted in the past decade on the implementation and reporting of
propensity score methods in epidemiology and social sciences (Ali et al., 2015; Lonjon et al.,
2017; Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018).

Propensity Score Methods
Rosenbaum and Rubin proposed the Propensity Score Methods (PSM) in 1983 as a
means to mimic RCT-like conditions on observational data and draw causal inference (as cited in
Austin, 2011; Pan & Bai, 2015). Since then, propensity score methods have experienced
tremendous popularity in various social science disciplines, especially psychology,
epidemiology, and education (Stuart, 2010; Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). Propensity scores are
essentially probabilities of allocation to treatment condition that is estimated using pre-treatment
covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin defined it as a balancing score that, when conditioned on,
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provides the balance on observed covariates for both the treated and the untreated groups
(Austin, 2011; Martin, 2014). Essentially, one propensity score replaces the need to include
multiple covariates in estimating the causal effect (Hahs-Vaughn & Onwuegbuzie, 2006).
As noted, the first step employing PSM to draw causal inference from observational data
is to estimate the propensity score – a balancing score – the probability of treatment assignment
based on the covariates considered. Participants with the same propensity score are considered
exchangeable with one another, irrespective if they were treated or not in actuality. This first step
consists of two sub-tasks: identifying covariates that are relevant to treatment assignment or the
outcome and using a modeling technique to calculate the probability of being assigned to the
treatment group.
Evaluation of systematic reviews from the last decade suggest that PSM studies did not
typically report the number of covariates included in the propensity score model. Lonjon et al.
(2017) report that some studies used as few as three to as many as 41, with a median of 12
covariates in the propensity score estimation model. Thoemmes and Kim (2011) report that most
studies (94%) use an extended list of covariates in estimating the propensity score, the number of
covariates included ranged from as few as 3 to as many as 238 covariates, with the mean of 31.3
and the median of 16. Additionally, though a vast majority of the studies reported the actual
covariates included in the PS estimation model (Ali et al., 2015; Yao et al., 2017), Lonjon et al.
(2017) notes that the majority of the studies (77%) do not report any justification for the same.
Similar sentiments were echoed by Thoemmes and Kim (2011), who notes that 56% of the
studies in their systematic review did not specify the covariate inclusion strategy. Ali et al.
(2015) report that among the 296 propensity score articles in their systematic review, only one in
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three articles (n = 102) explicitly reported variable selection strategy employed for their PS
estimation model.
All this suggests a haphazard approach to identifying covariates and an unsatisfactory job
of justifying their inclusion in the PS estimation model, which could be because of clear
guidelines on which covariates to include in the model. The debate about which covariates
should be included in calculating the propensity score to estimate the causal effect is of central
interest to this research project. It was explored in greater detail later in this chapter.
The systematic reviews’ examination suggests that reporting the modeling technique
employed to calculate the propensity score is more common. Though several systematic reviews
(Ali et al., 2015; Zakrison et al., 2018) acknowledge the prevalence of logistic regression to
estimate the propensity scores, only Thoemmes and Kim (2011) systematically documented the
PS estimation method in their study. They note that 78% of the PS studies employed logistic
regression to estimate propensity scores, while 12% employed probit regression.
After identifying the covariates and calculating the propensity score, the second step of
employing PSM is to balance the treated and untreated groups using the estimated propensity
score. Several techniques such as matching, stratification, inverse probability treatment
weighting (IPTW), and covariate adjustment using propensity score are used to balance the two
groups. Several other factors such as the number of matches, caliper width when matching,
matching with or without a replacement need to be considered as studies have shown that these
decisions can influence the causal estimate (Stuart, 2010).
All five systematic reviews identified, summarized, and reported the propensity score
balancing methods employed by the underlying PS studies with some missing information in a
couple of systematic reviews. For example, the systematic review by Yao et al. (2017) did not
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report on the matching ratio employed by the underlying PS studies, while the systematic review
conducted by Ali et al. (2015) did not summarize any information on methods used for matching
in the underlying PS studies.
The most common method employed to achieve balance was propensity score matching,
with an average of about 70% across the five systematic reviews. This is followed by the PS
score adjustment, i.e., using PS score as a covariate in the causal estimation model (M = 13%),
stratification on the PS score quintiles (M = 12%), and the PS score used as an inverse
probability of treatment weight (IPTW) (M = 5%). A small number of studies employed multiple
methods to achieve PS balance.
Of the studies that employed the PS matching approach, not all studies adequately
reported all the PS matching parameters – number of matches made (1:1 or 1:many), the method
to choose the matches (nearest neighbor matching, caliper matching, greedy matching, or
optimal matching), and replacement approach (with or without replacement). Slightly over three
in four (M = 77.3%) PS studies adequately reported the matching parameters listed here
(Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018).
Of the studies that reported matching ratios across the five systematic reviews, more than
half the PS studies (M = 54%) employed a 1:1 matching approach while a smaller proportion (M
= 12.7%) employed 1:many matching approaches. Almost one in three PS studies (M = 31.5%)
did not report the method employed to choose matches, while similar proportions employed
nearest neighbor matching (M = 36.5%) and caliper matching (33.8%). One in four PS studies
(M = 24.2%) employed a greedy matching strategy, while a smaller fraction (M = 10.9%)
employed an optimal matching strategy. (Thoemmes & Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et
al., 2018). Most PS studies (M = 71.6%) did not report any information on the replacement
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approach, while one in five (M = 18.8%) PS studies employed matching without replacement
approach. (Lonjon et al., 2015; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018). See Table 1 for more
details.
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Table 3. Characteristics of Propensity Score Step 2 Reporting (n = 5 Systematic Review Studies)

Number of studies in the systematic review
that employed PS matching approach

Summary of findings from the PSM Systematic Reviews
Thoemmes &
Ali et al.
Lonjon et al. Yao et al. Zakrison et al.
Kim
(2011)
(2015)
(2017)
(2017)
(2018)
58 (67%)
204 (69%)
97 (75%)
219 (72%)
46 (65%)

Mean

125 (70%)

Adequately reported matching parameters

90.0%

-

-

64.0%

78.0%

77.3%

Matching Ratio
1:1
1: many
several strategies used

43.1%
31.0%
15.5%

57.8%
5.8%
-

89.0%
9.0%
-

-

26.0%
5.0%
-

54.0%
12.7%
15.5%

58.6%
-

-

51.0%

21.0%
22.4%

30.0%
28.0%

36.5%
33.8%

53.4%
24.0%
22.4%

-

36.0%

8.2%
3.7%
36.0%

11.0%
5.0%
-

24.2%
10.9%
31.5%

-

-

1.0%
21.0%
78.0%

2.0%
23.0%
51.0%

1.5%
18.8%
71.6%

Method to choose the matches
Nearest neighbor matching
Caliper matching (with or without caliper
width)
Greedy matching
Optimal matching
No information reported
Replacement approach
With replacement
Without replacement
No information reported
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12.3%
85.8%

Table 4. Characteristics of Propensity Score Step 3 Reporting (n = 5 Systematic Review Studies)
Summary of Findings from the PSM Systematic Reviews
Thoemmes &
Ali et al.
Lonjon et al. Yao et al. Zakrison et al.
Kim
(2011)
(2015)
(2017)
(2017)
(2018)
Checked for Balance
Yes
No
Methods for checking the
balance of covariates
Standardized Difference
NHST
C-statistic
Graphical Displays
Eye balling
Others
Multiple approaches
Not reported

Mean

72.1%
27.9%

70.6%
29.4%

85.6%
14.4%

89.0%
11.0%

37.0%
63.0%

70.9%
29.1%

22.6%
66.1%
4.8%
1.6%
4.8%
-

25.4%
70.6%
6.2%
2.3%
7.3%
-

20.0%
72.0%

14.2%
23.3%
7.8%
2.0%
42.5%

-

20.6%
58.0%
7.8%
5.5%
2.3%
4.5%
6.4%
42.5%

8.0%
-
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The third step of employing PSM is to verify the balance between the treated and
untreated groups after matching them to check common support. The distribution of the
covariates that were used to calculate the propensity score is compared for the treated and
untreated groups using graphical methods like bar charts and box plots. The goal is to identify
the region of overlap between the two groups (Thoemmes & Kim, 2011).
Though checking for propensity score balance is a critical step to ensure that the treated
and untreated groups are balanced on observable covariates of interest, not all PS studies
reported this information. The five systematic reviews reported that 37% (Zakrison et al., 2018)
to 89% (Yao et al., 2017) of the PS studies reported covariate balance (M = 70.9%). Various
metrics, including null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), standardized difference,
graphical displays, and more, were used to check covariable balance. When covariate balance
was checked, significance testing was primarily employed (M = 58%), followed by standardized
difference testing (M = 20.6%), c-statistic of the PS estimation model (M = 7.8%) and graphical
methods (M = 5.5%). Some studies used multiple approaches to evaluate covariate balance. See
Table 3 and 4 for more information.
The fourth and final step in employing PSM is to estimate the causal effect. Thoemmes
and Kim (2011) note that there is on-going debate if the final causal estimation should factor in
the decisions made in steps 2 and 3, with several simulation studies making recommendations for
the same. One commonly used method of estimating the treatment effect in propensity score
methods is by employing regression using the propensity score as one of the covariates.
Typically, the different software packages provide causal effect estimates such as the average
treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment of the treated (ATT).
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I now turn to the primary interest for this research: covariate selection approaches
employed to draw causal inference using observational data using propensity score method
techniques. Though covariate selection is part of the first step in PSM, it is discussed here as it is
the primary focus of this research. It was noted earlier that the approach employed by
practitioners of PSM – including several covariates without justifying their inclusion to estimate
propensity score – is antithetical to what is typically recommended when modeling, where the
mantra typically is parsimony. Applied practitioners seem to be heavily influenced by the
approach suggested by Rubin et al. to include all the covariates that the researcher hypotheses to
be relevant, irrespective of the underlying data-generation mechanism. Austin notes the lack of
consensus among experts on which variables to include in calculating the propensity score
(Austin, 2011). Contrary to this notion, and as noted in the previous section, the SCM framework
recommends being judicious in including select covariates, provided the underlying datageneration mechanism is known. Including all the covariates could lead to various biases –
collider bias, confounder bias, selection bias, to name a few – that could adversely impact the
causal effect estimate by either introducing biases of varying magnitudes or amplifying the
variance of the causal estimate. Thoemmes and Kim (2011) note that a good propensity score
require several good covariates. Nonetheless, they also note that Shadish et al.'s (2006)
conclusion that propensity score constructed with fewer covariates may not provide unbiased
estimates.
To justify the importance of being thoughtful with covariate selection, I first turn to the
different types of biases inclusion of covariates can potentially introduce into the causal effect
estimates when the underlying data generation structure, causal graph, is known. Next, I explore

80

the covariate selection literature in greater detail before summarizing the approaches identified
by experts.

Biases in the Analysis Phase of Observational Research
Any causal effect assessment aims to estimate the true impact of a treatment or exposure
on an outcome of interest. Invariably bound in the true causal effect estimate are two types of
errors or noises – random error and systematic error – obscuring the causal effect, the signal.
These errors obfuscate the true effect resulting in a lack of internal and external validity, which
prevents the researcher from drawing valid inferences and generalizability of the findings to the
larger target population. The random error or the error due to chance, also known as sampling
error, is caused by a lack of sufficient sample size to represent the source population. Random
error impacts the estimate’s precision and can be handled by data and statistical methods (Attia
et al., 2016). The bias in research methodology refers to the systematic error introduced in the
causal effect estimate and impacts the accuracy of the study’s findings, i.e., lack of internal
validity. Systematic error is not influenced by the sample size and cannot be eliminated merely
by collecting more data. Adequate sample size can improve the statistical estimate’s precision,
but it has no impact on the estimate’s validity.
Additionally, statistical significance does not reflect the presence or absence of
systematic bias. Hence, a statistically significant result should not be considered proof of a lack
of systematic bias. Complex statistical methods cannot eliminate the presence of a random error
that occurs by chance (Attia et al., 2016; Gerhard, 2008). The internal validity provides the
researcher the confidence with how close the study results are to the actual truth (Attia et al.,
2016). The lack of internal validity reflects the investigator’s lack of confidence in the study
design, data collection methods, and statistical analysis to correctly identify the true impact of
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the treatment or exposure on the outcome of interest (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). A study that
lacks internal validity is not generalizable and hence lacks external validity. Bias can be
introduced or eliminated at various stages of the study: study design, participants included in the
study, data collection approaches and methods, the analytical approach employed, and the
summary of the findings. For this research, the focus was on biases introduced during the study’s
statistical analysis.
It is important to note that bias in a research study is not a yes/no proposition and should
be thought of as existing in a continuum with varying magnitudes. Pannucci and Wilkins (2010)
note that considering bias as a dichotomous variable would be an oversimplification of the
problem and cautions researchers from falling into that trap. They note that some degree of bias
is always present in the study findings. Consistent with these sentiments, Gerhard (2008)
suggests viewing bias as a quantitative problem, which must be explicitly acknowledged by the
researchers, and sometimes requires trade-offs to reduce the magnitude of the bias. Gerhard
concludes that “investigators should aim to avoid bias in the design of a study, adjust for bias in
the study analysis if bias cannot feasibly be avoided, and quantify and discuss the effects of
residual bias on study results”.
With the increasing popularity of observational studies, various researchers (DelgadoRodríguez & Llorca, 2004; Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010; Pearl, 2013; Sackett, 1979) have
cataloged the different types of biases and associated distortion on the causal effect estimate.
Sackett (1979) has a detailed list of 35 biases that arise in sampling and measurement of
covariates, while Delgado-Rodriguez and Llorca (2004) listed about 70 biases in epidemiology
by study design. Biases are typically cataloged by the stage of the research study where it is
introduced. Another way of cataloging bias is the impact it has on the causal effect estimate.
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Pannucci et al. note that bias can cause a spurious association contrary to the true association
between the treatment and outcome, negatively impact the causal effect estimates. Similarly,
some biases tend to inflate the causal effect estimate. Such variables are known as biasamplifiers. In a tutorial paper, Pearl (2013) analytically estimates the magnitude of biases during
the study's statistical analysis step for different causal structures.
Note that the name of biases tends to be impacted by the context of the field of origin.
For example, a covariate impacted by two variables is a "collider," as the arrows from these
variables collide on this covariate node. In computer science, where DAGs originated, the bias
caused due to such a structure is known as the “collider bias.” However, in the field of
epidemiology, it is referred to as the “admission rate bias” or “Berkson’s Paradox,” named after
the physician Joseph Berkson who observed varying rates of the disease among patients admitted
in the hospital.
To explain all the biases, Figure 17 shows a hypothetical causal structure of covariates
was used. The treatment is denoted by X, and the outcome is denoted by Y, and the model is
assumed to be a linear model. Covariates I, L, S, D, B, O, P, and A are related to the treatment X,
the outcome Y, or the mediator covariate M. Covariate I is a parent of treatment assignment X
and can be considered as an instrumental variable, whereas covariate L is a child of the treatment
assignment X. Similarly, O and P are the parent and child of the mediator covariate M,
respectively. Covariates B and D are parent and child of the outcome variable Y, respectively.
Covariate A impacts both the treatment assignment X and outcome Y simultaneously and can be
considered a true confounder variable. Covariate S is impacted by both the treatment assignment
X and outcome Y. The Greek letters represent the path coefficients/correlation coefficients
between different covariates. For example, the path coefficient between the treatment X and
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mediate M is represented by 𝛼1 . The true causal effect between the treatment X and outcome Y is
given by 𝛼1 . 𝛼2 .

Figure 17. Diagram showing a hypothetical data generation structure with path coefficients

In the next part of this chapter, I summarize select biases and present the analytic
expression to calculate the magnitude of the biases for linear structural equation models (LSEMs), based on path coefficients. The expressions are based on Pearl’s (2013) tutorial paper
about the same. It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive list of all the biases that one
could potentially encounter at the statistical analysis stage of the study, but merely a collection of
biases that were explored further in this research. For simplicity, the same causal graph depicted
by Figure 17 is referenced in discussing all the biases. Though Figure 17 is referenced in each
section, only the shaded nodes is assumed to be relevant for the discussion, and all other nodes
are assumed not to exist.
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Confounder Bias
The most commonly occurring bias in observational studies is the one due to the presence
of measured or unmeasured confounders – a covariate that is the cause of both the treatment
assignment and outcome without being an intermediate on the causal pathway between them.
The presence of a confounder creates a backdoor pathway that causes a spurious or distorted
estimate of the treatment exposure-outcome association, and the resulting bias is often referred to
as the “confounder bias.” The confounder bias is a systematic error introduced in the analysis
phase that inaccurately measures the association between the treatment and the outcome (Attia et
al., 2017).

Figure 18. In the causal graph with shaded nodes, covariate A is the confounder for 𝑋 → 𝑌.

As shown in Figure 18, let us consider a causal structure with only four shaded nodes –
X, M, Y, and A. Here, covariate A is considered a true confounder as it impacts both X and Y and
is not in the causal pathway between X and Y. Covariate M is the mediator as it downstream from
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X in the causal pathway between X and Y. Confounder A, impacting the treatment assignment, X,
and outcome, Y, implies that the association between X and Y represent a mix of both the true
causal effect flowing from 𝑋 → 𝑀 → 𝑌 [𝛼1 . 𝛼2 ] and a spurious effect flowing through the path
𝑋 ← 𝐴 → 𝑌 [𝜏1 . 𝜏2 ]. Depending on the values of 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 , the true causal effect may be
artificially increased, decreased, or even reversed. Gerhard (2008) shows an example from the
public health domain, where the association between smoking and lung cancer is confounded by
the study participants carrying matches. Attia et al. demonstrate how the effect of one’s alcohol
consumption on dementia can be confounded by the study participant’s smoking status (Attia et
al., 2017).
Confounding bias can be addressed by stratifying on confounders, identifying the causal
effect for each stratum of the confounding covariate, and then aggregating it across all the
stratum proportional to the stratum size. However, with multiple confounders and each having
multiple strata, it becomes an intractable problem. For example, four confounders with three
levels each mean that causal effect must be estimated in 81 different strata individually before
getting aggregated. The propensity score provides one consolidated score to address this
dimensionality problem; however, the regressing on the score in and by itself does not
effectively remove the noncausal flow that introduces the bias in the causal estimate.
Additionally, only measured confounders can be de-confounded, and unmeasured or unidentified
ones cannot. Attia notes that there is always a possibility of residual confounding as there could
be confounders that are unmeasured or due to the presence of unidentified confounders (Attia et
al., 2017). There is recent research on identification theory, where methodological advances are
proposed to identify hidden confounders (Shpitser, 2020), but outside the scope of this literature
review.
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Bias due to Conditioning on Intermediaries and Their Proxies
As noted in the confounder bias section, covariate that are considered confounders are not
on the causal pathway. The intermediate covariates on the causal pathway are usually referred to
as mediators. Pearl (2013) notes that it is common practice not to condition on the intermediary
covariate on the causal pathway, but what to do with such covariate’s proxies was only recently
discovered. Upstream covariates, parents of the intermediate covariate, and downstream
covariates, descendants of the intermediate covariate, are considered proxies of the intermediate
covariates, and conditioning on them sometimes has a similar effect as conditioning on the
intermediary covariate itself. Pearl states that bias can be introduced in the model by
conditioning on some of the intermediate covariates’ proxies. Figure 19 shows a causal graph
with shaded nodes X, M, Y, O, and P and its associated path coefficients.
Pearl (2013) demonstrates analytically that conditioning on the parent of an intermediary
covariate does not introduce a bias. In this example, conditioning on covariate O, parent of the
intermediary covariate, M, does not introduce any bias. However, conditioning on the descendant
of an intermediary covariate introduces bias. In this example, conditioning on covariate P, a
descendant of the intermediary covariate, M, introduces a bias of the magnitude
1−𝛼2

𝛼1 . 𝛼2 . γ22 (1−𝛼2.γ1 2). It can be noted that the magnitude of the bias is dependent on 𝛾2, i.e., the
1

2

bias is solely dependent on the strength of the relationship between the intermediary covariate
and its descendent. If P is a strong proxy of M, then there is a higher distortion to the true causal
effect and vice versa.
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Figure 19. In the causal graph with shaded nodes, intermediary M and its proxies P and O.

Bias due to Conditioning on Covariates Related to the Treatment
After exploring the possibility of bias introduction based on intermediary covariates'
ascendants and descendants, I turn next to parents and descendants of the treatment assignment.
The descendants considered here are the ones that are not related to the outcome of interest and
hence obviously not on the causal pathway.
Figure 20 shows a causal graph with shaded nodes X, M, Y, I, and L and their associated
path coefficients. Pearl notes that in the case of the treatment covariate conditioning on the
descendant of the treatment – one that is not related to the outcome – does not introduce any bias
to the causal estimate. Though this makes intuitive sense, it should be noted that it is the opposite
of our discussion in the previous section where conditioning on the descendant of an
intermediary covariate introduced bias. In this example, conditioning on L, does not introduce
any bias to X causal estimate on Y.
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Figure 20. In the causal graph with shaded nodes, treatment X and its proxies L and I.

Conditioning on pre-treatment covariates has been a prevalent practice in drawing causal
inference from observational data mainly due to the easy availability of instrumental variables in
many instances and the suggestions of founders of the potential outcome framework. Pearl
(2010a) notes that several propensity score tutorial papers have repeatedly reinforced the idea of
using in the propensity score modeling covariates that are strong predictors of the treatment
assignment without any regard for the covariates' impact on the outcome. Contrary to the
common practice, research has shown that conditioning on the parent of a treatment variable, i.e.,
pre-treatment covariates, sometimes amplifies the bias in the causal estimate (Bhattacharya &
Vogt, 2007; Ding et al., 2017; Wooldridge, 2009). Ding et al. (2017) note that in practice, it is
not always clear if a covariate is a confounder and hence should be controlled for or a valid
instrumental variable that should not be controlled. An instrumental variable can sometimes be a
confounder due to its direct, yet unknown or unmeasured, impact on the outcome or through
another unmeasured covariate. Pearl (2010b) notes that an instrumental variable has all the
characteristics of a confounder: a) it is a pre-treatment covariate, so is not impacted by the
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treatment; b) it is related to the treatment; c) it is related to the outcome conditioned on the
treatment and hence is easy to be mistaken for a confounder and controlled. The overcontrolling could inadvertently result in noncausal flow, resulting in bias amplification and is
often referred to as the Z-bias.
Pearl notes that conditioning on parents of the treatment variable results in a bias of the
1

magnitude of (1−𝜇2) (Pearl, 2010b, 2013), where 𝜇 depicts the path coefficient between the
instrumental and the treatment variables (refer to Figure 20). The equation implies that the
stronger the relationship between the instrumental variable and the treatment, the larger the
magnitude of the bias introduced into the causal estimate. In our example, the better I predicts X,
the more the bias introduced into the causal estimate. Ding et al. (2017) cite examples from
published literature were adjusting for the Z-bias reduces the causal estimate using the
propensity score. As noted earlier, it is impractical to find a “perfect” instrumental variable that
has no impact on the outcome either directly or through an unmeasured covariate. Such
covariates are known as imperfect instrumental variables.
Figure 21 provides a causal structure with four covariates X, Y, Z, and C, that are the
treatment, outcome, instrumental variable, and a confounder variable, respectively. When 𝛽2 is 0,
Z is a perfect instrumental variable that predicts the treatment and predicts the outcome
conditioned on the treatment. When the value of 𝛽2 increases, covariate Z starts behaving more
as a confounder, like C, and should be controlled. Pearl notes that instrumental variables do not
introduce bias but merely act as bias modifiers, i.e., capable of increasing or decreasing bias.
Pearl analytically defines the boundary between a covariate being an instrumental variable or a
confounder variable. He concludes that for an instrumental variable Z to be a bias-reducer than a
bias-amplifier, its effect on the outcome Y should exceed its effect on the treatment X by a factor
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𝛾 𝛾

1 2
of (1−𝛽
2 ) (Pearl, 2010b). Hence, covariates that are more robust instrumental variables, and
1

therefore better at predicting treatment assignment, have more potential to act as bias-amplifiers
due to the presence of uncontrolled confounders.
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Figure 21. Causal diagram of X on Y with a confounder C and instrumental variable Z.

Referring to Figure 17, so far, we have discussed the impact of conditioning on covariates
I, L, M, O, P, and A. Next, I discuss the impact on the causal estimate by conditioning on
covariates S and D. The biases introduced by conditioning on S are more commonly known as
collider biases. The biases introduced by conditioning on D are known as case-control biases in
epidemiology or selection biases in social sciences.

Selection Bias: Bias due to Conditioning on the Descendant of the Outcome
Conditioning on descendants of the outcome also could potentially introduce bias on the
causal effect. Conditioning on the descendant of an outcome is a fairly common practice.
Figure 22 shows a causal graph with nodes X, M, Y, and D and their associated path
coefficients.
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Figure 22. In the causal graph with shaded nodes, outcome Y and its proxy D.

Figure 22 shows a causal graph with shaded nodes X, M, Y, and D and its associated path
coefficients. Pearl notes that conditioning on a covariate that is only being impacted by the
outcome introduces bias (Pearl, 2013). In this example, conditioning on covariate D introduces
(𝛼 .𝛼2 )2 −1
2 2)
1 .𝛼2 ) .δ

bias of the magnitude 𝛼1 . 𝛼2 . δ2 (1−(𝛼1

to the causal estimate.

Collider Bias or Selection Bias
Colliders are covariates that are impacted by both the treatment and the outcome. If not
included in the analysis, i.e., if not conditioned on, collider covariates do not introduce any bias,
as their parents – the treatment and the outcome – are independent. When conditioned on, this
opens a backdoor pathway, introducing a spurious correlation between the treatment and the
outcome. In practice, self-selection is more commonplace, and it can happen if certain subjects
are preferentially included in the study out of convenience because data on such participants are
readily available. It can also happen when depending on the value of the outcome of interest,
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only participants who achieve the particular outcome value, i.e., specific observations, are
preferentially included in the study. This practice is also referred to as “right-censoring” or
“information-censoring” where say only participants in an epidemiologic study who are alive or
students in an educational study who graduated are considered in the study. Hernan et al. note
that epidemiologists apply the term “selection-bias” to several types of biases, such as incorrect
types of participants included in the study, failure to follow-up with all the participants of the
study, non-response bias during data collection, incidence-prevalence bias, to name a few
(Hernán et al., 2004). They demonstrate that the underlying causal structure has a covariate
impacted by both treatment or its descendant, and outcome, or its descendant, and is incorrectly
conditioned in all such situations. Pearl (2013) analytically calculates the magnitude of the bias
introduced by conditioning on a collider.

Figure 23. In the causal graph with shaded nodes, covariate S is the collider variable.
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Figure 23 shows a causal graph with shaded nodes X, M, Y, and S and its associated path
coefficients. Pearl notes that conditioning on collider S introduces a bias of the magnitude
[(𝛼1 .𝛼2 ).(1−𝜒12 −𝜒22 )]−[𝜒1 .𝜒2 ]
1−[𝜒1 +(𝛼1 .𝛼2 ).𝜒2 ]2

. If the outcome does not affect the collider variable, i.e., if 𝜒2 = 0, then

the bias disappears.
So far, we have evaluated different causal structures in isolation and evaluated the
magnitude of biases conditioning on different covariates introduces. However, this is rarely the
case in real life, and covariates don't always neatly fit into a unique category of a confounder, a
mediator, an instrumental variable, or a collider variable. Sometimes, covariates can be both
confounders and colliders, and it is difficult to determine if it should be controlled as a
confounder or not conditioned on as a collider variable. A similar situation was evaluated in the
section discussing instrumental variables where a trade-off based on the covariate’s strength with
the outcome and treatment variables was summarized. Next, I turn to a couple of such situations
and the biases, M-bias and Butterfly-bias, it introduces.

M-bias
As noted before, conditioning on a collider variable induces associations among its
causes even if these causes start as marginally independent (Greenland, 2003). Hence, it is not
advisable to condition on colliders (Pearl et al., 2016). The bias introduced by conditioning on
such variables is also known as endogenous selection bias (Elwert & Winship, 2014). Figure 24
shows an M-shaped causal structure with three measured covariates, X, Y, and A, and two
unmeasured covariates U1 and U2 could be two latent factors. Covariate A is a measured pretreatment covariate and is thus commonly controlled per the recommendations of experts of
potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 2001) but introduces a bias, known as M-bias,
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inadvertently opening a backdoor path between the ancestors of the collider covariate. When all
the covariates are in the M-structure are measured, Greenland et al. demonstrated that typically
the magnitude of M-bias is relatively small compared to the direct effect along the causal
pathway (Greenland, 2003). Using Monte Carlo simulation, Liu et al. (2012) quantified the
magnitude of the M-bias. For a binary exposure, an outcome, a collider, and two predictors of a
collider, a causal structure like the one in Figure 24, they showed that there exists an M-bias of
the magnitude of -2% to -5%. Ding and Miratrix (2014) further supported this argument using a
simulation study to show that even moderate correlations resulted in little bias (Ding & Miratrix,
2014). The M-bias' magnitude increased substantially when the relationship between the
unmeasured covariates and the collider covariate became stronger.

Figure 24. M-structure created by covariate A being the collider variable of two unmeasured
covariates.

Using analytical algebra, Pearl (2013) calculated the amount of bias to be

−(𝛽1 .𝛾1 )(𝛽2 .𝛾2 )
[1−(𝛽1 .𝛾1 )2 ]

for a causal structure depicted in Figure 24. The main factor controlling the magnitude of the Mbias is the collider variable’s relationship with the treatment through the U1 unmeasured
covariate. For a given 𝛽2 and 𝛾2 value, the magnitude of bias increases exponentially as the
strength of the relationship between X and A, governed by values of 𝛽1 and 𝛾1, increases. In
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contrast, the increase in the bias is proportional to the strength of the relationship between
collider A and outcome Y, for a given level of association between X and A.
Ding and Miratrix (2014) further investigated the bias caused by conditioning on the
collider covariate of the M-structure by relaxing the assumption of independence between the
two unmeasured covariates U1 and U2. They conclude that under such circumstances, bias is
introduced in both the adjusted and unadjusted causal estimates, and the critical thing governing
the magnitude of the bias is the correlation between the two latent unobserved variables and that
of the collider and the treatment variable. Ding and Miratrix also investigated a more interesting
situation when the collider in the M-structure (covariate A in our example) is also a commoncause confounder. They called such a causal structure the butterfly-structure and the resulting
bias butterfly-bias, which I turn to next.

Butterfly-bias
It has already been discussed before that failure to condition on common-cause
confounders opens up backdoor pathways and results in imprecise causal effect estimates. When
a covariate is a confounder and the collider of an M-structure, conditioning will help with the
confounding bias but will hurt with the M-bias (Ding & Miratrix, 2014). Such situations require
informed trade-offs to reduce the bias and increase the precision of the causal estimate. Figure 25
is like Figure 24 except that covariate A now is also a confounder of variables X and Y.
Covariate A is a confounder on the 𝑋 ← 𝐴 → 𝑌 pathway and a collider on the 𝑋 ← 𝑈1 → 𝐴 ←
𝑈2 → 𝑌 pathway. Pearl (2013) showed that if the covariate A is treated as a collider and not
conditioned on then a bias of magnitude 𝛿2 (𝛿1 + 𝛽1 . 𝛾1 ) + [𝛿1 . (𝛽2 . 𝛾2 )] (refer to Figure 23) is
introduced. However, if covariate A is treated as a confounder and conditioned on, then a bias of
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magnitude

−(𝛽1 .𝛾1 )(𝛽2 .𝛾2 )
2

[1−(𝛿1 +(𝛽1 .𝛾1 )) ]

is introduced. Ding and Miratrix (2014) concluded that though the

confounding strength is an essential consideration in the trade-off decision, it is generally
recommended to control for the confounder than not. Furthermore, they demonstrate that for
about three-fourths of the feasible region, defined by the analytical equation's bounds, the
covariate conditioning strategy yields less bias than not conditioning on it.

Figure 25. The butterfly-structure

The M-structure and butterfly-structure have given rise to contradictory rationales to
condition on specific pre-treatment covariates. The contradictory recommendation to condition or
not to condition has resulted in a controversy between the structural causal method's proponents
and potential outcomes frameworks. Ding and Miratrix (2014) call this the Rubin-Pearl
controversy, the name that I adopt here.
Table 5 summarizes the magnitudes of the biases listed in this section.
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Table 5. The Biases, Associated Data Generation Structure, and the Magnitude of Bias
Introduced
Impact of X → Y
while controlling
for…

Induces bias of magnitude…

A
(Confounder variable
of X and Y)

𝜏1 . 𝜏2

P
(Descendent of the
intermediary variable
M)

1 − 𝛼12
𝛼1 . 𝛼2 . γ22 (
)
1 − 𝛼12 . γ22

O
(Ascendent of the
intermediary variable
M)

No bias

Collider bias or
Sampleselection bias
or Berkson’s
Paradox

S
(Collider variable of
X and Y)

[(𝛼1 . 𝛼2 ). (1 − 𝜒12 − 𝜒22 )] − [𝜒1 . 𝜒2 ]
1 − [𝜒1 + (𝛼1 . 𝛼2 ). 𝜒2 ]2

Case-control
bias

D
(Descendent of the
outcome variable Y)

(𝛼1 . 𝛼2 )2 − 1
𝛼1 . 𝛼2 . δ2 (
)
1 − (𝛼1 . 𝛼2 )2 . δ2

Bias Name

Confounder
bias

Data Generation
Structure

Conditioning on
intermediaries
and its proxies
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Impact of X → Y
while controlling
for…

Induces bias of magnitude…

I
(Ascendent of the
treatment variable X –
Instrumental variable)

1
(1 − 𝜇 2 )

L
(Descendent of the
treatment variable X)

No bias

M-bias

A
(Collider variable for
unobserved variables
U1 and U2)

−(𝛽1 . 𝛾1 )(𝛽2 . 𝛾2 )
[1 − (𝛽1 . 𝛾1 )2 ]

Butterfly-bias

A
(Collider variable for
unobserved variables
U1 and U2
AND confounder
variable for X and Y)

Bias Name

Conditioning on
ascendents and
descendants of
the treatment
variable X

Data Generation
Structure

Pre-conditioning bias:
𝛿2 (𝛿1 + 𝛽1 . 𝛾1 ) + [𝛿1 . (𝛽2 . 𝛾2 )]
Post-conditioning bias:
−(𝛽1 . 𝛾1 )(𝛽2 . 𝛾2 )
2

[1 − (𝛿1 + (𝛽1 . 𝛾1 )) ]

So far, I have presented the magnitude of the biases assuming that the underlying causal
structure is known. However, it is difficult to be sure about the exact causal structure, and
models in social sciences are mere approximations of the investigator’s knowledge (Ding &
Miratrix, 2014). Under such circumstances, it is challenging to employ exact covariate selection
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approaches summarized in this section. Generally, what the investigator has a better
understanding of is if covariate influences the treatment assignment, the outcome of interest, or
both. Several covariate-selection approaches have been suggested for practitioners when only a
partial causal structure is known, which I turn to next.

Criteria for Covariate Selection in Propensity Score Methods
In their systematic review article Thoemmes and Kim (2011) suggest that a greater
number of covariates included in propensity score estimation typically yields a score that better
controls (compared to including only a limited number of covariates) any confounding covariates
to control for any potential bias. While it is understandable that only including demographic
variables or too few variables as covariates may not be enough to control for potential bias,
including 200 odd variables for the same seems to be excessive.
Regardless of the include-all-covariates approach practiced extensively, many scholars
have clearly noted the paucity of clear guidelines on the covariates that should be included and
the criterion employed for inclusion (Brookhart et al., 2006; Steiner et al., 2010; VanderWeele &
Shpitser, 2011; Witte & Didelez, 2019). Though the theory suggests that variables that impact
the treatment assignment (T) and outcome of interest (Y) should be included as a covariate in
propensity score estimation or in regression analysis, Brookhart et al. (2006) note that in
practice, covariate selection is more data-driven using algorithms to yield a model that best
predicts assignment to the treatment condition. Steiner et al. (2010) lament the dearth of clear
guidelines when it is not clearly understood as to which variable impacts the treatment
assignment and which one impacts the outcome of interest.
Several scholars have noted the importance of addressing the omnipresent problem in
observational studies – presence of confounders – and the need to identify a minimal set of
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covariates that would be sufficient for confounding adjustment while achieving efficiency and
robustness of the estimated causal effect (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011; Witte & Didelez,
2019). As noted by Witte and Didelez (2019), in linear regression, the causal estimates are more
precise when adjusted for predictors of the outcome, even when these are not necessary for
confounding adjustment. However, for matching based on propensity score it is important to
have a minimal set for covariate adjustment for propensity score estimation. Additionally, this is
consistent with the parsimonious approach typically practiced and advocated in statistical
modeling literature.

Covariate Selection Approaches
Table 7 describes the four main covariate selection approaches – a) the minimal set
approach; b) covariates related to only the outcome approach; c) covariates related to only the
treatment approach; and d) the union set approach – their main features, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each approach. Note there are a couple of covariate selection approaches,
causal search, and estimation approach that are in their infancy and are outside the score of this
literature review. First, Table 6 summarizes the different publications that describe in greater
detail the four variable selection approaches of interest to this research.
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Table 6. Covariate Selection Approaches and the Publications that Enumerates it Further
Covariate selection
approach
Minimal Set

(Brookhart et
(Witte &
(VanderWeele
al., 2006) Didelez, 2019) & Shpitser,
2011)
x
x

Covariates related to
only Outcome (Y)
Covariates related to
only Treatment
Assignment (T)
Union Set

x

x

(De Luna et
al., 2011)

(Guo &
Dawid, 2010)

x
x

x
x

x
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Table 7. Covariate Selection Approaches – Description, Advantages, and Disadvantages
Covariate selection
approach

Description of the approach

Advantages and Motivation for
the approach

Disadvantages and Caveats of
the approach

Minimal Set

Identify least number of
covariates that are predictors of
the outcome AND treatment
assignment. This set is needed
to yield an unbiased causal
estimate.

Advantageous for
nonparametric adjustment
methods in terms of both bias
and variance.

Prior knowledge of causal
structure is essential. It can be
challenging to identify the
minimal set of covariates
without properly knowing the
underlying causal structure.

Covariates related to only
Outcome (Y)

Identify a sufficient covariate
set that are strong predictors of
the outcome ONLY.

Reduces standard error in
variety of settings.

Sensitive to sample sizes. Small
samples may miss covariates
that have weak association with
outcomes but strong association
with the treatment.

Covariates related to only
Treatment Assignment (T)

Identify a covariate set that are
predictors of the treatment
assignment ONLY.

Is logical as the propensity score Sensitive to sample sizes. Small
modeling tries to predict
samples may miss covariates
treatment assignment.
that have weak association with
treatments but strong association
with the outcome.

Union Set

Identify covariates that are
predictors of the outcome OR
treatment assignment.

In the absence of detailed prior
knowledge of the causal
structure, it is easier to justify
inclusion of covariates related to
either treatment OR outcome.

Source: (Witte & Didelez, 2019)
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Typically results in the largest
set of covariates leading to
problems in model fitting and
robustness towards
misspecifications.

The Disjunctive Cause Criterion method was proposed by on VanderWeele and Shpitser
in 2011 and was later modified by VanderWeele (VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele & Shpitser,
2011). Within the broader topic of – covariate selection to draw causal inference from
observational data – this research specifically investigated the revised covariate selection
approach suggested by VanderWeele (2019), known as the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion
(MDCC).
The disjunctive cause criterion recommended the inclusion of covariates that are a cause
of the treatment assignment, or that of the outcome, or both the treatment assignment and the
outcome (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). There was no recommendation addressing proxy
variables and variables that do not conform to the criteria mentioned. The modifications in 2019
included two additional recommendations, a) to exclude the instrumental variables and b) to
include proxy covariate of an unmeasured confounder variable. Though, some of these
recommendations are not new, the MDCC covariate selection approach as a whole is new and
was the focus of this study. As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, the confounder
variable is a covariate that impacts the treatment assignment and the outcome of interest. The
focus of this research was to investigate the updated recommendation to include a proxy variable
of an unmeasured confounder covariate under real-life scenarios where the proxy of the
confounder covariate may not be a good proxy or may be measured with error.
Also, though unmeasured variables are pretty standard in social science research, it is
challenging to guarantee that the unmeasured covariate is a true confounder and impacts both the
treatment and outcome, as opposed to the covariate impacting only the treatment assignment or
the outcome of interest, but not both. Prior research suggests that if a covariate is a true
confounder, its proxy must be controlled for; otherwise, it should not be controlled for as that
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would increase bias (Pearl, 2013; VanderWeele, 2019), thus impacting the consistency of the
causal estimate. In applied research, the investigators are likely to be less confident of an
unmeasured variable being a true confounder and more likely to know that such a variable may
impact the treatment assignment or the outcome, but not both, and may find it challenging to
employ the updated disjunctive cause criterion recommendations as prescribed.

Chapter 2: Summary
This section summarizes the topics discussed so far in Chapter 2. The main focus of this
research is on covariate selection to draw causal inferences from observational data.
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs play a central role in estimating causal relationship
in social science disciplines such as psychology, economics, epidemiology, and education.
Though Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) are considered the gold standard for causal
inference, they are not always feasible, practical, or ethical. Additionally, to accommodate the
prevalence of observational and quasi-experimental data in social sciences, Rosenbaum and
Rubin proposed the potential outcomes (PO) framework (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The
propensity score method (PSM) is part of the PO framework and is extensively used in research
in various social science disciplines, including in education (Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). The
popularity of PSM can be traced back to its simplicity as it strives to match the treated and
untreated groups on observed covariates, as well as its comparability to regression analysis. It
should be noted that observational data is rife with biases (e.g., selection bias) and unmeasured
confounding bias due to unmeasured covariates that impact both the treatment assignment and
outcome of interest not included in the data set. If the covariates included to calculate the
propensity score are adequate and measured well, PSM satisfies certain assumptions (e.g., strong
ignorability) that are needed to draw causal inferences from non-randomized data.
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PSM, employing matching in step 2, consists of four steps: a) propensity score
estimation, b) matching units from the treated and the untreated groups based on the propensity
score, c) verifying covariate balance between the treated and the untreated groups, and d)
estimating the causal effect. The first step of PSM, the propensity score estimation, consists of
two sub tasks: i) covariate selection, and ii) propensity score estimation modeling. This research
reviews and critiques the research and scholarship on the topic of covariate selection in
regression analysis and propensity score methods. Among the steps to conduct propensity score
methods (PSM), covariates included in estimating the propensity scores have not been
adequately studied (Brookhart et al., 2006). Contrary, to variable inclusion criteria typically
followed in statistical modeling techniques which tends to advocate for parsimonious model, so
as to not over-fit the model, the methods for estimating propensity scores generally have relied
on include all-available-pre-treatment-covariates strategy. This has resulted in a non-prudent
approach of covariate inclusion in the logistic regression model to estimate the propensity score.
In a systematic review of PSM application in social sciences (79 studies), Thoemmes and Kim
(2011) showed that the average number of covariates included in the propensity score estimation
was 31.3 covariates. This is consistent with what Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) initially
proposed and since has been advocated by Rubin (2009) who states that there is no reasonable
justification of not including measured pre-treatment covariates which estimating the propensity
score. The main objective of any covariate identification should be to reduce the biases so that
there is balance between the treated and the untreated groups.
This literature review provides additional insight into criteria that should be employed
while selecting covariates to be included in regression analysis or while calculating the
propensity score. The analytic focus on causal graphs developed by Pearl (1995) provides
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another approach to studying causal inferences. The transparent nature of graphs makes it easy to
communicate the underlying causal structure that the investigator assumes is in play.
Additionally, the d-separation rules allow surgical isolation of parts of the graphs so that
conditional independence of certain sections of the causal structure can be verified using data.
Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and the direction-separation (d-separation) rules have shown
that depending on the causal flow, certain confounders (colliders), when included in the
propensity score estimation process or regression analysis, introduce inconsistent causal
estimates. However, not including these covariates results in consistent estimate of the causal
effect (Shrier, 2008; Sjolander, 2009; Pearl, 2010). Though, DAGs can help in causal framework
communication and are robust as they do not assume a functional form, the main drawback of
this approach is that the underlying causal structure has to be known precisely, through theory or
expert judgement, which sometimes can be challenging.
Tremendous progress has been made in the past two decades in the field of causal
inference with the infusion of DAGs and other potential outcome framework methods.
Numerous studies in the fields of economics and epidemiology have slowly but surely adopted
DAGs for various purposes such as addressing measurement bias (Hernan & Cole, 2009),
detecting limitations of traditional regression approaches in longitudinal studies (Moodie &
Stephens, 2010), detecting direction of unmeasured confounding bias (VanderWeele et al.,
2008), identifying confounding variables (Howards et al., 2012), and for identifying synergism in
the sufficient-component-cause framework (VanderWeele & Robbins, 2007), to name a few.
However, preliminary literature search suggests that little analytic attention has been paid to
DAGs in education research and the lack of DAGs application in the education setting has been
conspicuous.
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It should be noted that there are various covariate selection strategies that are commonly
employed while estimating the propensity score in the propensity score model or in regression
analysis: a) minimal number of covariates included in the model; b) only including covariates
related to the outcome; c) only including covariates related to the treatment; d) union set
approach – related to either outcome or treatment; e) causal search approach; and f) estimation
approach. However, VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) proposed a novel method for confounder
selection that is based on DAGs and using MC simulation studies proved that their approach
yields the most consistent causal effect estimate. The disjunctive cause criterion can be used
when the underlying causal structure is unknown or when the researcher has limited subject
matter knowledge. The approach assumes that the researcher knows if the covariate is a cause of
a treatment or that of the outcome, and if the answer to either of the questions is “yes,” then
recommends including the confounder in the analysis. This covariate selection method was
developed for practical utility so that the investigator does not need to have a complete
understanding of the underlying casual structure, as needed in SCM framework. The disjunctive
cause criterion was modified by VanderWeele in 2019 to include recommendations related to
instrumental variables and proxy variates of unmeasured true confounders.
This research investigated the recommendation to include proxy variables of unmeasured
true confounders in regression analysis and the propensity score estimation step of PSM to draw
causal inferences from observational data. The performance measures of interest are the bias of
the estimand (average treatment effect), the coverage, and the empirical SE.
Figure 28 shows the concept map – a pictorial representation of the topics that were
discussed in this chapter. It is based on the synthesis of the articles and foundational knowledge
and an attempt to provide a visual guide to the reader on how these vast domains are related. The
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green ovals and arrows in the concept map show the reader the path along the central topics in
this literature review from observational data and causal inference to the research topic.
VanderWeele and Shpitser’s disjunctive cause criterion uses the strengths of Pearl’s SCM
framework while addressing its weaknesses and applies it to PSM, which is central tool in
Rubin’s PO framework. The concept map shows how various topics are interrelated to get to the
topic that is central to this research – covariate selection in regression analysis, and
propensity score estimation in PSM, to draw causal inferences from observational data.
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Figure 26. Concept map – pictorial representation of research topics discussed in Chapter 2
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Overview
This chapter describes the methodology and research design employed to investigate the
research topic of interest – covariate selection criteria that result in the most consistent and
efficient causal effect estimate when employing regression and propensity score methods on
observational data. The focus of this research was limited to evaluating the modified disjunctive
cause criterion recommendation related to inclusion of proxy variables of unmeasured true
confounders, an update to VanderWeele and Shpitser's 2011 original covariate selection
recommendation known as the disjunctive cause criterion (VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele &
Shpitser, 2011).
Monte Carlo simulation methods were employed to generate data from an underlying
data generation structure. This chapter follows the ADEMP framework for planning, conducting,
and reporting of the Monte Carlo simulation studies (Morris et al., 2019). The ADEMP
framework consists of five main components that Morris et al. recommend should be reported
for each simulation study: study aim (A), data generation mechanism (D), estimands (E),
methods (M), and performance measures (P). The authors proposed the ADEMP framework after
conducting a meta-synthesis of hundreds of Monte Carlo simulation studies reported in the
journal Statistics in Medicine. For the study aim (A), Morris et al. propose that the investigator
should consider the desirable properties such as consistency and efficiency of the estimator that
is the focus of the study. Each of the four studies in this research had a specific study aim that
was related to the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimated using different set of
variables employing regression and propensity score estimation model in the propensity score
method (PSM). The term data generation mechanism (D) refers to the underlying data structure
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and the family of distribution from which the random numbers were generated. Factors such as
seed, distribution type, distribution parameters, functional relationship between variables,
exogenous and endogenous variables in the model, etc. are considered in this step. The estimand
(E) is the most important population parameter that is the focus of the study. The estimand of
interest has to be aligned with the study aim. In all four studies in this research the estimand of
interest was the average treatment effect (ATE) denoted by θ and was set to a constant value of
3. The methods (M) consist of the analysis procedure that were employed to compare the
different estimand models on the performance measures. The performance measures (P) have to
be consistent with the aim of the study and the estimand of interest. They are specific numerical
quantities used to compare the performance of different models. For all four studies in this
research, specific performance measures were compared to evaluate the consistency and
efficiency of the estimator θ. Morris et al. (2019) summarize different types of performance
measures and recommend key performance measures employed for various types of simulation
studies. The performance measures used across all the four simulation studies in this research
were the bias, the coverage, and the empirical SE which are explained in later in this chapter.
The AEDMP framework provides a systematic approach to designing, conducting,
analyzing, and reporting simulation studies with a coherent set of terminologies that could be
used to describe it. This research adopts the ADEMP framework for planning, executing,
analyzing, and reporting all four studies in this research. Next, the primary purpose of this
research is described. Following that section, the Monte Carlo simulation, and justification for
parameter values considered in the MC simulation studies are described. Finally, the four studies
that helped answer the research topic of interest were described using the ADEMP framework.
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Study Purpose
The purpose of this research was to identify the covariate selection approach that yields
the most consistent causal effect estimate and the most efficient causal effect estimator in the
presence of unmeasured true confounder. As discussed in chapter 2, Directed Acyclic Graphs
(known as DAGs) are graphical representations using arrows and nodes of the hypothesized data
generating structure. DAGs were invented in the field of computer science (Pearl, 1995) but
since has been championed by an increasing number of epidemiologists (Hernan & Cole, 2009;
VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011) and adopted by a small but rising number of economists in their
disciplines (Hünermund & Bareinboim, 2019). This study is a small number of studies that have
introduced these novel methods to the field of education by building on a confounder selection
method known as the disjunctive cause criterion based on DAGs. Disjunctive cause criterion
method was proposed by on VanderWeele and Shpitser and was later modified by VanderWeele
(VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). Within the broader topic of––covariate
selection to draw causal inference from observational data––this research specifically
investigated the revised covariate selection approach suggested by VanderWeele (2019), known
as the modified disjunctive-cause criterion. VanderWeele summarized the modified disjunctive
cause criterion as (VanderWeele, 2019):
Based on recent theoretically justified developments in the causal inference
literature, the following proposal is made for covariate control decisions:
control for each covariate that is a cause of the exposure, or of the outcome, or
of both; exclude from this set any variable known to be an instrumental
variable; and include as a covariate any proxy for an unmeasured variable that
is a common cause of both the exposure and the outcome.
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The disjunctive cause criterion recommended the inclusion of covariates that are a cause
of the treatment assignment, or that of the outcome, or both the treatment assignment and the
outcome (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). There was no recommendation addressing proxy
variables and variables that do not conform to the criteria mentioned. The modifications in 2019
included two additional recommendations, a) to exclude the instrumental variables and b) to
include proxy covariate of an unmeasured confounder variable. As discussed in chapter 2, the
confounder variable is a covariate that impacts the treatment assignment and the outcome of
interest. The focus of this research was to investigate the updated recommendation to include a
proxy variable of an unmeasured confounder covariate under real-life scenarios where the proxy
of the confounder covariate may not be a good proxy or may be measured with error.
Findings based on five meta-synthesis (Ali et al., 2015; Lonjon et al., 2017; Thoemmes &
Kim, 2011; Yao et al., 2017; Zakrison et al., 2018) that studied the application of PSM across the
medical and social science domains (888 individual studies included in the five studies) indicates
that typically studies include 3 to 41 covariates, with a median of 12 to 16 covariates, for PSM
studies. The parsimony of the model is often sacrificed to include all the variables that could help
balance the two groups being compared. These covariates can be typically grouped into four
groups: a) instrumental variables – ones that only impact treatment assignment; b) confounders –
ones that impact both the treatment assignment and outcome variable; c) one that only impacts
outcome variable; and d) one that does not impact either the treatment assignment or the
outcome directly. Also, though unmeasured variables are pretty standard in social science
research, it is challenging to guarantee that the unmeasured covariate is a true confounder and
impacts both the treatment and outcome, as opposed to the covariate impacting only the
treatment assignment or the outcome of interest, but not both. Prior research suggests that if a
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covariate is a true confounder, its proxy must be controlled for; otherwise, it should not be
controlled for as that would increase bias (Pearl, 2013; VanderWeele, 2019), thus impacting the
consistency of the causal estimate. In applied research, the investigators are likely to be less
confident of an unmeasured variable being a true confounder and more likely to know that such a
variable may impact the treatment assignment or the outcome, but not both, and may find it
challenging to employ the updated disjunctive cause criterion recommendations as prescribed.
This research investigated the challenges of including a proxy variable representing an
unmeasured covariate to draw causal inferences from observational data. In the first study, data
was generated using a data structure that included a true unmeasured confounder and its proxy.
Next, regression to estimate the causal effect was run without including the proxy variable of the
true unmeasured confounder as per the disjunctive cause criterion. Then, the proxy variable of
the true unmeasured confounder was included in the regression to estimate the causal effect.
Finally, critical metrics from the two approaches were compared to evaluate the efficacy of the
updated recommendation over the original one.
In the second study, data was generated using a data structure that included an
unmeasured covariate that was not a true confounder but only impacted the treatment or the
outcome, but not both. The proxy of such a variable was included in the casual effect estimation
regression to investigate the resulting impact on the consistency and efficiency of the causal
effect estimate. In the third study, the impact of including the proxy variable that represents a
true unmeasured confounder variable but may not be perfectly correlated with the unmeasured
covariate it represents was investigated. Data was generated using a data generation structure
where the correlation between the unmeasured confounder covariate and its proxy was varied by
changing the linear correlation between the two variables. The impact of including such
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imperfect proxy covariates on the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimation was
evaluated.
Many variables in social sciences are plagued with measurement error, and proxy
variables are no exception (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). To study the inclusion of proxy
variables with a measurement error of true confounders, data was generated using a data
structure where the measurement error was introduced into the proxy variable representing a true
unmeasured confounder. Proxy variables with measurement error can be considered fallible
proxy covariates. The inclusion of fallible proxy covariates in the causal effect estimation
regression and its impact on the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate is of
interest and was investigated.
The following section discusses the parameters of the Monte Carlo simulation employed
and each of these research topics of interest in further detail. The research topics of interest
identified in this section were investigated by conducting four simulation studies. First, the
Monte Carlo simulation approach, simulation parameters, and justifications for selecting them
are discussed. Next, the estimand (E) and performance measures (P) of interest that are the same
across all four studies are described. Finally, the specific study aim (A), research question, and
unique data generation process employed (D) that created the necessary data structure for each
study was described in detail.

Monte Carlo Simulation
Generally, analytical approaches (Ding & Miratrix, 2014; Pearl, 2013; VanderWeele &
Shpitser, 2011) or Monte Carlo simulation methods (Ding & Miratrix, 2014; Morris et al., 2019;
VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011) are employed to study topics that have been listed in the
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previous section. Four studies using Monte Carlo simulation methods (MC simulation) to
investigate the research topics of interest identified in the previous section were conducted.
MC simulations are computer experiments in which the data for each variable is
generated using pseudo-random sampling from known probability distributions. Certain
variables are endogenous to the model, while others are exogenous to the model. The
investigator generates the data for both the exogenous and endogenous variables and determines
the relationship of all the endogenous variables with other variables. As the investigator is in
complete control of the data-generation mechanism, they are aware of the true parameter value
of the estimand (θ). Thus, MC simulation allows the creation of scenarios where assumptions can
be easily violated, as we know the true data generation mechanism.
Additionally, it is easy to create imperfect proxy covariates of an unmeasured confounder
covariate by changing the correlation between the proxy variable and the unmeasured
confounder covariate. It can be assumed that proxy variables with higher correlations transmit
more of the unmeasured covariate’s impact and vice versa. Similarly, fallible proxy covariates of
an unmeasured true confounder covariate can be created by generating another proxy variable
that has a lower correlation with the original proxy, and hence a lower reliability index with the
unmeasured true confounder. Varying the sample size to study its impact on the resulting causal
effect estimate can be easily accomplished by generating the desired number of observations for
each simulation replication or iteration. Though MC methods have various uses, this research
compared the covariate selection methods and investigated the relevance of large-sample theory
approximations in finite samples.
Statistical software R was used with the necessary packages to generate the data.
Generally, MC simulation studies have several hundreds of simulation-runs, knows as
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replications or iterations, and are denoted by nsim and typically indexed by i to indicate each run.
Each iteration of the MC simulation can be considered a “study” in and by itself with a predetermined number of units or subjects denoted by nobs. As recommended by Morris et al., the
state of the random number generator was set by using a fixed “seed” assigned to each study, and
the rstream package was used to initialize the stream of random numbers (Morris et al., 2019).
Taking these steps prevented the software package from using the default seed, which prevented
the results for different nsim replications from being highly correlated.
Additionally, this made the data generation, analysis, and conclusions for the studies in
this research reproducible and open to verification by other researchers. To avoid correlation
between data sets generated during each simulation replication and for efficiency, Morris et al.
(2019) recommend storing the random numbers generated once for the study before generating
the data. This is particularly of concern when the number of simulation runs is less than or equal
to the number of observations (nsim < nobs), which is not the case in any of the studies here. As the
vagaries of small sample sizes are of interest to this research, enough simulation replications had
to be run to reduce Monte Carlo sampling error and which improved the precision of the
estimand. Depending on the aim of the simulation study, say when investigating large-sample
bias, only one replication is necessary. However, they note that of the simulation studies
included in their systematic review, the most common nsim values were 500 (about 20%) and
1,000 (about 40%). For the studies in this research, a nsim value of 1,000 replications were
employed.

Propensity Score Method Employed for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
As discussed in chapter 2, in several social science disciplines, random assignment of
participants is not possible or desirable resulting in self-selection into treatment conditions. The
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bias introduced due to participants self-selecting into treatment conditions and being
systematically different on observed covariates is known as self-selection bias. The self-selection
bias needs to be addressed to effectively estimate the true treatment effect. The propensity score
methods (PSM) are commonly employed to balance the comparison groups and address the
selection bias. In this research, for all four studies, propensity scores were calculated using
logistic regression. One-on-one matching with replacement and ties was employed in the
propensity score matching stage. Caliper matching was employed where the caliper width was
0.25 SD. After ensuring covariate balance, the final step of causal effect estimation using
propensity score method was calculated by employing the Matching package in R.
The following section discusses the justification for sample sizes included in the four
simulation studies.

Sample Size for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
Finally, most methodological studies using simulation techniques generate large sample
sizes, which does not account for the variations due to small sample sizes (Ding & Miratrix,
2014; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). However, investigators often encounter scenarios where
large samples with thousands of participants or records are a luxury in real-life situations, and
small samples are the norm. Therefore, all the scenarios described previously were investigated
in varying sample size conditions.
The sample size of 2,000 units employed by the VanderWeele and Shpitser can be on the
larger side. The effectiveness of the new confounding selection approach on samples of different
sizes, especially small samples, have not been studied. A large sample size essentially rules out
any sampling error, and these issues do not impact the causal estimate. However, smaller
samples are not uncommon in social science research, and the viability of their proposal has not
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been tested with smaller sample sizes. de Winter et al. (2016) summarize the findings of various
meta-synthesis studies and note that sample sizes employed by social scientists in various studies
vary substantially, with the lower quartile, median, and upper quartiles also varying wildly. For
their simulation study comparing the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients across
distributions and sample sizes, de Winter et al. employed 25 sample sizes logarithmically spaced
between 5 and 1,000 to generate stable correlation estimates. Of these 25 sample sizes, 6 sample
sizes that cover a wide range of a sample size typically found in social science studies were
employed in each of the four studies in this research. The sample sizes included are 18, 36, 70,
137, 265, 1,000.
The following section explains the estimand that is the main focus of the four simulation
studies.

Estimand for all the Simulations Studies (1 – 4)
Of the 100 simulation studies reviewed by Morris et al., (2019) the aim for most of the
simulation studies (64%) was estimation and had an estimand as its target. The four simulation
studies in this research aim to estimate the causal effect––the average treatment effect (ATE).
The estimand (E) of interest in this research for all four studies was the true average treatment
effect (ATE), which was set to a pre-determined value of 3 across all the studies by fixing the
treatment's value outcome during the data generation process. Each simulation replication
estimates the estimand of interest, denoted by 𝜃̂𝑖 for the ith replication. The mean of all the 𝜃̂𝑖 s
was denoted by 𝜃̅ and was the arithmetic mean of the estimand’s estimate across all the
simulation replications, an estimate for 𝐸(𝜃̂𝑖 ). With a large number of simulation replications
(nsim), the true variance of the estimated estimand (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂)) across the simulation replications
(𝜃̂𝑖 ) could also be estimated. Similarly, an estimate for the 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂) from the ith replication could
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̂ (𝜃̂). Other notations considered were the level of
also be calculated and is denoted by 𝑉𝑎𝑟
significance 𝛼 and the p-value for the ith replication denoted by 𝑝𝑖 .
Next, the performance measure employed to compare the models in each of the four
simulation studies is summarized.

Performance Measure for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
Morris et al. note that it is often a desirable property for the estimator 𝜃̂ of the estimand
𝜃 to be consistent and efficient. For an estimator to be consistent, for large n, the estimated
estimand 𝜃̂ should be equal to 𝜃, i.e., as 𝑛 → ∞, 𝜃̂ → 𝜃. The n here refers to both the number of
replications (nsim) and the number of units in each replication (nobs). For large number of
replications, the estimand’s estimate across all the simulation runs, i.e., the mean of all the 𝜃̂𝑖 s
denoted by 𝜃̅ should be equal to 𝜃. It is also a desirable property for the estimated estimand for
each replication (𝜃̂𝑖 ) be unbiased for 𝜃 in finite samples, i.e., 𝐸(𝜃̂𝑖 ) = 𝜃 (Morris et al., 2019).
Any arithmetic difference between the estimated estimand 𝜃̂𝑖 (estimate of 𝜃 within a simulation
replication) or 𝜃̅ (estimate of 𝜃 across all the simulation replications) and 𝜃 (the true value of the
estimand), on average, is defined as bias. Bias is considered a vector quantity composed of
magnitude and direction, and both these components are essential to consider. For the four
studies in this research, bias was calculated as the arithmetic difference between the 𝜃̂𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝜃̅ and
𝜃, where 𝜃 value was fixed to 3. Additionally, the confidence interval calculated for the
estimated estimand across all the simulation runs, 𝜃̅, should have the property that at least
100(1 − 𝛼)% of the intervals contain 𝜃 (Morris et al., 2019). This performance measure is
known as coverage.
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Also, the estimating process of the estimand should be as efficient as possible. The
efficiency of the estimation process can be examined by computing the true variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂)
across all the simulation replications. A small value for 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂) indicates an efficient estimator
of 𝜃.
As these performance metrics––bias, coverage, and empirical SE––are estimates of
performance based on simulation, they are also subject to error. Summarized in Table 8 are the
definition, estimate, and Monte Carlo SE of estimate for the three performance measures as
provided by Morris et al. (2019).
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Table 8. Performance Measures - Definition, Mathematical Formulae to Estimate, and the MC Standard Error Estimate Formulae
Performance
Measure
Bias

Coverage

Empirical SE

Definition

Estimate
1

𝐸(𝜃̂) − 𝜃

Pr(𝜃𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃𝑢𝑝𝑝 )

√𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜃̂)

𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚

Monte Carlo SE of Estimate

𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚

∑ 𝜃̂𝑖 − 𝜃
𝑖=1

√

1
𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚 (𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚 − 1)

𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚

1
𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚

∑ 1(𝜃̂𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑖 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̂𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑖 )
𝑖=1

√

1
𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚 − 1

Note. The formulae listed in table 1 are from Morris et al. (2019).
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𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚

∑ (𝜃̂𝑖 − 𝜃)2
𝑖=1

√

∑

𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑖=1

(𝜃̂𝑖 − 𝜃)2

̂ . (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
̂ )
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚
̂
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝐸
√2(𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑚 − 1)

Study 1: Investigating the Recommendation to Include a Proxy of an Unmeasured
Confounder
Study Aim
Study 1 examined efficacy of the modified disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC) compared
to the original disjunctive cause criterion (DCC). To be significant, the modified
recommendation to include the proxy of an unmeasured true confounder covariate would have to
improve the consistency and efficiency of the causal inference estimate compared to the one
estimated using the original disjunctive cause criterion (DCC). Here the term “true confounder”
refers to a confounder covariate impacting the treatment assignment and the outcome of interest.
The study investigated large- or small-sample bias, the precision of the estimate defined by
consistency of the estimand’s estimate for the MDCC method compared to the DCC method, and
efficiency of the estimand’s estimate for the two methods. Therefore, only perfect proxy of the
true confounder was considered in this study. The term “perfect proxy” refers to a proxy
covariate with a bivariate correlation of 0.9 or greater with the unmeasured true confounder.

Research Question 1
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including a perfect proxy of an unmeasured true
confounder covariate in the causal effect estimation model compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 27 shows a data generation structure that consists of seven variables, six measured
variables, and one unmeasured variable, U1. Most of the variables in the model, B, Z, C, U1, and
Y, were normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0,1). In
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contrast, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a
linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser in their original article (2011). The
causal effect estimate of interest was the effect of treatment T over outcome Y, which was set to a
constant value of 3. Covariate C was a true confounder that impacts both the treatment
assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacted the treatment
assignment T. In contrast, the covariate B only impacted the outcome variable Y. This structure
was comparable to the data generation structure employed by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011)
in their original article. The only addition was the inclusion of the unmeasured covariate U1 and
its proxy P1. U1 was a true confounder, and P1 was its perfect proxy (i.e., rU1.P1 > 0.9) and was
generated such that the bivariate correlation between U1 and P1 was equal to 0.95. Per the 2011
disjunctive cause criterion, variables Z, C, and B were included in the causal effect estimation,
whereas P1 was not included as it did not directly impact the treatment assignment T or the
outcome variable Y. It should be noted that U1, being an unmeasured true confounder covariate,
could not be included in the causal effect estimation model as it was not available for inclusion.
However, the modified disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC) would warrant the inclusion of P1 in
the causal effect estimation model.
One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample sizes (nobs
= {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship depicted in
Figure 27 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072001 was used
for the first study.
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Figure 27. Data generation process for Study 1.
Note. Covariate U1 is shaded as it is an unmeasured true confounder covariate and P 1 is its perfect proxy. Error
terms are omitted from the diagram.

𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈1 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈1 ,𝑃1 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (3𝑈1 + 𝐶 + 2𝑍) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 3𝑈1 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
Method and Analysis
After the data was generated, the causal effect was estimated using two approaches,
regression analysis and propensity score methods employing propensity score matching. The
variables to be included in each of these approaches were determined by the disjunctive cause
criterion (DCC) and the modified disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC).
In regression analysis, first, the outcome variable Y was predicted using the variables that
satisfy the DCC criteria and the performance measures calculated. Next, in regression analysis,
the variables that satisfy the MDCC criteria were included to predict outcome Y and performance
measures calculated. The difference between the two criteria in Study 1 was the inclusion of the
proxy variable P1 of the unmeasured true confounder variable U1. To estimate the causal effect
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using the disjunctive cause criterion (DCC), only variables Z, C, B, and T were included as
predictors while estimating the causal effect using regression. Whereas, to estimate the causal
effect using the modified disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC), covariates Z, C, B, T, and P1 were
included. Finally for the regression approach, performance measures––bias, coverage, and
empirical SE––were calculated as previously discussed and compared.
Similar to all the steps enumerated here for the regression approach, different sets of
variables using the DCC and MDCC criterion were included in the propensity score estimation
model of the PSM. Then, the performance measures were calculated and compared to see the
impact of inclusion of proxy variable of an unmeasured true confounder on the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate.
Similar analysis approach was employed for studies 2 – 4, where different sets of
variables, consistent with the study aim, were included while predicting outcome Y using
regression approach or in the propensity score estimation step of the PSM approach.

Study 2: Investigating the Violation of Recommendation to Only Include a Proxy Variable
of an Unmeasured True Confounder
VanderWeele notes that including the proxy of an unmeasured confounder does not
always guarantee reduced bias (VanderWeele, 2019). Care must be taken only to include proxy
covariates of the unmeasured true confounders, a covariate that impacts both the treatment
assignment and outcome of interest. However, this is a very stringent criterion that may seldom
be met as the researchers may not know with certainty that a covariate is a true confounder
(Steiner et al., 2010). Hence, this recommendation warrants more careful examination. Based on
past research or expert opinion, the investigator may know if any observed covariate is a cause of
the treatment assignment, cause of the outcome, or a confounder, i.e., the variable impacts both
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the treatment assignment and the outcome. However, having this knowledge for an unmeasured
covariate may be more challenging. To mimic real-life situations, this research studied the
implications of violating the recommendation to include only the proxy covariate of an
unmeasured confounder while estimating the causal effect.
The investigation was conducted by including one of the following in the causal
inference regression: a proxy variable of just the treatment assignment or a proxy variable of just
the outcome. Including such a proxy variable possibly unblocked the back-door paths between
the proxy variable, the treatment assignment, and the outcome variable. Thus, it could have
impacted the consistency and efficiency of the average treatment effect estimation.

Study Aim
Studies 2a and 2b examined the robustness of the recommendation to only include proxy
variables of true confounders. The recommendation to include the proxy of an unmeasured true
confounder covariate (base model) was violated by creating an unmeasured covariate that was
not a true confounder, i.e., the unmeasured covariate either impacted only the treatment
assignment or the outcome of interest, but not both. Therefore, only perfect proxies of the
unmeasured covariates were considered in this study. The term “perfect proxy” refers to a proxy
covariate with a bivariate correlation of 0.9 or higher with the unmeasured true confounder. To
be significant, the inclusion of the proxy covariate in the model with the perfect proxy covariate
would have improved the consistency and efficiency of the causal inference estimate. The aim of
studies 2a and 2b was to investigate large- or small-sample bias, the precision of the estimate
defined by consistency of the estimand’s estimate for the model with and without the perfect
proxy of unmeasured covariates that were not true confounders. Studies 2a and 2b investigated
the impact on consistency and efficiency of the causal estimate by including in the causal effect
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estimate model a perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that only impacted the treatment
assignment and the outcome of interest, respectively.

Research Question 2a
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but only impacts the
treatment assignment, compared to not including it?

Research Question 2b
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but only impacts the
outcome of interest, compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 28a to 28c shows data generation structures for studies 2a and 2b. Figure 28a is
labeled the base model – where the unmeasured covariate was a true confounder. In Figure 28b,
the unmeasured covariate U2 was not a true confounder as it only impacted the treatment
assignment T. In Figure 28c, the unmeasured covariate U3 was not a true confounder as it only
impacted the outcome of interest Y. Other than the impact of the unmeasured covariates on either
treatment assignment or outcome of interest, all three data generation structures were identical.
In addition to the unmeasured covariates, the data generation structure consisted of six measured
variables. Similar to the parameters in Study 1, most of the observed variables in the model, B, Z,
C, and Y, as well as the proxy variables, P1, P2, and P3, were normally distributed with a mean of
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zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1). In contrast, the treatment assignment was
dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a linear function as performed by
VanderWeele and Shpitser in their original article (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). The causal
effect estimate of interest was the effect of treatment T over outcome Y, which was set to a
constant value of 3. Covariate C was a true confounder that impacts both the treatment
assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacted treatment assignment T,
whereas covariate B only impacted outcome Y. The unmeasured covariates U1, U2, and U3 had
perfect proxy covariates P1, P2, and P3. Perfect proxies are proxies that have a linear correlation
of greater than 0.9 with the unmeasured covariate they represent (i.e., rU1.P1 > 0.9, rU2.P2 > 0.9,
rU3.P3 > 0.9).
One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample sizes (nobs
= {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship depicted in
Figure 28 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072002 was used
for the second study.

For Study 2a,
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈2 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈2 ,𝑃2 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈2 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)

For Study 2b,
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈3 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
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𝑟𝑈3 ,𝑃3 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + +3𝑈3 + 4𝐵 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
Method and Analysis
After the data was generated, the causal effect was estimated using only the modified
disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC). As it is assumed that the researcher was oblivious to the
nature of the relationship the unmeasured covariate has with the treatment assignment and the
outcome, the proxy of the unmeasured variable was treated as a true confounder and was
included in the causal effect estimation even though it is contrary to the modified disjunctive
cause criterion recommendations. Hence, for Study 2a, to estimate the causal effect using the
modified disjunctive cause criterion variables Z, C, B, T, and P2 were included while estimating
the causal effect using regression and in the propensity score estimation step of PSM. Whereas
for Study 2b, to estimate the causal effect using the modified disjunctive cause criterion,
covariates Z, C, B, T, and P3 were included. Performance measures––bias, coverage, and
empirical SE––were calculated as previously discussed and compared.
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.
a. Data generation process for the base model

b. Data generation process for Study 2a

c. Data generation process for Study 2b
Figure 28. Data generation process for Study 2a and Study 2b
Note. Covariates U1, U2, and U3 are shaded as they are unmeasured covariates and P1, P2, and P3 are their perfect
proxies, respectively. Thus, U1 is a true confounder, whereas U2 and U3 are not true confounders. Error terms are
omitted from the diagram.
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Study 3: Investigating the Inclusion of Imperfect Proxy Variable of an Unmeasured True
Confounder
In social science research, there could be situations where the researcher has to include a
variable that cannot be observed or for which data is not available for the model to be correctly
specified (Wickens, 1972). Also, it is not uncommon to have multiple proxy variables of an
unmeasured confounder covariate that may represent the unmeasured confounder to varying
degrees (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). These proxy covariates may vary in their linear strength
(correlation) with the unmeasured confounder and may be either a weak proxy or a relatively
more robust proxy. Different proxies could contain varying degrees of noise along with the
signal from the variable it represents (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). However, they note that
using multiple proxies would not be advisable as the noise in the proxy variables may correlate
with one another and lead to other undesirable issues. Wickens argues that if the errors are not
correlated, to reduce bias, it is better to include the proxy of an unmeasured covariate, especially
if the proxy is not a weak proxy than to exclude the unmeasured covariate all together (Frost,
1979; Wickens, 1972). Instead of conceptualizing the problem of not being able to include the
unmeasured covariate as a misspecification problem, but rather as a measurement error issue,
where the associated proxy variable is considered a shadow of the unmeasured covariate,
Bollinger and Minier (2014) make a similar argument of including all available proxy variables
of the unmeasured covariate in the regression to minimize bias as long as they are strong proxy
variables. However, no empirical guidance is provided as to what makes a proxy a strong one. If
multiple proxy variables are available to the investigator and the information of its linear strength
with the unmeasured confounder is known, the investigator would naturally pick the best proxy
variable, one with the strongest linear correlation with the unmeasured covariate and hence
represents it the best. However, as the confounder covariate is unmeasured, it is impossible to
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actually measure its linear strength with the proxy covariate. The investigator can rely on the
theoretical expectation of the proxy’s relationship with the unmeasured confounder covariate if
that information is available. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate the inclusion of strong and
weak proxy covariates of the unmeasured confounder and its impact on the consistency and
efficiency of the estimated causal effect. Study 3 examined this research topic by varying the
linear strength of the proxy variable with the unmeasured confounder covariate. One of the
assumptions in this study was that proxy variables were related to only one unmeasured variable,
which was a true confounder. Even though multiple proxies can represent an unmeasured
variable, I only considered one proxy at a time in the causal effect estimation model. To focus
exclusively on the measurement error, it was also assumed that proxy variables do not have any
independent effects on the outcome, an assumption routinely imposed when researchers assume
they have classical measurement error (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006).

Study Aim
Study 3 examined the impact of the inclusion of a proxy covariate, which was not a
perfect proxy of the unmeasured true confounder covariate, in the causal effect estimation model
has on the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate. As noted previously, the term
“perfect proxy” refers to a proxy covariate that has a bivariate correlation of 0.9 or greater with
the unmeasured true confounder covariate. This empirical method of defining a perfect proxy is
consistent with other simulation studies involving proxy variables where the covariance or
correlation between the variables is manipulated to get the desired type of proxy variable
(Bollinger & Minier, 2014). Proxy covariates with weaker correlations with the unmeasured
confounder covariates can be considered "imperfect proxy" variables of the unmeasured variable.
To be significant, inclusion of the imperfect proxy covariate in the model would have improved
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the consistency and efficiency of the causal inference estimate. In this study, only true
confounder covariates were considered, i.e., the unmeasured covariate impacted both the
treatment assignment and outcome of interest. The aim of Study 3 was to investigate large- or
small-sample bias, the precision of the estimate defined by consistency of the estimand’s
estimate for the model with and without the imperfect proxy of unmeasured covariates that were
true confounders.

Research Question 3
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model an
imperfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder compared to not including
it?

Data Generation Process: Generating Imperfect Proxy Variables
Figure 29 shows a data generation structure that consists of ten variables, nine measured
variables, and one unmeasured variable, U4. Most of the variables in the model, B, Z, C, U4, and
Y, were normally distributed with of mean zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1), whereas
the proxy variables in the model, P4a, P4b, P4c, P4d, were generated in conjunction with the
unmeasured covariate U4. Similar to Study 1, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using
an inverse logit transformation of a linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser
(2011) in their original article. The causal effect estimate of interest was the effect of treatment T
over outcome Y, which was set to a constant value of 3. Covariate C was a true confounder that
impacts both the treatment assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only
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impacted the treatment assignment T, whereas the covariate B only impacted the outcome
variable Y. U4 was a true confounder, and P4a was its perfect proxy (i.e., rU4.P4a > 0.9).

Figure 29. Data generation process for Study 3.
Note. Covariates U4 is shaded as it is an unmeasured covariate, and P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d are its proxies. P4a is a
perfect proxy (r > 0.9), whereas P4b, P4c, and P4d are not as they have a linear correlation of 0.8, 0.4, and 0.2,
respectively. Error terms are omitted from the diagram.

Additionally, the model had three imperfect proxies for the unmeasured covariate. The
imperfect proxies were generated the same way as the perfect proxy P4a but using a lower linear
correlation value. To ensure that the ranges of coefficient correlations considered in this research
were representative of the correlations encountered in social science research, this research relied
on the recommendations by de Winter et al.’s (2016) meta-meta-synthesis of several other metaanalysis studies. Their research reports that the absolute correlation coefficients in social
psychology averaged 0.21, with 95% of the studies having coefficients between 0 and 0.50
shown to be the most common, while for the remaining 5% of the studies the correlation ranged
between 0.50 and 0.80. de Winter et al. report that in social science research a correlation value
of 0.20 can be considered of moderate strength, a correlation of 0.40 can be considered to
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represent a strong relationship, whereas a correlation of 0.80 can be considered a very strong
relationship, but a rarity. Therefore, these three correlation values were adopted in this study, and
three imperfect proxy variables P4b, P4c, and P4d of U4 with linear correlations of 0.80, 0.40, and
0.20, respectively, were generated. Per the modified disjunctive cause criterion, variables Z, C,
and B were included in the causal effect estimation along with one proxy variable at a time (P4a,
P4b, P4c, and P4d) for the unmeasured true confounder variable U4. It should be noted that U4,
being an unmeasured true confounder covariate, could not be included in the causal effect
estimation model as it was not available for inclusion.
One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample sizes (nobs
= {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship depicted in
Figure 29 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072003 was used
for the third study. The structural equation was similar to the one in Study 1, except for creating
three additional proxy variables of varying linear correlation with the unmeasured true
confounder variable. Note that the proxy variables in Study 3 were assumed to have no
measurement error.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈4 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑎 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑏 = 0.80, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑐 = 0.40, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑑 = 0.20, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈4 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 4𝑈4 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
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Method and Analysis
After the data was generated, the causal effect was estimated using the modified
disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC). As noted, though multiple proxy variables of varying linear
strength were available to represent the unmeasured true confounder covariate, only one variable
at a time was included in the causal effect estimation model. Hence, four distinct causal effect
estimation models were generated for Study 3 using two different approaches, regression
analysis to predict outcome Y and in the propensity score estimation step of PSM. Using
regression and propensity score methods employing propensity score matching, all four models
to estimate the causal effect included the variables Z, C, B, and T and one of the following four
proxies P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d, respectively. For each model, the performance measures––bias,
coverage, and empirical SE–– were calculated as previously discussed, and then the models were
compared with each other on the performance measures. The first model––the one with Z, C, B,
P4a, and T ––was comparable to the model generated in Study 1 in that it had a perfect proxy (r >
0.9) of a true unmeasured confounder and could be considered as the base model. The other three
models had imperfect proxies and were compared to the base model. The analysis showed if the
modified disjunctive cause criterion recommendation to include the proxy variable of a true
unmeasured confounder was robust irrespective of the type of proxy variable, strong or weak
proxy variable.

Study 4: Investigating the Inclusion of Fallible Proxy Variable of an Unmeasured True
Confounder
Independent variables with measurement errors are not uncommon, especially in social
science research (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). Though proxy variables are often used as
stand-ins for unmeasured covariates to address misspecification bias, they should not be used
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without careful consideration. The inclusion of proxy covariates with random measurement error
does not impact bias (Frost, 1979). However, measurement errors are seldom independent of the
true regressors, and the impact of measurement error is more complex (Cole & Preacher, 2014).
One safeguard suggested by Frost (1979) is identifying proxies that have a large squared partial
correlation with the unmeasured covariate, given other variables in the model. However, through
analytical work, Frost demonstrates that a high partial correlation between the proxy variable and
the left-out unobservable covariate, given the set of other covariates, is a necessary but
insufficient condition to reduce the squared bias. Thus, the inclusion of proxy variables with nonrandom error or a large amount of measurement error could impact the efficiency and
consistency of the causal effect estimate. Hence, it is important to investigate it more carefully.
The measurement error noted here is the lack of precision in measuring the proxy
variable. In the social science realm, covariates are often self-reported and seldom precisely
measured and often contain measurement error. It should be noted that the measurement error
discussed in Study 4 is different from the one discussed in Study 3, where the proxy variable
itself is conceptualized as a true unmeasured confounder variable with measurement error due to
the lower correlation between the two variables. The measurement error in Study 4 is the
difference between the true proxy variable (𝜏), which only exists in theory and the actual proxy
variable (𝜏′ ) that is measured and is available for inclusion in the analysis. The difference
between (𝜏) and (𝜏′ ) may be due to various reasons such as the employment of an unreliable
measurement instrument, incorrect usage of a reliable measurement instrument, invalid or short
assessment instrument, inaccurate recording of the data by the rater, among others. Some of
these causes could result in a systematically mismeasured proxy variable, while others may
sporadically impact the proxy variable. The measurement error results in the actual proxy

140

variable (𝜏′ ) being less reliable 𝜌 < 1 than the true proxy variable (𝜏) due to the presence of
systematic and sporadic errors. Cole and Preacher use the term “infallible variable” for variables
that are measured without errors. This research employs the terminology of fallible and infallible
covariates to distinguish between covariates measured with and without errors, respectively
(Cole & Preacher, 2014). Proxy variables with measurement errors are known as fallible proxy
variables and is less reliable than the true proxy variable. The impact of including fallible proxy
variables of a true unmeasured confounder in causal inference regression was investigated.
Additionally, an investigator may face a situation where a fallible proxy variable of an
unmeasured confounder is available for inclusion in the causal inference regression and may
have to decide if the inclusion of a fallible proxy variable is better than not controlling for the
unmeasured confounder altogether and risking misspecification bias. Study 4 investigated this
conundrum by including in the causal inference regression analysis fallible proxy variables, with
higher levels of non-random error, compared to the true proxy variable and analyzing its impact
on the average causal effect estimate.

Study Aim
Study 4 examined the impact of the inclusion of a proxy covariate with measurement
errors of the unmeasured true confounder covariate can lead to underestimating some paths and
overestimating others (Cole & Preacher, 2014), which in turn impacts the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate. Fallible proxy covariates are covariates with a lower
reliability index and a non-random large amount of error compared to a perfect proxy variable.
As noted previously, the term “perfect proxy” refers to a proxy covariate that has a bivariate
correlation of 0.9 or greater with the unmeasured true confounder covariate. On the other hand,
fallible proxy covariates can be thought of as a shadow of the perfect proxy covariate and one
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that has higher amounts of non-random error. To be significant, the inclusion of the fallible
proxy covariate in the model would decrease the consistency and efficiency of the causal
inference estimate. In this study, only true confounder covariates were considered, i.e., the
unmeasured covariate impacted both the treatment assignment and the outcome of interest. The
aim of Study 4 was to investigate large- or small-sample bias, the precision of the estimate
defined by consistency of the estimand’s estimate for the model with and without the fallible
proxy of unmeasured covariates that were true confounders.

Research Question 4
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
fallible proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process: Generating Fallible Proxy Variables
Figure 30 shows a data generation structure consisting of seven variables, six measured
variables, and one unmeasured variable, U5. Most of the model variables, B, Z, C, U5, and Y,
were normally distributed with a of mean zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1), whereas
the model proxy variables, P5, was generated in conjunction with the true unmeasured
confounder, U5. Similar to Study 1, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse
logit transformation of a linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) in
their original article. The causal effect estimate of interest was the effect of treatment T over
outcome Y, which was set to a constant value of 3. Covariate C was a true confounder impacting
both the treatment assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacted
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treatment assignment T, whereas the covariate B only impacted outcome variable Y. U5 was a
true confounder and, P5 was its perfect proxy (i.e., rU5.P5 > 0.9).
Similar to the data generation approach employed by Cole and Preacher in their Monte
Carlo simulation study (Cole & Preacher, 2014), the fallible proxy variables - P5a, P5b, P5c, P5d,
P5e, and P5f - were conceptualized as fallible versions of the infallible proxy variable P5. Cole
and Preacher report that for the articles included in their meta-synthesis, it is not common to
report the reliability of the variable or address measurement error. Of the 535 variables included
in the model for which reliability was reported, they report that the median reliability was 0.84,
with about one-third (33.6%) of the variables having reliabilities lower than 0.80 and only one in
twelve variables (8.3%) had reliability values of less than 0.70. Through Monte Carlo simulation,
they show that reliability indexes lower than 0.80 can be a cause of concern.

Figure 30. Data generation process for Study 4.
Note. Covariates U5 is shaded as it is an unmeasured covariate, and P5 is its perfect proxy (r > 0.9) with random
error. P5a is a perfect proxy (r > 0.9), whereas P5a, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f reliability index with P5 ranging from 1.0
to 0.75, as noted. Error terms are omitted from the diagram.
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Based on these considerations, in Study 4, six reliability indexes with values ranging
from 1.0 to 0.75, with a 0.05 decrement, were employed. First, the infallible variable P5 was
generated, and then its fallible proxies with lower reliability indexes were generated such that
their correlation was as desired. Note that the fallible proxies were not generated directly from
the unobserved variable, U5 and no causal arrow pointed to any of these variables.
Per the modified disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC), variables Z, C, and B were
included in the causal effect estimation along with one proxy variable at a time (P5a, P5b, P5c, P5d,
P5e, and P5f) for the unmeasured true confounder variable U5. However, it should be noted that
U5, being an unmeasured true confounder covariate, could not be included in the causal effect
estimation model as it was not available for inclusion.
One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample sizes (nobs
= {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship depicted in
Figure 30 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072004 was used
for the fourth study. The structural equation was similar to the one in Study 1, except for creating
three additional proxy variables of varying linear correlation with the unmeasured true
confounder variable.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈5 , 𝑃5 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝜀𝑃5𝑎 ~ 𝑁 (0.0, 1.0); 𝜀𝑃5𝑧 ~ 𝑁 (0.1, 1.5) 𝜀𝑃5𝑏 𝜀𝑃5𝑐 𝜀𝑃5𝑑 𝜀𝑃5𝑒 𝜀𝑃5𝑓 ~ 𝑁 (0.1, 1.5)
𝑃5𝑎 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑎 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑎 = 1.0, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑧 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑧 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑧 = 1.0, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑏 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑏 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑏 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑐 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑐 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑐 = 0.90, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑑 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑑 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑑 = 0.85, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑒 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑒 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑒 = 0.80, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑓 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑓 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑓 = 0.75, where r is the bivariate correlation
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1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈5 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 4𝑈5 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
Method and Analysis
After the data was generated, the causal effect was estimated using the modified
disjunctive cause criterion (MDCC). Though multiple proxy variables with varying degrees of
measurement errors and reliability indexes were generated, only one of them was included in the
causal effect estimation model at a time. Hence, six distinct causal effect estimation models were
generated for Study 4. Using regression and propensity score methods employing propensity
score matching, all four models to estimate the causal effect included the variables Z, C, B, and T
and one of the following six proxies P5a, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f, respectively. For each model,
the performance measures––bias, coverage, and empirical SE––were calculated as previously
discussed, and then the models were compared with each other on the performance measures.
The first model––the one with Z, C, B, P5a, and T––was comparable to the model generated in
Study 1 and Study 3 in that it had a perfect proxy (r > 0.9) of a true unmeasured confounder and
was considered as the base model. Note that each of the error terms for P5b - P5z was drawn from
a normal distribution with a non-zero mean and higher variability ~ N (0.1, 1.5). The other five
models had fallible proxies and were compared to the base model. The analysis showed if the
modified disjunctive cause criterion recommendation to include a proxy variable of a true
unmeasured confounder was robust irrespective of the measurement error in the proxy variable.
The next chapter reports the findings and the implications of the findings for the four MC
simulations studies.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Overview
This chapter summarizes the results of the four Monte Carlo simulation studies proposed
in Chapter 3. The studies evaluated the recommendation to include a proxy covariate of an
unmeasured true confounder covariate in the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criteria
(VanderWeele, 2019). VanderWeele and Shpitser had previously shown that including covariates
that satisfy the Disjunctive Cause Criterion (DCC) yields the most consistent and efficient causal
effect estimator compared to models that included all the covariates or just the common cause
(also known as confounders) covariates (CC) (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). As a reminder,
the Disjunctive Cause Criterion recommends including covariates that impact the treatment OR
the outcome in linear regression or propensity score methods employed to estimate the causal
effect.
This research builds on their work by comparing the recommendations of the Modified
Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC) with that of the Disjunctive Cause Criterion (DCC) and
Common Cause (CC) criterion. The Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion subsumes all the
recommendations of the Disjunctive Cause Criteria. In addition, the MDCC approach
recommends including the proxy covariate of an unmeasured true confounder in the causal
effect estimation model to reduce confounding bias and exclude instrumental variables to
prevent bias amplification (VanderWeele, 2019). These additional recommendations were
evaluated separately by comparing two separate models. One of the models, MDCC*, only
implements the recommendation to include the proxy covariate, while the other model, MDCC,
includes the proxy covariate and excludes the instrumental variable. For comprehensiveness, a
model that included measured common causes (true confounders) and proxies of unmeasured
common causes (true confounders) has also been evaluated. This new approach is called the
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Modified Common Cause (MCC) criterion. This study evaluated the five causal effect estimation
models described and were compared on three performance measures – bias, coverage, and
empirical SE. The different covariate selection approaches were implemented using two causal
estimation methods - using linear regression and propensity score estimation methods.
Four studies were conducted where linear regression and propensity score methods were
employed to create five models (CC, DCC, MDCC*, MDCC, MCC) to estimate the causal effect
– Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and tabulates the results, for six sample sizes (18, 36, 70,
137, 265, 1,000). Each study was designed to progressively build on one another. The first study
evaluated the efficacy of the MDCC covariate selection approach to the DCC approach in the
presence of a true unmeasured confounder. Study 2 relaxes the requirement for the unmeasured
covariate to be a true confounder. Study 3 evaluates the findings of Study 1 for proxies that have
different linear correlation with the unmeasured true confounder. Study 4 further builds on Study
3 by introducing measurement error to the proxy covariate. For each study, five models using
linear regression and propensity score methods were compared on the efficiency – bias (small
value is preferred) and coverage (large value is preferred) – and consistency – empirical SE
(small value is preferred) – of the causal effect estimator. The Monte Carlo simulation was
conducted using R Studio v 1.4.1106. This chapter first briefly summarizes the estimand and the
performance measures. The following section summarizes the five linear regression models and
the covariates included in each model, followed by a section explaining parameters related to the
propensity score methods. To ensure comparability with VanderWeele and Shpitser’s
recommendations, their 2011 simulation study was replicated and reported. Finally, the results
from each of the four studies are reported. Results interpretation and discussion is included in the
next chapter.
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Estimand for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
As noted in chapter 3, the estimand (E) of interest in this research for all four studies is
the true average treatment effect (ATE). The effect of T on Y was set to a pre-determined value
of 3 for all the studies by fixing the treatment's value outcome during the data generation
process. Each simulation replication estimates the estimand of interest, denoted by 𝜃̂𝑖 for the ith
replication. The mean of all the 𝜃̂𝑖 s was denoted by 𝜃̅ and is the arithmetic mean of the
estimand’s estimate across all the simulation replications, an estimate for 𝐸(𝜃̂𝑖 ).

Performance Measure for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
Morris et al. (2019) note it is often a desirable property for the estimator 𝜃̂ of the
estimand 𝜃 to be consistent and efficient. For a large number of replications, the estimands’
estimate across all the simulation runs, i.e., the mean of all the 𝜃̂𝑖 s denoted by 𝜃̅ should be equal
to 𝜃. It is also a desirable property for the estimated estimand for each replication (𝜃̂𝑖 ) to be
unbiased for 𝜃 in finite samples, i.e., 𝐸(𝜃̂𝑖 ) = 𝜃 (Morris et al., 2019). Any arithmetic difference
between the estimated estimand 𝜃̂𝑖 (estimate of 𝜃 within a simulation replication) or 𝜃̅ (estimate
of 𝜃 across all the simulation replications) and 𝜃 (the true value of the estimand, 3), on average,
is defined as bias. For the four studies in this research, bias was calculated as the arithmetic
difference between the 𝜃̂𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝜃̅ and 𝜃, where 𝜃 value was fixed to 3. Additionally, the confidence
interval calculated for the estimated estimand across all the simulation runs, 𝜃̅, should have the
property that at least 100(1 − 𝛼)% of the intervals contain 𝜃 (Morris et al., 2019). This
performance measure is known as coverage. Also, the estimating process of the estimand should
be as efficient as possible. Efficiency of the estimation process can be examined by computing
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the true variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂) across all the simulation replications. A small value for 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃̂)
indicates an efficient estimator of 𝜃. This performance measure is known as empirical SE.

Parameters of Linear Regression for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
Using RStudio, for each study, five multiple regression models were conducted to
estimate the causal effect of 𝑻 → 𝒀, by regressing the outcome (Y) on treatment (T) and sets of
covariates that satisfied the commonly employed covariate selection criteria as explained below:
a) Linear regression Model 1 only included measured common causes, true confounders
(CC), i.e., covariates that impacted the treatment AND the outcome.
b) Linear regression Model 2 only included covariates that satisfied the Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (DCC), i.e., covariates that impacted the treatment OR the outcome.
c) Linear regression Model 3 only included covariates that satisfied the inclusion of proxy
covariates recommendation of the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC*) i.e.,
covariates that impacted the treatment OR the outcome AND any proxy covariate of an
unmeasured true confounder.
d) Linear regression Model 4 included only included covariates that satisfied the entire
Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC) – inclusion of proxy covariates and
exclusion of instrumental variables; i.e., covariates that impacted the treatment OR the
outcome AND any proxy covariate of an unmeasured true confounder BUT not
instrumental variables.
e) Linear regression Model 5 only included measured common causes (same as Model 1)
and the proxy of unmeasured common causes (per the Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion) i.e., measured and proxies of unmeasured covariates impacting the treatment
AND the outcome. Model 5 was called the Modified Common Cause (MCC) criterion.
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The treatment coefficient and the associated standard error from each replication (nsim =
1,000) are used to calculate the three performance measures for linear regression.

Parameters of Propensity Score Methods for all the Simulation Studies (1 – 4)
The causal effect was also estimated using propensity score methods for each study. Five
models were employed to estimate five different propensity scores in the propensity score
estimation step. As in the linear regression, each propensity score estimation model included
covariates that satisfied the CC, DCC, MDCC*, MDCC, and MCC criteria described above. The
propensity score was estimated using logistic regression with the first-order and quadratic terms
and all two-way and three-way interaction terms for all the variables. After the propensity score
was estimated, matching was performed using the following parameters – 1:1 greedy matching
with replacement using caliper of width 0.25 SD. After the matching was performed the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE) causal effect was estimated using propensity score in the causal
estimation model. The propensity score methods were employed using the MATCH function in
the Matching package (Sekhon, 2008) in statistical software R. The cases were not weighted to
account for using the same cases in multiple matches. All these parameters are consistent with
the simulation study conducted by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011). As noted in Chapter 3,
based on study by de Winter et al. (2016), several small sample sizes are considered in this study.
For linear regression modeling, six sample sizes {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000} were considered.
However, it should be noted that the propensity score methods were only conducted for sample
sizes 70, 137, 265, and 1,000 as the small two sample sizes of 18 and 36 did not yield proper
matches.
The next section summarizes the replication of the Disjunctive Cause Criterion
simulation study conducted by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011).
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Results From Replication of VanderWeele and Shpitser’s 2011 Study
The first step was to conduct a replication study to recreate the Monte Carlo simulation
study findings by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011). The replication study helped get a better
insight into the following: a) identifying the steps needed for causal modeling using linear
regression and propensity score methods; b) identifying the R packages used for both procedures
that could produce similar results; and c) identifying the parameter settings employed within the
R packages in the original study. The methodological summary, data generation equations, and
the propensity score method particulars listed in the original 2011 article––one that introduced
DCC––were used as the basis to replicate the study findings. Table 9 below shows that the
findings from the original study were successfully replicated in its entirety.

Table 9. Results from VanderWeele and Shpitser’s 2011 Study and its Replication Study (Fig. 1)
Results from
VanderWeele 2011
study
All Covariates
Only Common Cause
Covariate
Only Covariates
satisfying Disjunctive
Cause Criterion
Results from the
replication study
All Covariates
Only Common Cause
Covariate
Only Covariates
satisfying Disjunctive
Cause Criterion

Linear Regression
Propensity Score Methods
Mean
% Within Mean
% Within
95% CI
95% CI
(ATE)
CI
(ATE)
CI
1.75

[1.46, 2.04]

0.0%

1.76

[1.35, 2.16]

0.0%

4.37

[3.87, 4.88]

0.0%

4.37

[3.75, 4.99]

0.0%

3.00

[2.58, 3.42]

94.4%

2.99

[2.46, 3.53]

96.2%

Linear Regression
Propensity Score Methods
Mean
% Within Mean
% Within
95% CI
95% CI
(ATE)
CI
(ATE)
CI
1.75

[1.46 , 2.05]

0.0%

1.75

[1.40 , 2.10]

0.0%

4.37

[3.87 , 4.88]

0.0%

4.38

[3.81 , 4.94]

0.0%

3.00

[2.58 , 3.42]

93.8%

3.00

[2.53 , 3.47]

95.0%
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Study 1: Investigating the Recommendation to Include a Proxy of a True Unmeasured
Confounder
Research Question 1
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including a perfect proxy of an unmeasured true
confounder covariate in the causal effect estimation model compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 31 shows a data generation structure that consists of seven variables: six measured
variables, and one unmeasured variable, U1. Most of the variables in the model, B, Z, C, U1, and
Y, were normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1). In
contrast, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a
linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser in their 2011 study. The causal effect
estimate of interest is the effect of treatment T over outcome Y, which was set to a constant value
of 3. Covariate C is a true confounder that impacts both the treatment assignment T and outcome
Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacts the treatment assignment T, and the covariate B only
impacts the outcome variable Y. This structure is comparable to the data generation structure
employed by VanderWeele and Shpitser in their 2011 study. The only addition is the inclusion of
the unmeasured covariate U1 and its proxy P1. U1 is a true confounder, and P1 is its perfect proxy
(i.e., rU1,P1 > 0.9) and was generated such that the bivariate correlation between U1 and P1 is
equal to 0.95. Per the 2011 Disjunctive Cause Criterion, variables Z, C, and B should be included
in the causal effect estimation, whereas P1 would not be included as it does not directly impact
the treatment assignment T or the outcome variable Y. It should be noted that U1, being an
unmeasured true confounder covariate, cannot be included in the causal effect estimation model
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as it is not observed and hence is not available for inclusion. However, the Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (MDCC) covariate selection approach recommends the inclusion of the
unmeasured covariates proxy and hence P1 would be included in the causal effect estimation
model.

Figure 31. Data generation process for Study 1.
Note. Covariate U1 is shaded as it is an unmeasured true confounder covariate and P1 is its perfect proxy [𝑟𝑈1,𝑃1 =
0.95].

The simulation seed of 072001 was used for the first study.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈1 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈1 ,𝑃1 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (3𝑈1 + 𝐶 + 2𝑍) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 3𝑈1 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
Table 10 shows the mean and standard deviation for all the generated variables, except
for the error terms, by sample size, over 1,000 replications. The table also shows the percentage
of 1,000 replications for which the treatment (T) had a value of 1 as well as the average
correlation between U1 and P1 over the 1,000 replications. It shows that the data generated is
consistent with the equations in this section.
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics Over 1,000 Replications of the Generated Variables Included in
Models for Study 1 by Sample Size
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

Z
Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

C
Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Covariates
B
Mean SD
0.00 0.98
0.00 0.99
0.00 1.00
0.00 0.99
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00

P1
Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.89
0.93
0.96
0.98
0.99
1.00

T
%T=1
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%

Cor
(U1,P1)
𝜌 = 0.95
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.95

Results
Table 11 shows the covariates from Figure 31 that were included in the linear regression
model estimating the causal effect. In addition to the covariates, quadratic and all two-way and
three-way interaction terms were included in the propensity score estimation step of propensity
score methods.
Table 12 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 1. Consistent with findings from the article by VanderWeele and
Shpitser (2011), all estimated treatment effects were biased in the presence of an unmeasured
confounder. The recommendation to include the proxy of the unmeasured covariate had
tremendous impact in reducing the bias. Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5
(MCC), which included the proxy covariate (P1) of the unmeasured true confounder (U1) had the
lowest amount of bias. Only, the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized in the
narrative, but results for other sample sizes can be found in the results tables 12 and 13.
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Over 1,000 replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications for sample
size = 1,000 was 4.91 and CI = [4.29, 5.54] for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for DCC; 3.22
and CI = [3.04 , 3.41] for MDCC*; 3.21 and CI = [3.03, 3.39] for MDCC; and 3.20 and CI =
[3.02, 3.38] for MCC. The average bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for
sample size = 1,000 were greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3
(MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC), though statistically Models 3 – 5 had
comparable amount of bias. Over 1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence
level for the five models were 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 33.8% (MDCC*); 36.9%, (MDCC); and
37.3% (MCC). The efficiency of the estimator – empirical SE – of 0.01 was the same for Models
3 – 5, with models 1 and 2 had an empirical SE of 0.06.
Table 11. Covariates from Figure 31 Used in linear Regression and Propensity Score Estimation
Models
Model

Model 1 (CC)

Covariate terms Included in
the Linear Regression to
estimate Causal Effect

Covariate terms Included in the
Propensity Score estimation step of
PSM

C

C, C2

Model 2 (DCC)

Z, C, B

Model 3 (MDCC*)

Z, C, B, P1

Model 4 (MDCC)

C, B, P1

Model 5 (MCC)

C, P1

Z, C, B, Z2, C2, B2,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (C*B),
(Z*C*B)
Z, C, B, P1, Z2, C2, B2, P12,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (Z* P1), (C*B),
(C* P1), (B*P1),
(Z*C*B), (Z*C* P1), (Z*CB* P1),
(C*B* P1),
(Z*C*B* P1)
C, B, P1, C2, B2, P12,
(C*B), (C* P1), (B*P1),
(C*B* P1)
C, P1, C2, P12,
(C* P1)
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Table 13 provides the results using propensity score matching for Study 1. Model 3
(MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC) that included the proxy covariate (P1) of the
unmeasured true confounder (U1) had the lowest amount of bias. Over 1,000 replications, the
average causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 were 4.91 and CI =
[4.20, 5.63] for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.24, 5.78] for DCC; 3.24 and CI = [2.48, 4.00] for MDCC*,
3.23 and CI = [2.56, 3.89] for MDCC; and 3.21 and CI = [2.55 , 3.87] for MCC. Similar to the
findings using linear regression causal estimation, the average bias in the causal effect estimates
using propensity score methods, across replications for sample size = 1,000, were greatest for
Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5
(MCC). These findings were consistent with what Strumer et al. (2006) found that most studies
showed little different between the two methods. Considering the Monte Carlo estimation
standard errors, Models 3 – 5 have statistically comparable amount of bias. Over 1,000
replications, the average coverage for the five models were 0% (CC), 0% (DCC), 98.7%
(MDCC*), 98.0%, (MDCC), and 90.4% (MCC). The efficiency of the estimator – empirical SE –
of 0.01 was the same for Models 3 – 5, while that for both Models 1 and 2 was 0.06. For
propensity score methods, over 1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level
for the five models were 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 98.7% (MDCC*); 98%, (MDCC); and 90.4%
(MCC).
The results summarized in Table 12 and Table 13 show that for almost all sample sizes,
the magnitude of the bias for Model 1 (CC) is slightly less than that for Model 2 (DCC) for both
the linear regression and propensity score methods. For sample sizes 18 and 137, Model 1 (CC)
has biases of 1.75 and 1.87, respectively, while Model 2 (DCC) has biases of 1.98 and 2.01,
respectively. For Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC), as expected, the
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bias decreases as the sample size increases. For comparable sample sizes, similar values of
empirical SE can be found for Models 3 (MDCC*) and Model 4 (MDCC) which indicates that
the linear regression and the propensity scores are efficient estimators. Additionally, within each
estimation method, as the sample size increases the empirical SE value decreases suggesting the
efficiency of the causal effect estimator improves with sample size, as expected.
Based on Study 1, it can be concluded that the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion
(MDCC) results in more consistent and efficient causal effect estimates in the presence of
unmeasured true confounders. In addition, the novel method suggested here – Modified Common
Cause (MCC) – criterion also has comparable results.
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Table 12. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 1 – Linear Regression
Cor(U1,P1) = 0.95

Common Cause
Criterion: LR_Model1
[Y ~ T + C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model2
[Y ~ T + Z + C + B]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3
[Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P1]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model4
[Y ~ T + C + B + P1]

Modified Common
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model5
[Y ~ T + C + P1]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

4.75
4.94
4.98
4.87
4.89
4.91
4.98
5.02
5.05
5.01
5.01
5.01
3.34
3.29
3.28
3.23
3.23
3.22
3.34
3.27
3.26
3.22
3.22
3.21
3.13
3.27
3.28
3.17
3.18
3.20

1.75
1.94
1.98
1.87
1.89
1.91
1.98
2.02
2.05
2.01
2.01
2.01
0.34
0.29
0.28
0.23
0.23
0.22
0.34
0.27
0.26
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.13
0.27
0.28
0.17
0.18
0.20

(-0.16, 9.66)
(1.58, 8.29)
(2.58, 7.38)
(3.17, 6.56)
(3.67, 6.10)
(4.29, 5.54)
(1.71, 8.25)
(2.89, 7.14)
(3.56, 6.54)
(3.96, 6.05)
(4.26, 5.76)
(4.63, 5.40)
(1.49, 5.20)
(2.16, 4.42)
(2.52, 4.04)
(2.71, 3.75)
(2.86, 3.59)
(3.04, 3.41)
(1.6, 5.07)
(2.19, 4.35)
(2.53, 4.00)
(2.72, 3.73)
(2.86, 3.57)
(3.03, 3.39)
(1.4, 4.86)
(2.19, 4.36)
(2.54, 4.01)
(2.66, 3.67)
(2.83, 3.54)
(3.02, 3.38)

87.4%
78.8%
62.8%
43.3%
14.5%
0.0%
76.7%
54.3%
22.6%
3.9%
0.2%
0.0%
91.6%
90.6%
89.6%
85.8%
76.9%
33.8%
91.5%
92.0%
89.4%
85.9%
77.6%
36.9%
54.9%
51.1%
49.9%
51.1%
42.0%
37.3%

Empirical
SE
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01

Note. Seed: 072001; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U1,P1): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 13. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 1 – Propensity Score Methods
Cor(U1,P1) = 0.95
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3 [Z, C, B, P1]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4 [C, B, P1]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5 [C, P1]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.86
4.92
4.98
4.91
5.00
5.03
5.03
5.01
3.32
3.28
3.24
3.24
3.29
3.25
3.24
3.23
3.22
3.28
3.25
3.21

1.86
1.92
1.98
1.91
2.00
2.03
2.03
2.01
0.32
0.28
0.24
0.24
0.29
0.25
0.24
0.23
0.22
0.28
0.25
0.21

ATE 95%
CI
(2.28, 7.45)
(2.99, 6.84)
(3.58, 6.37)
(4.20, 5.63)
(2.43, 7.58)
(3.06, 7.01)
(3.57, 6.50)
(4.24, 5.78)
(0.74, 5.89)
(1.29, 5.27)
(1.78, 4.70)
(2.48, 4.00)
(0.95, 5.64)
(1.49, 5.01)
(1.96, 4.52)
(2.56, 3.89)
(0.84, 5.59)
(1.50, 5.05)
(1.95, 4.54)
(2.55, 3.87)

Coverage
68.7%
50.0%
21.6%
0.0%
69.8%
46.4%
16.2%
0.0%
97.8%
99.2%
99.3%
98.7%
98.6%
99.2%
99.6%
98.0%
92.5%
93.9%
93.5%
90.4%

Empirical
SE
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

Note. Seed: 072001; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U1,P1): 0.95; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

The next section summarizes Study 2 where the assumption of the unmeasured is a true
confounder is relaxed to see its implication on the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect
estimate.

159

Study 2: Investigating the Violation of Recommendation to Only Include a Proxy Variable
of an Unmeasured True Confounder
VanderWeele notes that including the proxy of an unmeasured confounder does not
always guarantee bias reduction (VanderWeele, 2019). He states that if the presumed proxy of
the unmeasured confounder, if in reality, is just a proxy of the unmeasured covariate that impacts
only the treatment assignment or the outcome, inclusion of such proxies may inadvertently
introduce collider bias. However, to only include proxy variables of true confounders is a very
stringent requirement. Researchers may not know with certainty that an unmeasured covariate is
a true confounder (Steiner et al., 2010) and so this requirement warrants more careful
examination. To mimic real-life situations, Study 2 investigated the robustness of the
recommendations to only include proxies of unmeasured true confounders in the underlying data
generation structure and its impact on the efficiency and consistency of the causal effect
estimate. Unlike in Study 1, where the unmeasured covariate (U1) was a true unmeasured
confounder, in Study 2a, the unmeasured covariate (U2) only impacted the treatment (T), and in
Study 2b, the unmeasured covariate (U3) only impacted the outcome (Y).

Research Question 2a
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but only impacts the
treatment assignment, compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 32 shows data generation structure for Study 2a. It shows the unmeasured
covariate U2 is not a true confounder as it only impacts the treatment assignment T. Data
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generation structures of studies 1 and 2a are identical, except that the unmeasured covariate in
Study 1 was a true confounder and in Study 2a it only impacted the treatment assignment. In
addition to the unmeasured covariates, the data generation structure consists of six other
variables. Similar to the parameters in Study 1, most of the observed variables in the model, B, Z,
C, and Y, as well as the proxy variable, P2, were normally distributed with a mean of zero and
standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1). Similar to Study 1, the treatment assignment was
dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a linear function as performed by
VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011). The causal effect estimate of interest is the effect of treatment
T over outcome Y, which is set to a constant value of 3. Covariate C was a true confounder that
impacts both the treatment assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only
impacts treatment assignment T, whereas covariate B only impacts outcome Y. The unmeasured
covariates U2 had a perfect proxy covariate P2. Perfect proxies are proxies that have a linear
correlation of greater than 0.9 with the unmeasured covariate they represent (i.e., rU2.P2 > 0.9).
The simulation seed of 072002 is used for the first study. Table 14 shows the mean and
standard deviation over 1,000 replications for all the generated variables, except for the error
terms, by sample size. The table also shows the percentage of 1,000 replications for which the
treatment (T) had a value of 1 as well as the average correlation between U2 and P2 over the
1,000 replications.
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Figure 32. Data generation process for Study 2a.

The simulation seed of 072002 was used for the Study 2a.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈2 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈2 ,𝑃2 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈2 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)

Table 14. Descriptive Statistics over 1,000 Replications of the Generated Variables Included in
Model for Study 2a by Sample Size
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

Z

Covariates
B

C

U2

P2

T

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

%T=1

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.99
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.98
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.89
0.93
0.96
0.97
0.99
1.00

50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
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Cor
(U2,P2)
𝜌
= 0.95
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.95

Results
Table 15 shows the covariates from Figure 32 that were included in the linear regression
model estimating the causal effect. In addition to the covariates, quadratic and interaction terms
were included in the propensity score estimation step of propensity score methods.

Table 15. Covariates From Figure 32 Used in Linear Regression and Propensity Score
Estimation Models
Model

Model 1 (CC)
Model 2 (DCC)

Covariate terms included in
the linear regression to
estimate causal effect

Covariate terms included in the
propensity score estimation step of
PSM

C

C, C2

Z, C, B

Z, C, B, Z2, C2, B2,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (C*B),
(Z*C*B)

Model 3 (MDCC*)

Z, C, B, P2

Model 4 (MDCC)

C, B, P2

Model 5 (MCC)

C, P2

Z, C, B, P2, Z2, C2, B2, P22,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (Z* P2), (C*B),
(C* P2), (B*P2),
(Z*C*B), (Z*C* P2), (Z*CB* P2),
(C*B* P2),
(Z*C*B* P2)
C, B, P2, C2, B2, P22,
(C*B), (C* P2), (B*P2),
(C*B* P3)
C, P2, C2, P22,
(C* P2)

Table 16 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 2a. The results show that as the unmeasured covariate (U2) is not a true
confounder, the inclusion of its proxy covariate (P2) has no impact on the causal effect
estimation. It should be noted that the proxy covariate’s inclusion does not adversely impact the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimation. For a sample size of 1,000, none of the
five models had any bias. However, the coverage value of Model 5 (MCC) was the lowest.
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Tables 16 and 17 shows that all the sample sizes produce similar results. In the narrative only the
largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized so as to focus on the differences between
models and not impacted by variability due to smaller sample sizes.
Over the 1,000 replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications for
sample size = 1,000 was 3.00 and CI = [2.48, 3.51] for CC; 3.00 and CI = [2.87, 3.13] for DCC;
3.00 and CI = [2.86, 3.13] for MDCC*; 3.00 and CI = [2.87, 3.13] for MDCC; 3.00 and CI =
[2.87, 3.13] for MCC. The average bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for
sample size = 1,000 were comparable across all the five models, though the efficiency of the
causal effect estimator improves as the sample size increases. Table 16 shows that as the sample
size increases, for all five models (Models 1 – 5), the width of the 95% CI and the empirical SE
values decrease suggesting an improvement in the causal effect estimator. Additionally, focusing
on the empirical SE values for three sample sizes––18, 137, and 1,000––across the five models
shows that, Model 5 (MCC) was the least efficient estimator, followed by Model 1 (CC), while
Model 2 (DCC), Model 3 (MDCC*), and Model 4 (MDCC) were comparable in the efficiency
metric. Over the 1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five
models is 94.1% (CC); 94.6% (DCC); 95.3% (MDCC*); 95.2%, (MDCC); and 38.8% (MCC).
The efficiency of the estimator––empirical SE––for Models 2 (DCC), 3 (MDCC*), and 4
(MDCC) is 0.00, while that for Models 1 (CC) and 5 (MCC) is 0.01.
Table 17 shows results for the propensity score matching for Study 2a. Similar to the
results for linear regression, these results show that as the unmeasured covariate (U2) is not a true
confounder, the inclusion of its proxy covariate (P2) has no impact on the causal effect
estimation and following the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC) recommendations
does not negatively impact the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate.

164

Table 16. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 2a – Linear Regression
Cor(U2,P2) = 0.95

Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[ Y ~ T+ C ]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P2 ]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P2 ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5
[ Y ~ T + C + P2 ]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

2.95
3.01
2.97
3.00
3.02
3.00
2.98
3.00
2.99
3.01
3.00
3.00
2.97
3.00
2.99
3.01
3.00
3.00
2.99
3.01
2.99
3.01
2.99
3.00
2.90
3.01
2.96
3.01
3.02
3.00

-0.05
0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.02
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.03
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.10
0.01
-0.04
0.01
0.02
0.00

ATE 95%
Empirical
Coverage
CI
SE
(-1.10, 7.00)
94.5%
0.06
(0.27, 5.75)
93.7%
0.04
(1.01, 4.92)
93.8%
0.03
(1.60, 4.40)
94.6%
0.02
(2.02, 4.02)
95.4%
0.02
(2.48, 3.51)
94.1%
0.01
(1.90, 4.05)
93.5%
0.02
(2.29, 3.70)
93.9%
0.01
(2.49, 3.48)
94.4%
0.01
(2.66, 3.36)
94.1%
0.01
(2.75, 3.25)
95.4%
0.00
(2.87, 3.13)
94.6%
0.00
(1.79, 4.15)
92.0%
0.02
(2.24, 3.76)
94.7%
0.01
(2.46, 3.51)
94.3%
0.01
(2.64, 3.38)
94.5%
0.01
(2.73, 3.26)
94.8%
0.00
(2.86, 3.13)
95.3%
0.00
(1.89, 4.08)
92.9%
0.02
(2.28, 3.73)
94.5%
0.01
(2.48, 3.49)
94.7%
0.01
(2.65, 3.37)
95.0%
0.01
(2.74, 3.25)
95.4%
0.00
(2.87, 3.13)
95.2%
0.00
(1.80, 4.00)
35.9%
0.07
(2.28, 3.73)
37.0%
0.05
(2.45, 3.46)
34.4%
0.03
(2.65, 3.37)
36.1%
0.02
(2.76, 3.27)
36.7%
0.02
(2.87, 3.13)
38.8%
0.01

Note. Seed: 072002; Replications: 1,000; correlation (u2,p2): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications that
contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 17. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 2a – Propensity Score Methods
Cor(U2,P2) = 0.95
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]
Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3 [Z, C, B, P2]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4 [C, B, P2]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5 [C, P2]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

2.96
3.01
3.00
3.00
2.97
2.99
3.00
2.99
3.03
3.00
3.00
3.01
3.03
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.94
2.97
3.00
2.98

-0.04
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.03
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.06
-0.03
0.00
-0.02

ATE 95%
Empirical
Coverage
CI
SE
(0.83, 5.10)
91.6%
0.04
(1.44, 4.58)
92.6%
0.03
(1.85, 4.15)
95.1%
0.02
(2.41, 3.58)
93.6%
0.01
(0.84, 5.10)
99.6%
0.02
(1.36, 4.62)
99.5%
0.02
(1.78, 4.22)
99.8%
0.01
(2.35, 3.64) 100.0%
0.01
(0.74, 5.31)
98.3%
0.03
(1.21, 4.79)
99.5%
0.02
(1.64, 4.37)
99.6%
0.01
(2.28, 3.73) 100.0%
0.01
(0.84, 5.22)
99.1%
0.02
(1.29, 4.70)
99.8%
0.02
(1.71, 4.28) 100.0%
0.01
(2.31, 3.68) 100.0%
0.01
(0.58, 5.29)
90.6%
0.04
(1.18, 4.75)
94.4%
0.03
(1.67, 4.32)
95.9%
0.02
(2.29, 3.67)
96.0%
0.01

Note. Seed: 072002; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U2,P2): 0.95; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

The next section discusses Study 2b and related findings in greater detail.

Research Question 2b
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but only impacts the
outcome of interest, compared to not including it?
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Data Generation Process
Figure 33 shows data generation structures for Study 2b. It shows the unmeasured
covariate U3 is not a true confounder as it only impacts the treatment outcome Y. Data generation
structures of studies 1 and 2b are identical, except that the unmeasured covariate in Study 1 was
a true confounder and in Study 2b it only impacts the outcome. In addition to the unmeasured
covariates, the data generation structure consists of six other variables. Similar to the parameters
in Study 1, all the observed variables in the model, B, Z, C, and Y, as well as the proxy variable,
P3, was normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1).
However, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a
linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) in their original article. The
causal effect estimate of interest is the effect of treatment T over outcome Y, which is set to a
constant value of 3. Covariate C is a true confounder that impacts both the treatment assignment
T and outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacts treatment assignment T, whereas
covariate B only impacts outcome Y. The unmeasured covariates U3 has a perfect proxy covariate
P3. Perfect proxies are proxies that have a linear correlation of greater than 0.9 with the
unmeasured covariate they represent (i.e., rU3.P3 > 0.9).
The simulation seed of 072002 is used for Study 2b. Table 12 shows the mean and
standard deviation over 1,000 replications for all the generated variables, except for the error
terms, by sample size. The table also shows the percentage of 1,000 replications for which the
treatment (T) had a value of 1 as well as the average correlation between U3 and P3 over the
1,000 replications.
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Figure 33. Data generation process for Study 2b.
Note. The simulation seed of 072002 was used for the Study 2b.

𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈3 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈3 ,𝑃3 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + +3𝑈3 + 4𝐵 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)

Table 18. Descriptive Statistics over 1,000 Replications of the Generated Variables Included in
Model for Study 2b by Sample Size
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

Z
Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

C
Mean
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Covariates
B
U3
P3
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
0.00 0.99 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.89
0.00 0.98 -0.01 1.00 0.00 0.93
0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.96
0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.97
0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99
0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
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T
%T=1
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%

Cor
(U3,P3)
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.95

Results
Table 19 shows the covariates from Figure 4.3 that were included in the linear regression
model estimating the causal effect. In addition to the covariates, quadratic and interaction terms
were included in the propensity score estimation step of propensity score methods.
Table 20 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 2b. The results show that when the unmeasured covariate (U3) is not a
true confounder and only impacts outcome Y, the inclusion of its proxy covariate (P3) has no
impact on the causal effect estimation. Similar to the results from Study 2a, the proxy covariate’s
inclusion does not adversely impact the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect
estimation. For a sample size of 1,000, none of the models had bias. Consistent with the findings
in Study 2a, the coverage value of Model 5 (MCC) was the lowest.
Tables 20 and 21 shows that all the sample sizes produce similar results. In the narrative
only the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized so as to focus on the differences
between models and not impacted by variability due to smaller sample sizes. Over the 1,000
replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 is
2.99 and CI = [2.35, 3.62] for CC; 2.99 and CI = [2.58, 3.40] for DCC; 3.00 and CI = [2.82,
3.17] for MDCC*; 3.00 and CI = [2.82, 3.17] for MDCC; 2.99 and CI = [2.82, 3.16] for MCC.
Similar to Study 2a, the average bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for sample
size = 1,000 were comparable across all the five models. However, it should be noted that the
standard error of the bias for the models in Study 2b was larger than that in Study 2a. Over the
1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 95.4%
(CC); 95.3% (DCC); 94.1% (MDCC*); 94.6%, (MDCC); and 49.0% (MCC).
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Table 19. Covariates From Figure 33 Used in Linear Regression and Propensity Score
Estimation Models
Model

Covariate terms included in
the linear regression to
estimate causal effect

Covariate terms included in the
propensity score estimation step of
PSM

Model 1 (CC)

C

C, C2

Z, C, B

Z, C, B, Z2, C2, B2,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (C*B),
(Z*C*B)

Model 2 (DCC)

Model 3 (MDCC*)

Z, C, B, P3

Model 4 (MDCC)

C, B, P3

Model 5 (MCC)

C, P3

Z, C, B, P3, Z2, C2, B2, P32,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (Z* P3), (C*B),
(C* P3), (B*P3),
(Z*C*B), (Z*C* P2), (Z*CB* P2),
(C*B* P3),
(Z*C*B* P3)
C, B, P3, C2, B2, P32,
(C*B), (C* P3), (B*P3),
(C*B* P3)
C, P2, C2, P32,
(C* P3)

Table 21 has similar results for the propensity score methods part of Study 2b. Similar to
the results for linear regression, these results show that as the unmeasured covariate (U3) is not a
true confounder, the inclusion of its proxy covariate (P3) has no impact on the causal effect
estimation and following the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC) recommendations
does not negatively impact the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate.
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Table 20. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 2b – Linear Regression
Cor(U3,P3) = 0.95

Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P3 ]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P3 ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5
[ Y ~ T + C + P3 ]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI Coverage

2.86
2.98
2.97
3.02
3.00
2.99
3.06
3.03
2.96
3.04
3.01
2.99
2.99
3.00
2.99
3.02
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.02
2.99
3.02
2.99
3.00
2.83
2.97
2.99
3.00
2.99
2.99

-0.14
-0.02
-0.03
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.06
0.03
-0.04
0.04
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
-0.01
0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.17
-0.03
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.01

(-2.17, 7.90)
(-0.43, 6.39)
(0.54, 5.39)
(1.28, 4.75)
(1.77, 4.24)
(2.35, 3.62)
(-0.41, 6.52)
(0.77, 5.29)
(1.39, 4.53)
(1.93, 4.16)
(2.21, 3.80)
(2.58, 3.40)
(1.19, 4.79)
(1.92, 4.09)
(2.26, 3.71)
(2.52, 3.52)
(2.64, 3.35)
(2.82, 3.17)
(1.34, 4.66)
(1.98, 4.05)
(2.29, 3.69)
(2.54, 3.50)
(2.65, 3.33)
(2.82, 3.17)
(1.17, 4.49)
(1.93, 4.01)
(2.29, 3.69)
(2.51, 3.48)
(2.65, 3.33)
(2.82, 3.16)

92.9%
94.1%
95.2%
95.6%
95.2%
95.4%
93.5%
93.5%
94.1%
95.7%
95.0%
95.3%
93.0%
93.9%
94.8%
94.0%
95.2%
94.1%
92.8%
93.5%
94.8%
94.3%
95.4%
94.6%
52.3%
51.3%
49.0%
46.9%
48.1%
49.0%

Empirical
SE
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01

Note. Seed: 072002; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U3,P3): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications that
contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 21. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 2b – Propensity Score Methods
Cor(U3,P3) = 0.95
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]
Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3 [Z, C, B, P3]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4 [C, B, P3]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5 [C, P3]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

2.88
2.98
3.03
2.98
2.96
2.93
3.01
2.99
2.97
2.98
2.99
2.99
2.98
3.00
2.98
3.00
2.95
2.98
3.01
2.99

-0.12
-0.02
0.03
-0.02
-0.04
-0.07
0.01
-0.01
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.05
-0.02
0.01
-0.01

ATE 95%
CI
(0.23, 5.52)
(1.03, 4.93)
(1.60, 4.45)
(2.25, 3.71)
(0.32, 5.60)
(0.91, 4.95)
(1.50, 4.51)
(2.19, 3.78)
(0.35, 5.60)
(0.96, 5.01)
(1.48, 4.49)
(2.20, 3.78)
(0.52, 5.44)
(1.13, 4.86)
(1.62, 4.34)
(2.29, 3.70)
(0.40, 5.50)
(1.07, 4.89)
(1.62, 4.40)
(2.27, 3.71)

Coverage
91.3%
93.3%
94.3%
94.3%
96.0%
98.2%
98.5%
99.2%
99.1%
99.8%
99.9%
100.0%
99.2%
100.0%
99.9%
100.0%
92.6%
95.7%
96.7%
95.7%

Empirical
SE
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

Note. Seed: 072002; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U3,P3): 0.95; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

Based on studies 2a and 2b, it can be concluded the recommendation to include the proxy
variable of the unmeasured confounder does not have any negative impact on the consistency
and efficiency of the causal effect estimate even if the unmeasured variable is not a true
confounder. The MDCC and MCC covariate selection approaches are robust to the unobserved
variable being a true confounder. The next section summarizes findings from Study 3.
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Study 3: Investigating the Inclusion of Imperfect Proxy Variable of an Unmeasured True
Confounder
In social sciences, the perfect proxy of a covariate (r > 0.90) is a rarity. Hence, it is of
interest to investigate inclusion of proxy covariates of varying linear strength with the
unmeasured true confounder and evaluate its impact on the consistency and efficiency of the
estimated causal effect. Study 3 examined this by varying the linear strength of the proxy
covariate with the unmeasured true confounder. One of the assumptions in this study is that
proxy variables are related to only one unmeasured variable that is a true confounder, and not to
multiple unmeasured covariates, i.e., the proxy covariate does not have a “M-structure” with two
unmeasured covariates. As discussed in Chapter 2, controlling for the middle node (collider
variable) of the M-structure results in increasing bias and must not be done (Ding & Miratrix,
2014; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). Additionally, even though multiple proxies can represent
an unmeasured true confounder, we only considered one proxy at a time in the causal effect
estimation modeling process.

Research Question 3
Relative to sample size, to what extent is there improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model an
imperfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 34 shows a data generation structure for Study 3. It consists of ten variables, nine
measured variables, and one unmeasured covariate, U4. With the exception of the treatment
assignment, T, all other variables in the model, B, Z, C, U4, P4a, P4b, P4c, P4d, and Y, were
normally distributed with of mean zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1). Similar to Study
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1, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse logit transformation of a linear
function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) in their original article. The causal
effect estimate of interest is the effect of treatment T over outcome Y, which is set to a constant
value of 3. Covariate C is a true confounder that impacts both the treatment assignment T and
outcome Y. The instrumental variable Z only impacts the treatment assignment T, whereas the
covariate B only impacts the outcome variable Y. U4 is a true confounder, and P4a is its perfect
proxy (i.e., rU4.P4a > 0.9).

Figure 34. Data generation process for Study 3.
Note. Covariates U4 is shaded as it is an unmeasured covariate, and P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d are its proxies. P4a is a
perfect proxy (r > 0.9), whereas P4b, P4c, and P4d are not as they have a linear correlation of 0.80, 0.40, and 0.20,
respectively. Error terms are omitted from the diagram.

Additionally, three imperfect proxies for the unmeasured covariate were generated. The
imperfect proxies were generated the same way as the perfect proxy P4a but using a lower linear
correlation value. To ensure that the ranges of coefficient correlations considered in this research
were representative of the correlations encountered in social science research, this research relies
on the recommendations by de Winter et al.’s (2016) meta-meta-synthesis of several other meta-
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analysis studies. Their research reports that the absolute correlation coefficients in social
psychology averaged 0.21, with 95% of the studies having coefficients between 0 and 0.50
shown to be the most common, while for the remaining 5% of the studies the correlation ranged
between 0.50 and 0.80. de Winter et al. report that in social science research a correlation value
of 0.20 can be considered of moderate strength, a correlation of 0.40 can be considered to
represent a strong relationship, whereas a correlation of 0.80 can be considered a very strong
relationship, but a rarity. Therefore, these three correlation values were adopted in this study, and
three imperfect proxy variables P4b, P4c, and P4d of U4 with linear correlations of 0.80, 0.40, and
0.20, respectively, were generated. Per the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion, variables Z, C,
and B were included in the causal effect estimation along with one proxy variable at a time (P4a,
P4b, P4c, and P4d) for the unmeasured true confounder variable U4. It should be noted that U4,
being an unmeasured true confounder covariate, could not be included in the causal effect
estimation model. One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample
sizes (nobs = {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship
depicted in Figure 34 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072003
is used for Study 3. The structural equation is similar to the one in Study 1, except for creating
three additional proxy variables of varying linear correlation with the unmeasured true
confounder.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈4 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑎 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑏 = 0.80, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑐 = 0.40, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑟𝑈4 ,𝑃4𝑑 = 0.20, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈4 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
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𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 4𝑈4 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)
Table 22 shows the mean and standard deviation over 1,000 replications for all the
generated variables, except for the error terms, by sample size. The table also shows the average
correlation between U4 and P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d over the 1,000 replications.
Table 22. Descriptive Statistics Over 1,000 Replications of the Generated Variables Included in
Model for Study 3 (Models 3a to 3d) by Sample Size
Covariates
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

Z
Mean
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C
SD
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Mean
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

B
SD
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Mean
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

U4
SD
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Mean
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

SD
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Covariates
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

P4a
r(U4,P4a) = 0.95

P4b
r(U4,P4b) = 0.80

P4c
r(U4,P4c) = 0.40

P4d
r(U4,P4d) = 0.20

Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Mean
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Mean
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00

SD
0.89
0.93
0.96
0.97
0.99
0.99

SD
0.91
0.94
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00

SD
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00

SD
0.98
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00

Correlation between U4 and its proxy variables
Sample Size

P4a
r(U4,P4a) = 0.95

P4b
r(U4,P4b) = 0.80

P4c
r(U4,P4c) = 0.40

P4d
r(U4,P4d) = 0.20

18
36
70
137
265
1,000

0.92
0.93
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.95

0.75
0.77
0.78
0.79
0.79
0.80

0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.39
0.40

0.17
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.20
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Results
Table 23 shows the covariates from Figure 34 that were included in the linear regression
model estimating the causal effect. In addition to the covariates, quadratic and interaction terms
were included in the propensity score estimation step of propensity score methods.

Table 23. Covariates From Figure 34 Used in Linear Regression and Propensity Score
Estimation Models
Model

Model 1 (CC)

Covariate terms included in
the linear regression to
estimate causal effect
C

Model 2 (DCC)

Z, C, B

Model 3 (MDCC*)

Z, C, B, P4

Model 4 (MDCC)

C, B, P4

Model 5 (MCC)

C, P4

Covariate terms included in the
propensity score estimation step of
PSM
C, C2
Z, C, B, Z2, C2, B2,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (C*B),
(Z*C*B)
Z, C, B, P4, Z2, C2, B2, P42,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (Z* P4), (C*B),
(C* P4), (B*P4),
(Z*C*B), (Z*C* P4), (Z*CB* P4),
(C*B* P4),
(Z*C*B* P4)
C, B, P4, C2, B2, P42,
(C*B), (C* P4), (B*P4),
(C*B* P4)
C, P4, C2, P42,
(C* P4)

Note: For the sake of readability variable P4 is included instead of P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d. For Study 3, models a, b, c,
and d variable P4 should be substituted by P4a, P4b, P4c, and P4d, respectively.
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Table 24. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model a [cor(U4,P4a) = 0.95] – Linear
Regression
Sample
ATE 95%
Empirical
Cor(U4,P4a) = 0.95
ATE Bias
Coverage
Size
CI
SE
18
4.99 1.99 (0.13, 9.85)
85.2%
0.10
36
4.85 1.85 (1.48, 8.22)
81.0%
0.08
Common Cause Criterion:
70
4.89 1.89 (2.50, 7.29)
64.4%
0.07
LR_Model1
137
4.92 1.92 (3.22, 6.62)
40.9%
0.07
[Y~T+C]
265
4.92 1.92 (3.70, 6.14)
11.8%
0.06
1,000 4.92 1.92 (4.29, 5.54)
0.0%
0.06
18
4.99 1.99 (1.77, 8.22)
73.7%
0.08
36
4.96 1.96 (2.82, 7.10)
56.9%
0.07
Disjunctive Cause
70
4.97 1.97 (3.48, 6.46)
27.4%
0.07
Criterion: LR_Model2
137
5.01 2.01 (3.96, 6.06)
3.4%
0.07
[Y~T+Z+C+B]
265
5.00 2.00 (4.24, 5.75)
0.0%
0.06
1,000 5.01 2.01 (4.63, 5.40)
0.0%
0.06
18
3.37 0.37 (1.50, 5.23)
90.6%
0.03
Modified Disjunctive Cause
36
3.27 0.27 (2.13, 4.41)
91.4%
0.02
Criterion (proxy
70
3.24 0.24 (2.49, 4.00)
90.3%
0.01
recommendation only):
137
3.24 0.24 (2.72, 3.76)
85.3%
0.01
LR_Model3a
265
3.23 0.23 (2.87, 3.60)
75.9%
0.01
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P4a ]
1,000 3.23 0.23 (3.04, 3.41)
32.1%
0.01
18
3.35 0.35 (1.61, 5.09)
89.9%
0.03
36
3.25 0.25 (2.16, 4.34)
91.4%
0.02
Modified Disjunctive Cause
70
3.23 0.23 (2.50, 3.96)
91.2%
0.01
Criterion:
LR_Model4a
137
3.23 0.23 (2.72, 3.73)
85.9%
0.01
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P4a ]
265
3.22 0.22 (2.86, 3.57)
77.0%
0.01
1,000 3.22 0.22 (3.04, 3.40)
35.5%
0.01
18
3.42 0.42 (-1.13, 7.97)
93.3%
0.08
36
3.27 0.27 (0.20, 6.35)
94.4%
0.05
Modified Common Cause
70
3.24 0.24 (1.09, 5.38)
92.4%
0.04
Criterion:
LR_Model5a
137
3.23 0.23 (1.72, 4.75)
94.4%
0.03
[ Y ~ T + C + P4a ]
265
3.24 0.24 (2.16, 4.32)
92.6%
0.02
1,000 3.21 0.21 (2.66, 3.76)
87.3%
0.01
Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4a): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 25. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model a [cor(U4,P4a) = 0.95] –
Propensity Score Methods
Cor(U4,P4a) = 0.95
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]
Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3a [Z, C, B, P4a]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4a [C, B, P4a]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5a [C, P4a]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.84
4.99
4.87
4.92
5.02
5.03
4.98
5.02
3.30
3.27
3.25
3.25
3.29
3.26
3.22
3.22
3.26
3.31
3.20
3.22

1.84
1.99
1.87
1.92
2.02
2.03
1.98
2.02
0.30
0.27
0.25
0.25
0.29
0.26
0.22
0.22
0.26
0.31
0.20
0.22

ATE 95%
CI
(2.24, 7.44)
(3.06, 6.92)
(3.48, 6.27)
(4.2, 5.63)
(2.44, 7.61)
(3.07, 6.99)
(3.52, 6.43)
(4.25, 5.78)
(0.69, 5.92)
(1.29, 5.26)
(1.78, 4.71)
(2.49, 4.01)
(0.92, 5.66)
(1.51, 5.01)
(1.93, 4.5)
(2.56, 3.89)
(0.86, 5.67)
(1.53, 5.08)
(1.91, 4.49)
(2.56, 3.88)

Coverage
71.1%
47.8%
24.9%
0.1%
68.7%
46.0%
19.5%
0.0%
98.2%
99.1%
99.1%
98.8%
98.6%
99.4%
99.4%
98.6%
91.8%
91.8%
94.6%
89.3%

Empirical
SE
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4a): 0.95; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

Table 24 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 3 – with proxy covariate P4a included. Only, the largest sample size (nsim
= 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for other sample sizes can be found in the
results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications
for sample size = 1,000 was 4.92 and CI = [4.29, 5.54] for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for
DCC; 3.23 and CI = [3.04, 3.41] for MDCC*; 3.22 and CI = [3.04, 3.40] for MDCC; 3.21 and
CI = [2.66, 3.76] for MCC. Similar to the findings of Study 1, the findings of Study 3 show that,
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the average bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 were
greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC),
and Model 5 (MCC), though statistically Models 3 – 5 had comparable amount of bias. Over the
1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 0%
(CC); 0% (DCC); 32.1% (MDCC*); 35.5%, (MDCC); and 87.3% (MCC).
Table 25 show the similar results for the propensity score matching for Study 3 – with
proxy covariate P4a included. The results from the propensity score method is similar to the ones
from linear regression for the bias performance measure, but the coverage performance metric is
different for the propensity score methods. The Abadie-Imbens standard error estimates are
wider as it factors in the uncertainty of propensity score calculation and matching and hence the
true treatment effect of 3 is captured more frequently within the ATE 95% confidence interval.
For the sample size of 1,000, both linear regression and propensity score methods have
comparable empirical SE performance measure which suggests that the causal effect estimators
are efficient.
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Table 26. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model b [cor(U4,P4b) = 0.80] – Linear
Regression
Cor(U4,P4b) = 0.80

Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3b
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P4b ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4b
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P4b ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5b
[ Y ~ T + C + P4b ]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.99
4.85
4.89
4.92
4.92
4.92
4.99
4.96
4.97
5.01
5.00
5.01
3.99
3.85
3.80
3.82
3.80
3.79
3.96
3.81
3.77
3.78
3.76
3.75
4.01
3.81
3.77
3.78
3.78
3.74

1.99
1.85
1.89
1.92
1.92
1.92
1.99
1.96
1.97
2.01
2.00
2.01
0.99
0.85
0.80
0.82
0.80
0.79
0.96
0.81
0.77
0.78
0.76
0.75
1.01
0.81
0.77
0.78
0.78
0.74

ATE 95%
Empirical
Coverage
CI
SE
(0.13, 9.85)
85.2%
0.10
(1.48, 8.22)
81.0%
0.08
(2.50, 7.29)
64.4%
0.07
(3.22, 6.62)
40.9%
0.07
(3.70, 6.14)
11.8%
0.06
(4.29, 5.54)
0.0%
0.06
(1.77, 8.22)
73.7%
0.08
(2.82, 7.10)
56.9%
0.07
(3.48, 6.46)
27.4%
0.07
(3.96, 6.06)
3.4%
0.07
(4.24, 5.75)
0.0%
0.06
(4.63, 5.40)
0.0%
0.06
(1.47, 6.52)
84.6%
0.05
(2.26, 5.45)
80.2%
0.04
(2.71, 4.88)
69.1%
0.03
(3.07, 4.57)
45.3%
0.03
(3.27, 4.33)
16.3%
0.03
(3.52, 4.05)
0.0%
0.03
(1.59, 6.33)
85.3%
0.05
(2.28, 5.34)
80.7%
0.04
(2.72, 4.82)
69.0%
0.03
(3.05, 4.51)
45.6%
0.03
(3.24, 4.28)
17.6%
0.03
(3.49, 4.01)
0.0%
0.02
(-0.69, 8.71)
90.3%
0.09
(0.61, 7.00)
91.4%
0.06
(1.53, 6.02)
87.5%
0.05
(2.20, 5.37)
83.2%
0.04
(2.65, 4.91)
72.1%
0.03
(3.16, 4.32)
30.5%
0.03

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4b): 0.80; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 27. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model b [cor(U4,P4b) = 0.80] –
Propensity Score Methods
Cor(U4,P4b) = 0.80
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]

Disjunctive Cause Criterion:
PS_Model2 [Z, C, B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3b [Z, C, B, P4b]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4b [C, B, P4b]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5b [C, P4b]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.84
4.99
4.87
4.92
5.02
5.03
4.98
5.02
3.90
3.84
3.81
3.78
3.86
3.80
3.76
3.75
3.84
3.82
3.76
3.74

1.84
1.99
1.87
1.92
2.02
2.03
1.98
2.02
0.90
0.84
0.81
0.78
0.86
0.80
0.76
0.75
0.84
0.82
0.76
0.74

ATE 95%
CI
(2.24, 7.44)
(3.06, 6.92)
(3.48, 6.27)
(4.2, 5.63)
(2.44, 7.61)
(3.07, 6.99)
(3.52, 6.43)
(4.25, 5.78)
(1.28, 6.51)
(1.83, 5.84)
(2.33, 5.28)
(3.01, 4.55)
(1.41, 6.32)
(1.99, 5.6)
(2.44, 5.09)
(3.07, 4.43)
(1.34, 6.34)
(1.98, 5.67)
(2.42, 5.09)
(3.05, 4.42)

Coverage
71.1%
47.8%
24.9%
0.1%
68.7%
46.0%
19.5%
0.0%
92.9%
93.7%
88.6%
47.9%
94.4%
92.4%
87.3%
38.4%
88.5%
84.6%
78.3%
44.0%

Empirical
SE
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.03

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4b): 0.80; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

Table 26 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 3 – with proxy covariate P4b included.
In the narrative only the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized so as to focus
on the differences between models and not impacted by variability due to smaller sample sizes.
Only the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for other
sample sizes can be found in the results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average causal
effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 was 4.92 and CI = [4.29, 5.54] for
CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for DCC; 3.79 and CI = [3.52, 4.05] for MDCC*; 3.75 and CI =
182

[3.49, 4.01] for MDCC; 3.74 and CI = [3.16, 4.32] for MCC. Table 26 shows that for sample
size 18, Model 1 (CC) and Model 2 (DCC) have similar amount of average bias over 1,000
replications in the causal effect estimate (bias: 1.99), however a wider 95% CI and higher value
of empirical SE suggests that Model 2 (DCC) is a more efficient estimator compared to Model 1
(CC). Similar to the findings for the perfect proxy, when the correlation of the proxy covariate
and the unmeasured true confounder is lower, the average bias in the causal effect estimates
across replications for sample size = 1,000 were greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model
1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC). For a given sample size, as
the consistency of the causal effect estimate and the efficiency of the causal estimator is one of
the best, if not the best, Model 4, MDCC covariate selection approach is superior to other models
with other covariate selection approaches. Over the 1,000 replications, the average coverage at
95% confidence level for the five models was 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 0% (MDCC*); 0%,
(MDCC); and 30.5% (MCC).
Table 27 shows results for the propensity score matching for Study 3 – with proxy
covariate P4b included. The results from the propensity score method is similar to the ones from
linear regression with respect to the bias performance measure. For the sample size of 1,000,
both linear regression and propensity score methods have comparable empirical SE performance
measure which suggests that the causal effect estimators are efficient.
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Table 28. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model c [cor(U4,P4c) = 0.40] – Linear
Regression
Cor (U4,P4c) = 0.40

Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3c
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P4c ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4c
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P4c ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5c
[ Y ~ T + C + P4c ]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.99
4.85
4.89
4.92
4.92
4.92
4.99
4.96
4.97
5.01
5.00
5.01
4.76
4.71
4.71
4.73
4.71
4.72
4.69
4.64
4.63
4.65
4.64
4.65
4.77
4.61
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.64

1.99
1.85
1.89
1.92
1.92
1.92
1.99
1.96
1.97
2.01
2.00
2.01
1.76
1.71
1.71
1.73
1.71
1.72
1.69
1.64
1.63
1.65
1.64
1.65
1.77
1.61
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.64

ATE 95%
Empirical
Coverage
CI
SE
(0.13, 9.85)
85.2%
0.10
(1.48, 8.22)
81.0%
0.08
(2.50, 7.29)
64.4%
0.07
(3.22, 6.62)
40.9%
0.07
(3.70, 6.14)
11.8%
0.06
(4.29, 5.54)
0.0%
0.06
(1.77, 8.22)
73.7%
0.08
(2.82, 7.10)
56.9%
0.07
(3.48, 6.46)
27.4%
0.07
(3.96, 6.06)
3.4%
0.07
(4.24, 5.75)
0.0%
0.06
(4.63, 5.40)
0.0%
0.06
(1.54, 7.98)
77.7%
0.08
(2.64, 6.78)
62.1%
0.06
(3.29, 6.13)
35.2%
0.06
(3.74, 5.73)
7.6%
0.06
(4.00, 5.42)
0.5%
0.06
(4.36, 5.09)
0.0%
0.05
(1.68, 7.70)
76.5%
0.07
(2.64, 6.63)
62.3%
0.06
(3.25, 6.01)
37.6%
0.06
(3.68, 5.63)
8.4%
0.05
(3.94, 5.33)
0.6%
0.05
(4.29, 5.00)
0.0%
0.05
(-0.21, 9.76)
85.9%
0.10
(1.23, 7.99)
84.1%
0.08
(2.27, 7.02)
71.7%
0.07
(2.97, 6.34)
52.3%
0.06
(3.45, 5.85)
24.0%
0.06
(4.03, 5.26)
0.2%
0.05

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4c): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 29. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model c [cor(U4,P4c) = 0.40] –
Propensity Score Methods
Cor (U4, P4c) = 0.40
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]
Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3c [Z, C, B, P4c]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4c [C, B, P4c]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5c [C, P4c]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.84
4.99
4.87
4.92
5.02
5.03
4.98
5.02
4.71
4.74
4.72
4.72
4.67
4.66
4.66
4.64
4.67
4.72
4.61
4.66

1.84
1.99
1.87
1.92
2.02
2.03
1.98
2.02
1.71
1.74
1.72
1.72
1.67
1.66
1.66
1.64
1.67
1.72
1.61
1.66

ATE 95%
CI
(2.24, 7.44)
(3.06, 6.92)
(3.48, 6.27)
(4.20, 5.63)
(2.44, 7.61)
(3.07, 6.99)
(3.52, 6.43)
(4.25, 5.78)
(2.03, 7.38)
(2.71, 6.77)
(3.23, 6.21)
(3.94, 5.49)
(2.14, 7.21)
(2.79, 6.53)
(3.29, 6.03)
(3.94, 5.35)
(2.04, 7.31)
(2.76, 6.67)
(3.20, 6.02)
(3.94, 5.37)

Coverage
71.1%
47.8%
24.9%
0.1%
68.7%
46.0%
19.5%
0.0%
78.8%
62.8%
35.5%
0.0%
78.8%
59.0%
30.8%
0.0%
75.0%
60.9%
39.0%
0.7%

Empirical
SE
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4c): 0.40; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

Table 28 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 3 – with proxy covariate P4c included. Only, the largest sample size (nsim
= 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for other sample sizes can be found in the
results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications
for sample size = 1,000 was 4.92 and CI = [4.29, 5.54] for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for
DCC; 4.72 and CI = [4.36, 5.09] for MDCC*; 4.65 and CI = [4.29, 5.00] for MDCC; 4.64 and
CI = [4.03, 5.26] for MCC. Similar to the findings of the linear regression causal estimation,
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while using propensity score methods, the average bias in the causal effect estimates across
replications for sample size = 1,000 were greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1
(CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC). Over the 1,000 replications,
the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 0%
(MDCC*); 0%, (MDCC); and 0.2% (MCC).
Table 29 shows results for the propensity score matching for Study 3 – with proxy
covariate P4c included. The results from the propensity score method is similar to the ones from
linear regression.
Table 30 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 3 – with proxy covariate P4d included. Only, the largest sample size (nsim
= 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for other sample sizes can be found in the
results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average causal effect estimates across replications
for sample size = 1,000 was 4.92 and CI = [4.29, 5.54] for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for
DCC; 4.95 and CI = [4.57, 5.32] for MDCC*; 4.86 and CI = [4.49, 5.23] for MDCC; 4.85 and
CI = [4.23, 5.47] for MCC. The ranking of the causal effect estimation models by the magnitude
of bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 is consistent with
Study 1. Bias is found to be greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3
(MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC). However, it should be noted that as the
correlation between the proxy covariate and the unmeasured true confounder gets lower, Models
4 (MDCC) and 5 (MCC) have lower bias compared to Model 3 (MDCC*). Over the 1,000
replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 0% (CC); 0%
(DCC); 0% (MDCC*); 0%, (MDCC); and 0.1% (MCC).
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Table 30. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model d [cor(U4,P4d) = 0.20] – Linear
Regression
Cor (U4,P4d) = 0.20

Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3d
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P4d ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4d
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P4d ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5d
[ Y ~ T + C + P4d ]

Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.99
4.85
4.89
4.92
4.92
4.92
4.99
4.96
4.97
5.01
5.00
5.01
4.94
4.89
4.90
4.94
4.93
4.95
4.87
4.81
4.81
4.85
4.84
4.86
4.97
4.79
4.82
4.85
4.86
4.85

1.99
1.85
1.89
1.92
1.92
1.92
1.99
1.96
1.97
2.01
2.00
2.01
1.94
1.89
1.90
1.94
1.93
1.95
1.87
1.81
1.81
1.85
1.84
1.86
1.97
1.79
1.82
1.85
1.86
1.85

ATE 95%
Empirical
Coverage
CI
SE
(0.13, 9.85)
85.2%
0.10
(1.48, 8.22)
81.0%
0.08
(2.50, 7.29)
64.4%
0.07
(3.22, 6.62)
40.9%
0.07
(3.70, 6.14)
11.8%
0.06
(4.29, 5.54)
0.0%
0.06
(1.77, 8.22)
73.7%
0.08
(2.82, 7.10)
56.9%
0.07
(3.48, 6.46)
27.4%
0.07
(3.96, 6.06)
3.4%
0.07
(4.24, 5.75)
0.0%
0.06
(4.63, 5.40)
0.0%
0.06
(1.62, 8.25)
75.1%
0.08
(2.74, 7.05)
58.8%
0.07
(3.41, 6.38)
30.3%
0.07
(3.90, 5.98)
4.5%
0.06
(4.18, 5.67)
0.0%
0.06
(4.57, 5.32)
0.0%
0.06
(1.75, 7.98)
74.2%
0.08
(2.74, 6.89)
59.8%
0.07
(3.37, 6.25)
32.3%
0.06
(3.83, 5.86)
4.8%
0.06
(4.12, 5.57)
0.2%
0.06
(4.49, 5.23)
0.0%
0.06
(-0.05, 9.99)
85.7%
0.11
(1.37, 8.20)
82.1%
0.08
(2.42, 7.23)
65.7%
0.07
(3.15, 6.55)
43.8%
0.06
(3.64, 6.07)
14.0%
0.06
(4.23, 5.47)
0.1%
0.06

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4d): 0.95; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 31. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 3 – Model d [cor(U4,P4d) = 0.20] –
Propensity Score Methods
Cor (U4,P4d) = 0.20
Common Cause Criterion:
PS_Model1 [C]
Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: PS_Model2 [Z, C,
B]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
PS_Model3d [Z, C, B, P4d]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model4d [C, B, P4d]
Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
PS_Model5d [C, P4d]

Sample
Size
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.84
4.99
4.87
4.92
5.02
5.03
4.98
5.02
4.87
4.97
4.92
4.94
4.83
4.89
4.83
4.85
4.79
4.92
4.80
4.85

1.84
1.99
1.87
1.92
2.02
2.03
1.98
2.02
1.87
1.97
1.92
1.94
1.83
1.89
1.83
1.85
1.79
1.92
1.80
1.85

ATE 95%
CI
(2.24, 7.44)
(3.06, 6.92)
(3.48, 6.27)
(4.20, 5.63)
(2.44, 7.61)
(3.07, 6.99)
(3.52, 6.43)
(4.25, 5.78)
(2.23, 7.51)
(2.95, 7.00)
(3.44, 6.41)
(4.17, 5.72)
(2.3, 7.36)
(3.01, 6.77)
(3.45, 6.20)
(4.15, 5.55)
(2.14, 7.44)
(2.95, 6.89)
(3.38, 6.23)
(4.13, 5.57)

Coverage
71.1%
47.8%
24.9%
0.1%
68.7%
46.0%
19.5%
0.0%
71.6%
52.2%
23.5%
0.0%
70.4%
48.0%
21.3%
0.0%
72.1%
52.4%
29.0%
0.1%

Empirical
SE
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06

Note. Seed: 072003; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U4,P4d): 0.20; propensity score calculated using logistic
regression with covariates, quadratic, and interaction terms. Propensity score matching performed using the
following parameters - 1:1 greedy matching with replacement and ties. Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

Table 31 has similar results for the propensity score methods part of Study 3 – with proxy
covariate P4d included. The results from the propensity score method is similar to the ones from
linear regression.
For the sample size of 1,000, both linear regression and propensity score methods have
comparable empirical SE performance measure which suggests that the causal effect estimators
are efficient.
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Study 3 extends findings of Study 1 to more realistic scenarios where the correlation
between the proxy covariate and the unmeasured true confounder is what is typically observed in
the social science disciplines. Study 3 shows that for the sample size of 1,000, both linear
regression and propensity score methods have comparable empirical SE performance measure
which suggests that the causal effect estimators are efficient. However, as the correlation
between the proxy covariate and the unmeasured true confounder gets smaller the causal effect
estimator is less efficient. As expected, for each covariate selection approach (CC, DCC,
MDCC*, MDCC, and MCC) the causal effect estimator is less efficient for smaller sample sizes
than for larger sample sizes. However, within each sample size, the MDCC covariate selection
approach is typically marginally more efficient than other approaches.
Next, Study 4 are its related findings are summarized.

Study 4: Investigating the Inclusion of Fallible Proxy Variable of an Unmeasured True
Confounder
Independent variables with measurement errors are not uncommon, especially in social
science research (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). Typically, the inclusion of proxy covariates
with completely random measurement error does not impact bias (Frost, 1979). The proxy
variables in Study 3 are conceptualized without measurement error, i.e., they are infallible
proxies (𝜏). The lower correlation of the infallible proxy variable (P4 ) with the unmeasured true
confounder (U4 ) is the result of the unmeasured covariate having varying levels of impact on the
proxy variable.
The measurement error in Study 4 is the difference between the true proxy variable (𝜏),
which only exists in theory and the actual proxy variable (𝜏′ ) that is measured and is available
for inclusion in the analysis. The theoretical proxy variable has a reliability index of 1 and no
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measurement error. The difference between the true proxy variable (𝜏) and actual proxy variable
(𝜏′ ) is that the latter has lower reliability index and has measurement error the proxy variable.
The measurement error results in the actual proxy variable (𝜏′ ) being less reliable 𝜌 < 1 than the
true proxy variable (𝜏) due to the presence of systematic and sporadic errors. The measurement
error noted here is the lack of precision in measuring the proxy variable. The lack of precision
can be conceptualized has a shift the mean of the error or an increase in the variance of the error.
This research employs the terminology of fallible and infallible covariates to distinguish between
covariates measured with and without errors, respectively (Cole & Preacher, 2014). Proxy
variables with measurement errors are known as fallible proxy variables and can be less reliable
than the true proxy variable. The impact of including fallible proxy variables of a true
unmeasured confounder in causal inference regression was investigated.

Research Question 4
Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect estimation model a
fallible proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder compared to not including it?

Data Generation Process
Figure 35 shows a data generation structure that consists of seven variables, six measured
variables, and one unmeasured variable, U5. Most of the variables in the model, B, Z, C, U5, P5,
and Y, are all normally distributed with of mean zero and standard deviation of 1, ~ N (0, 1).
Similar to Study 1, the treatment assignment was dichotomized using an inverse logit
transformation of a linear function as performed by VanderWeele and Shpitser in their original
article (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). The causal effect estimate of interest is the effect of
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treatment T over outcome Y, which is set to a constant value of 3. Covariate C is a true
confounder that impacts both the treatment assignment T and outcome Y. The instrumental
variable Z only impacts the treatment assignment T, whereas the covariate B only impacts the
outcome variable Y. U5 is a true confounder and, P5 is its perfect proxy (i.e., rU5.P5 > 0.9).
Similar to the data generation approach employed by Cole and Preacher (2014) in their
Monte Carlo simulation study, the fallible proxy variables - P5a, P5z, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f are conceptualized as fallible versions of the infallible proxy variable P5. In Study 4, the proxy
variable’s ( P5 ) relationship with the unmeasured true confounder ( U5 ) is impacted by two
things – a) the reliability index which is modelled by varying the correlation between the two
variables, and b) by the presence of measurement error in the proxy variable which is modelled
by injecting error into the proxy variable. Additionally, the error of the proxy variables is drawn
from normal distributions of different parameters.
Measurement error was studied by controlling the relationship of three variables – U5, P5,
and P5a,5z,5b-5f – as well as by drawing the error component of the P5a,5z,5b-5f from either standard
normal or normal distributions with shifted mean and increased variance. P5a,5z,5b-5f are fallible
proxies of the true proxy P5 with varying levels of reliability indexes ranging from 1.0 to 0.75.
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Figure 35. Data generation process for Study 4.
Note. Covariates U5 is shaded as it is an unmeasured covariate, and P5 is its perfect proxy (r > 0.9). P5a and P5z are
perfectly measured infallible variables (both have reliability index = 1 with P5), whereas P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f
reliability index with P5 ranging from 0.95 to 0.75.

First, the infallible variable P5 was generated, and then its fallible proxies with lower
reliability indexes were generated such that their correlation is as desired. Note that the fallible
proxies are not generated directly from the unobserved variable, U5 and no causal arrow points to
any of these variables.
Per the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion, variables Z, C, and B would be included in
the causal effect estimation along with one proxy variable at a time (P5a, P5z, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e,
and P5f) for the unmeasured true confounder variable U5. However, it should be noted that U5,
being an unmeasured true confounder covariate, cannot be included in the causal effect
estimation model as it is not available for inclusion.
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P5a is a perfectly reliable variable of the perfect proxy P5 of the unmeasured covariate U5.
The reliability (correlation) between P5a and P5 is 1.0. However, the addition of the error e_P5a to
P5a deteriorates the reliability (correlation) even though the error is drawn from a standard
normal distribution N (0,1). After the addition of the error to P5a the correlation of P5a with P5
changes from 1.0 to 0.70. The correlation of P5a with U5 is 0.66.
Though, P5z is also a perfectly reliable variable of the perfect proxy P5 with a reliability
index of 1.0, it is different from P5a in that the error e_P5z is drawn from a normal distribution
with a shifted mean and expanded variance ~ N (0.1, 1.5). This deteriorates the reliability
(correlation) between P5 and P5z from a correlation of 1.0 to 0.56. The correlation of P5z with U5
is 0.54.
Similar to P5z, variables P5b – P5f have errors with shifted means and additional variance
~ N (0.1, 1.5) but have lower reliability indices with P5 ranging from 0.95 to 0.75, respectively.
The correlations of P5b-f with P5 are 0.56, 0.50, 0.48, 0.44, and 0.39, respectively. The
correlations of P5b-f with U5 are 0.52, 0.47, 0.45, 0.44, and 0.35, respectively.
One thousand (nsim = 1,000) simulated data sets, each of the following sample sizes (nobs
= {18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000}) were generated using the structural relationship depicted in
Figure 34 and the structural equations in this section. The simulation seed of 072004 is used for
the fourth study.

The seed for Study 4 is 072004.
𝑍, 𝐶, 𝐵, 𝑈5 , 𝑃5 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1)
𝜀𝑃5𝑎 ~ 𝑁 (0.0, 1.0);
𝜀𝑃5𝑧 ~ 𝑁 (0.1, 1.5)
𝜀𝑃5𝑏 𝜀𝑃5𝑐 𝜀𝑃5𝑑 𝜀𝑃5𝑒 𝜀𝑃5𝑓 ~ 𝑁 (0.1, 1.5)
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𝑃5𝑎 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑎 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑎 = 1.0, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑧 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑧 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑧 = 1.0, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑏 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑏 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑏 = 0.95, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑐 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑐 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑐 = 0.90, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑑 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑑 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑑 = 0.85, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑒 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑒 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑒 = 0.80, where r is the bivariate correlation
𝑃5𝑓 = 𝑃5 + 𝜀𝑃5𝑓 and 𝑟𝑃5,𝑃5𝑓 = 0.75, where r is the bivariate correlation
1
𝑇 = 1 [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 −1 { (𝐶 + 2𝑍 + 3𝑈5 ) > 𝜀𝑇 } , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑇 ~ 𝑈(0, 1) ]
4
𝑌 = 3 + 𝟑𝑇 + 2𝐶 + 4𝐵 + 4𝑈5 + 𝜀𝑌 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜀𝑌 ~ 𝑁(0, 1)

Results
Tables 32 and 33 show the mean and standard deviations over 1,000 replications for all
the generated variables, except for the error terms, by sample size. The table also shows the
average correlation between U5 and P5a, P5z, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f over the 1,000
replications.
Table 35 shows the covariates from Figure 35 that were included in the linear regression
model estimating the causal effect. In addition to the covariates, quadratic and interaction terms
were included in the propensity score estimation step of propensity score methods.
In Study 4, in all 35 models are constructed – five models with different covariates
included based on the CC, DCC, MDCC*, MDCC, and MCC approaches discussed in studies 1
– 3. In addition, each of the fallible proxy covariates P5a, 5z, 5b-5f (seven fallible covariates) are
included in the five models instead of the perfect proxy P5 of the unmeasured covariate U5. In
the narrative section of the results only results for three fallible proxies P5a, P5z, and P5f are
reported. However, all the results from the linear regression portion of Study 4 can be found in
the Appendix. As noted, P5a has a correlation of 1.0 with P5 and error ~ N (0, 1). Whereas, P5z
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has a correlation of 1.0 with P5 and error ~ N (0.1, 1.50). and P5f has a correlation of 0.75 with
P5 and error ~ N (0.1, 1.50).

Table 32. Descriptive Statistics over 1,000 Replications of the Generated Variables Included in
Model for Study 4 (Models 4a, 4z, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, and 4f) by Sample Size
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
Sample
Size
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

Covariates
Z
Mean
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C
B
U5
P5a
P5z
SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
0.98 -0.01 0.98 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.31 0.11 1.73
0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.36 0.09 1.75
1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.38 0.10 1.78
1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.39 0.10 1.79
1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.41 0.00 1.41 0.00 1.41 0.10 1.79
1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.41 0.00 1.41 0.00 1.41 0.10 1.80
Covariates

P5b
Mean
0.11
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10

SD
1.73
1.75
1.77
1.78
1.79
1.80

P5c
Mean
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.10

SD
1.72
1.76
1.77
1.79
1.79
1.80

P5d
Mean
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
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SD
1.73
1.74
1.78
1.79
1.79
1.80

P5e
Mean
0.11
0.08
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10

P5f
SD
1.74
1.75
1.78
1.79
1.80
1.80

Mean
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

SD
1.73
1.78
1.79
1.78
1.80
1.80

Table 33. Correlations Between the Unmeasured True Confounder (U5), the Theoretical Perfect Proxy (P5), and Fallible Proxies (P5a
– P5f)
Correlation between infallible proxy P5 and fallible proxy variables
[r(U5, P5) = 0.95]
Sample
Size

18
36
70
137
265
1,000

P5a

P5z

P5b

P5c

P5d

P5e

P5f

r(P5,P5a) = 1.0

r(P5,P5z) = 1.0

r(P5,P5b) = 0.95

r(P5,P5c) = 0.90

r(P5,P5d) = 0.85

r(P5,P5e) = 0.80

r(P5,P5f) = 0.75

e_Pa ~
N(0,1)

e_Pz ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pb ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pc ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pd ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pe ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pf ~
N(0.1,1.5)

0.65
0.68
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.70

0.50
0.51
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.55

0.47
0.50
0.51
0.51
0.52
0.52

0.44
0.46
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.50

0.42
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.47

0.40
0.41
0.43
0.43
0.44
0.44

0.36
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.41

Correlation between true unmeasured confounder U5 and fallible proxy variables
[r(U5, P5) = 0.95]
Sample
Size

18
36
70
137
265
1,000

P5a

P5z

P5b

P5c

r(P5,P5a) = 1.0

r(P5,P5z) = 1.0

r(P5,P5b) = 0.95

e_Pa ~
N(0,1)

e_Pz ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pb ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pc ~
N(0.1,1.5)

0.61
0.63
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.67

0.46
0.48
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.52

0.44
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.50

0.40
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.47

P5d

P5e

P5f

r(P5,P5e) = 0.80

r(P5,P5f) = 0.75

e_Pd ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pe ~
N(0.1,1.5)

e_Pf ~
N(0.1,1.5)

0.39
0.41
0.43
0.44
0.44
0.45

0.37
0.38
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.42

0.33
0.36
0.38
0.39
0.39
0.39

r(P5,P5c) = 0.90 r(P5,P5d) = 0.85
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Table 35 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 4 – for the models where the fallible variable P5a is included in the
model. Only, the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for
other sample sizes can be found in the results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average
causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 was 4.92 and CI = [4.30, 5.55]
for CC; 5.01 and CI = [4.63, 5.40] for DCC; 4.17 and CI = [(3.86, 4.48] for MDCC*; 4.12 and
CI = [3.81, 4.42] for MDCC; 4.12 and CI = [3.52, 4.71] for MCC. The average bias in the causal
effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 were greatest for Model 2 (DCC),
followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC), though
statistically Models 4 – 5 had comparable amount of bias. Over the 1,000 replications, the
average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 0%
(MDCC*); 0%, (MDCC); and 4.60% (MCC).
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Table 34. Covariates from Figure 35 used in Linear Regression and Propensity Score Estimation
Models
Model
Covariate terms included in
Covariate terms included in the
the linear regression to
propensity score estimation step of
estimate causal effect
PSM
Model 1 (CC)
C
C, C2
Z, C, B, Z2, C2, B2,
Model 2 (DCC)
Z, C, B
(Z*C), (Z*B), (C*B),
(Z*C*B)
Z, C, B, P5, Z2, C2, B2, P52,
(Z*C), (Z*B), (Z* P5), (C*B),
(C* P5), (B*P5),
Model 3 (MDCC*)
Z, C, B, P5
(Z*C*B), (Z*C* P5), (Z*CB* P5),
(C*B* P5),
(Z*C*B* P5)
C, B, P5, C2, B2, P52,
Model 4 (MDCC)
C, B, P5
(C*B), (C* P5), (B*P5),
(C*B* P5)
C, P5, C2, P52,
Model 5 (MCC)
C, P5
(C* P5)
Note. For the sake of readability variable P5 is included instead of P5a, P5z, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f. For Study 4,
models a, z, b, c, d, e, and f variable P5 should be substituted by P5a, P5z, P5b, P5c, P5d, P5e, and P5f, respectively.
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Table 35. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 4 – Model f [cor (P5, P5a) = 1.0; e_P5a ~ N
(0, 1.0)] – Linear Regression
U5, P5, P5a ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5a ~ N (0, 1.00)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5a) = 1.00 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5a) = 0.70 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5a) = 0.66 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause Criterion:
LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3a
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5a ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4a
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5a ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5a
[ Y ~ T + C + P5a ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.90
5.00
4.84
4.94
4.92
4.92
4.91
5.06
4.95
5.04
5.00
5.01
4.30
4.32
4.17
4.23
4.19
4.17
4.25
4.26
4.12
4.18
4.13
4.12
4.29
4.32
4.09
4.16
4.14
4.12

1.90
2.00
1.84
1.94
1.92
1.92
1.91
2.06
1.95
2.04
2.00
2.01
1.30
1.32
1.17
1.23
1.19
1.17
1.25
1.26
1.12
1.18
1.13
1.12
1.29
1.32
1.09
1.16
1.14
1.12

(0.02, 9.78)
(1.65, 8.35)
(2.45, 7.23)
(3.25, 6.64)
(3.70, 6.14)
(4.30, 5.55)
(1.67, 8.14)
(2.93, 7.18)
(3.47, 6.44)
(3.99, 6.09)
(4.25, 5.75)
(4.63, 5.40)
(1.45, 7.16)
(2.52, 6.12)
(2.94, 5.41)
(3.36, 5.10)
(3.58, 4.80)
(3.86, 4.48)
(1.57, 6.94)
(2.52, 6.00)
(2.93, 5.32)
(3.33, 5.02)
(3.53, 4.73)
(3.81, 4.42)
(-0.58, 9.16)
(1.06, 7.58)
(1.79, 6.39)
(2.54, 5.78)
(2.98, 5.30)
(3.52, 4.71)

85.8%
76.5%
65.2%
40.4%
13.7%
0.0%
76.6%
52.0%
27.6%
3.2%
0.0%
0.0%
82.6%
68.0%
53.9%
21.2%
3.7%
0.0%
82.4%
68.9%
54.7%
22.6%
4.1%
0.0%
89.6%
87.3%
85.0%
71.3%
51.4%
4.6%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04

Note. Seed: 072004; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U5,P5a): 0.66; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 36. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 4 – Model f [cor (P5, P5z) = 1.0; e_P5z ~ N
(0.1, 1.50)] – Linear Regression
U5, P5, P5z ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5z ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5z) = 1.00 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5z) = 0.56 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5z) = 0.54 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause Criterion:
LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3a
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5z ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4a
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5z ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5a
[ Y ~ T + C + P5z ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.86
4.90
4.92
4.95
4.90
4.91
4.99
4.95
5.04
5.01
5.00
5.00
4.62
4.55
4.58
4.53
4.50
4.49
4.52
4.49
4.50
4.46
4.43
4.43
4.47
4.53
4.48
4.49
4.42
4.42

1.86
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.90
1.91
1.99
1.95
2.04
2.01
2.00
2.00
1.62
1.55
1.58
1.53
1.50
1.49
1.52
1.49
1.50
1.46
1.43
1.43
1.47
1.53
1.48
1.49
1.42
1.42

(-0.01, 9.72)
(1.54, 8.25)
(2.54, 7.3)
(3.25, 6.66)
(3.68, 6.12)
(4.28, 5.54)
(1.77, 8.21)
(2.82, 7.08)
(3.56, 6.53)
(3.96, 6.07)
(4.25, 5.75)
(4.62, 5.39)
(1.53, 7.71)
(2.58, 6.53)
(3.23, 5.93)
(3.58, 5.48)
(3.82, 5.17)
(4.15, 4.84)
(1.61, 7.43)
(2.59, 6.38)
(3.19, 5.81)
(3.54, 5.39)
(3.77, 5.09)
(4.09, 4.76)
(-0.46, 9.4)
(1.21, 7.85)
(2.14, 6.81)
(2.82, 6.15)
(3.23, 5.61)
(3.82, 5.03)

86.4%
80.5%
63.2%
37.9%
12.9%
0.0%
74.8%
58.1%
23.4%
3.4%
0.2%
0.0%
80.0%
64.3%
37.3%
11.4%
0.6%
0.0%
79.5%
64.8%
39.4%
12.6%
0.9%
0.0%
89.0%
84.9%
76.2%
58.0%
34.8%
0.3%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05

Note. Seed: 072004; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U5,P5z): 0.54; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications
that contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.
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Table 37. Bias, Coverage, and Empirical SE for Study 4 – Model f [cor (P5, P5f) = 0.75] – Linear
Regression
U5, P5, P5f ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5f ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5f) = 0.75 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5f) = 0.39 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5f) = 0.35 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause Criterion:
LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3f
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5f ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4f
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5f ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5f
[ Y ~ T + C + P5f ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.86
4.90
4.92
4.95
4.90
4.91
4.99
4.95
5.04
5.01
5.00
5.00
4.82
4.72
4.79
4.74
4.72
4.72
4.71
4.64
4.70
4.66
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.68
4.67
4.69
4.64
4.64

1.86
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.90
1.91
1.99
1.95
2.04
2.01
2.00
2.00
1.82
1.72
1.79
1.74
1.72
1.72
1.71
1.64
1.70
1.66
1.64
1.65
1.66
1.68
1.67
1.69
1.64
1.64

(-0.01, 9.72)
(1.54, 8.25)
(2.54, 7.30)
(3.25, 6.66)
(3.68, 6.12)
(4.28, 5.54)
(1.77, 8.21)
(2.82, 7.08)
(3.56, 6.53)
(3.96, 6.07)
(4.25, 5.75)
(4.62, 5.39)
(1.59, 8.04)
(2.66, 6.79)
(3.37, 6.2)
(3.74, 5.74)
(4.01, 5.43)
(4.36, 5.09)
(1.67, 7.75)
(2.65, 6.63)
(3.33, 6.07)
(3.68, 5.63)
(3.95, 5.34)
(4.29, 5.00)
(-0.32, 9.64)
(1.32, 8.05)
(2.31, 7.03)
(3.01, 6.38)
(3.43, 5.84)
(4.03, 5.26)

86.4%
80.5%
63.2%
37.9%
12.9%
0.0%
74.8%
58.1%
23.4%
3.4%
0.2%
0.0%
77.7%
61.9%
30.3%
8.2%
0.3%
0.0%
79.0%
63.3%
31.4%
9.0%
0.4%
0.0%
87.3%
83.3%
71.5%
49.6%
23.6%
0.1%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05

Note. Seed: 072004; Replications: 1,000; correlation (U5,P5f): 0.35; Coverage: % of CIs of the 1,000 replications that
contain the Average Treatment Effect of 3.0.

201

Table 36 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 4 – for the models where the fallible variable P5z is included in the
model. Only, the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for
other sample sizes can be found in the results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average
causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 was 4.91 and CI = [4.28, 5.54]
for CC; 5.00 and CI = [4.62, 5.39] for DCC; 4.49 and CI = [4.15, 4.84] for MDCC*; 4.43 and CI
= [4.09, 4.76] for MDCC; 4.42 and CI = [3.82, 5.03] for MCC. The average bias in the causal
effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 were greatest for Model 2 (DCC),
followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC). Though
statistically Models 4 – 5 had comparable amount of bias Model 4 (MDCC) is a more efficient
causal effect estimator compared to Model 5 (MCC) as the 95% CI is narrower for Model 4.
Given that most social science correlations are in the 0.20 – 0.40 range and has measurement
error, performance of Model 4 (MDCC) with respect to consistency and efficiency is superior to
all other models. Over the 1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for
the five models was 0% (CC); 0% (DCC); 0% (MDCC*); 0%, (MDCC); and 0.3% (MCC).
Table 37 shows the bias, coverage, and empirical SE performance measures for the linear
regression part of Study 4 – for the models where the fallible variable P5f was included in the
model. Only, the largest sample size (nsim = 1,000) is summarized in the narrative, but results for
other sample sizes can be found in the results table. Over the 1,000 replications, the average
causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 was 4.91 and CI = [4.28, 5.54]
for CC; 5.00 and CI = [4.62, 5.39] for DCC; 4.72 and CI = [4.36, 5.09] or MDCC*; 4.65 and CI
= [4.29, 5.00] for MDCC; 4.64 and CI = [(4.03, 5.26] for MCC. Similar to prior findings, the
average bias in the causal effect estimates across replications for sample size = 1,000 were
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greatest for Model 2 (DCC), followed by Model 1 (CC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC),
and Model 5 (MCC). Again, though statistically Models 4 – 5 had comparable amount of bias,
Model 4 with a narrower CI is a more efficient causal effect estimator and is superior to other
models with respect to consistency and efficiency even for propensity score methods. Over the
1,000 replications, the average coverage at 95% confidence level for the five models was 0%
(CC); 0% (DCC); 0% (MDCC*); 0%, (MDCC); and 0.1% (MCC).
The Study 4 results show that even when the proxy variable is fallible – with a lower
reliability index and errors that are not drawn from a standard normal distribution – linear
regression models consisting of proxy covariates instead of the unmeasured true confounder, i.e.,
covariates included based on the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC* and MDCC)
and the Modified Cause Criterion (MCC), yield the most consistent and efficient causal effect
estimates compared to the ones where covariates based on the Common Cause (CC) and
Disjunctive Cause Criterion (DCC) are included. As the fallible proxy variables have much
lower correlation with the unmeasured true confounder (U5), the amount of confounding bias
control was much lower but nevertheless the MDCC*, MDCC and MCC covariate selection
approaches correct for the unmeasured confounding variable to a small extent.
In the next chapter, the results are discussed further in the context of existing literature.
Also included are the implications of this research, its limitations and delimitations,
recommendations for practitioners when selecting covariates for causal estimation using
observational data, and some possible future research ideas.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Overview
Reliance on observational data to draw causal inferences is ubiquitous in social science
research (Witte & Didelez, 2019). However, one of the biggest criticisms of observational
studies is the lack of bias control that in turn prevents the researcher from making causal claims
(VanderWeele & Ding, 2017). There are several sources of these biases in observational studies
including collider-stratification bias (commonly known as self-selection bias; Arah, 2019),
missing data bias (Ding & Li, 2018), and unmeasured or uncontrolled confounding bias
(VanderWeele & Arah, 2011; VanderWeele & Ding, 2017). Greenland (2003) investigated the
relative magnitudes of the collider-stratification and confounding biases and concluded that
under some circumstances, the self-selection bias can be of equal magnitude as the classical
confounding bias. However, uncontrolled confounding in observational studies results in biased
effect estimates (Brookhart et al., 2006; VanderWeele, 2019; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011;
Witte & Didelez, 2019); this concern was the focus of this research. This chapter summarizes the
findings from the Monte Carlo simulation conducted in the present study and situates the
findings within existing research.

The Menace of the Lurking Variable
The confounding bias, or the bias due to “mixing of effects,” occurs when a covariate that
impacts both the treatment and the outcome is not controlled for in the causal effect estimation
model. It is easy to identify the minimal set of control variables in the causal effect estimation if
the underlying data generation mechanism, (i.e., the relationship of every covariate with the
treatment and the outcome and with one another) is known. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs),
proposed by Pearl (1995) and his team, can be employed to identify confounders and to address
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confounding bias. Over the past two decades several analytical and empirical methodological
studies have utilized the DAG principles to address different biases and to provide actionable
recommendations to practitioners (Ding et al., 2017; Ding & Miratrix, 2014; VanderWeele,
2019; VanderWeele et al., 2008; VanderWeele & Arah, 2011; VanderWeele & Ding, 2017;
VanderWeele & Robins, 2007; VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). However, the application of
DAG principles requires a comprehensive understanding of the underlying data structure. This
can be impractical as it is almost impossible to know the underlying data structure with certainty,
especially in disciplines social science disciplines–economics, epidemiology, education, political
science, and others. Though in some circumstances all the confounders are known, in many cases
the researcher only knows a few confounders with certainty while there may be other
confounders that are suspected to play a role (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 138). Moreover, to
ensure that the research is manageable with respect to time and resources employed, the
practitioner often has to assume certain variables to be exogenous to their study. These
assumptions and limitations prevent the practitioner from having a comprehensive understanding
of the underlying data generation structure and make employment of DAG principles
challenging.
The causal estimation relies heavily on the ignorability assumption or the conditional
exchangeability assumption (Greenland & Robins, 2009; Witte & Didelez, 2019). These
assumptions imply that there are no unmeasured confounding variables and that the treated and
untreated groups are exchangeable as they are similar on all observed covariates. The
ignorability or conditional exchangeability assumption is difficult assumption to meet in social
science research. Greenland and Robins (2009) note that an ignorable mechanism does not
necessarily mean that there is no chance of confounding. This is referred to as the “unmeasured
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confounding,” which results in increased bias in the causal effect estimation due to the
unmeasured confounding not being accounted for. The unmeasured confounding could be caused
by several factors, such as inadequate confounder selection; the timing of the measurement of the
confounder, as it can change values over time; or having a large set of potential confounders in
comparison to the sample size, which may force the researcher to be judicious in including
variables in the analysis (Groenwold & Dekkers, 2020). The assumption that the full set of the
covariates included in the causal effect estimation is sufficient for confounding adjustment is
strong and can only be justified by subject-matter knowledge, which as noted before is
impractical in social science disciplines (VanderWeele, 2019; Witte & Didelez, 2019). Thus, in
most observational studies unmeasured confounding should be expected.

Addressing Unmeasured Confounding
The essential challenge then becomes identifying all the unmeasured confounders.
Several researchers have proposed recommendations and best practices for overcoming this
challenge. Groenwold and Dekkers (2020) note that residual confounding due to unmeasured or
inaccurately measured confounders is not controlled by conventional methods of handling
confounding, including propensity score methods. They recommend against data-driven methods
for selecting confounders, most notably univariate preselection or selection by change-inestimate criteria. As discussed in Chapter 2, the confounders should be controlled for while the
mediators should not. However, VanderWeele (2019) notes that statistical analysis alone cannot
distinguish between confounders and mediators. It is important to acknowledge the bias due to
unmeasured confounding and try and eliminate it and verify the robustness of the causal effect
estimate.
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If unmeasured confounding is suspected, it is advisable to conduct a sensitivity analysis
to verify the robustness of the causal effect estimate in the presence of the uncontrolled
confounding variables. VanderWeele and Arah (2011) note that there are several sensitivityanalysis techniques available that are situation specific. They propose a general class of
sensitivity-analysis formulas for outcomes, treatments, and measured and unmeasured
confounding variables that can be categorical or continuous (VanderWeele & Arah, 2011).
In 2017, VanderWeele and Ding introduced E-values, which is a metric that can be used
to assess how much an unmeasured confounder would explain away an effect estimate. They
define E-values as follows:
E-values is related to the evidence for causality in observational studies that
are potentially subject to confounding. The E-value is defined as the minimum
strength of association, on the risk–ratio scale, that an unmeasured confounder
would need to have with both the treatment and the outcome to fully explain
away a specific treatment-outcome association, conditional on the measured
covariates. A large E-value implies that considerable unmeasured confounding
would be needed to explain away an effect estimate. A small E-value implies
little unmeasured confounding would be needed to explain away an effect
estimate. (VanderWeele & Ding, 2017, p. 2)
Although the sensitivity-analysis techniques help in versifying the robustness of the causal effect
estimates in the presence of uncontrolled confounding, they do not address the bias caused due to
uncontrolled confounding.
The root cause of the uncontrolled confounding bias is the omission of important
confounding variables in the analysis. The covariate selection approaches employed to identify
variables to include in the analysis are an important first step. The goal of this step is to identify a
set of covariates that results in the least amount of bias in the causal effect estimation. As
discussed extensively in chapter 2, for different data generation structures, Pearl (2013) showed
that the inclusion and exclusion of certain covariates —thus controlling for them, could result in

207

bias introduction or bias reduction of varying magnitude. My research focused on this vital step
of covariate selection approaches to address the unmeasured confounding in the causal
estimation modeling using linear regression and propensity score methods.
As noted in Chapter 3 in Tables 6 and 7, several covariate selection approaches are
routinely employed. They include controlling for covariates that impact: only the outcome, only
the treatment, both the treatment and the outcome (minimal set approach), and either the
treatment or the outcome (union set approach; Brookhart et al., 2006; VanderWeele & Shpitser,
2011; Witte & Didelez, 2019). Using analytical and Monte Carlo simulation, VanderWeele and
Shpitser (2011) show that the union set approach–Disjunctive Cause Criterion (DCC)–in the
absence of detailed prior knowledge of the causal structure, provides causal effect estimates that
are the most consistent (i.e., that have the least amount of bias). However, they also conclude
that in the presence of unmeasured confounding in the underlying data structure the DCC does
not yield consistent estimates. To address the unmeasured confounding, the DCC was later
modified by two additional recommendations: a) to include proxy variables of unmeasured
confounders to address confounding bias, and b) to exclude instrumental variables to address Zbias (VanderWeele, 2019).

Study Objectives
The current study was planned to achieve four objectives. These objectives are described
and justified in this section, but specific research questions tied to each objective are summarized
in the next section. The first objective was to explore data structures with true unmeasured
confounding and to ascertain whether or not causal effect estimation using covariates that satisfy
the Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion (MDCC) result in the most consistent and efficient
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causal effect estimates compared to those that use the DCC and the Common Cause (CC)
covariate selection approaches.
The second objective was to verify the robustness of the causal effect estimate using
MDCC when the underlying confounder is not a true confounder but only impacts the treatment
or only impacts the outcome. As discussed before, the underlying data generation structure is
often not completely understood in the social sciences. Hence, it is important to verify the
robustness of the causal effect estimate using MDCC compared to DCC, when the unmeasured
confounder is not a true confounder. It should be noted that DCC has been shown to yield
consistent causal effect estimates in the absence of unmeasured true confounders (VanderWeele
& Shpitser, 2011).
The third objective of the research was an extension of the primary objective, which was
to verify whether or not a perfect proxy (rU.P > 0.9) could control for the unmeasured
confounding. In social science disciplines it is not uncommon to have multiple proxy variables
for an unmeasured confounder covariate that may represent the unmeasured confounder to
varying degrees (Lubotsky & Wittenberg, 2006). Bollinger and Minier (2014) recommend
including all available proxy variables for the unmeasured covariate in the regression to
minimize bias as long as they are strong proxy variables. However, no empirical guidance is
provided as to what makes a proxy a strong one. If multiple proxy variables are available to the
investigator and the information of its linear strength with the unmeasured confounder is known,
the investigator would naturally pick the best proxy variable—that is, the one with the strongest
correlation with the unmeasured covariate. In the absence of this knowledge, it is of interest to
investigate the inclusion of proxy variables of varying correlation strength with the unmeasured
confounder in the causal effect estimation modeling to determine their impacts on the
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consistency and efficiency of the estimated causal effect. Three proxy variables of varying
degrees of correlation with the unmeasured confounder (rU.P = 0.80, rU.P = 0.40, rU.P = 0.20)
were included in the causal effect estimation model, one at a time, to observe the degree of
confounding bias reduction.
The fourth objective of this study was to investigate inclusion of proxy variables with
measurement errors because such measures are common in social science research (Lubotsky &
Wittenberg, 2006). The theoretical true proxy variable has a reliability index of one and no
measurement error. The difference between the theoretical true proxy variable (τ) and actual
proxy variable (τ') is that the latter has a lower reliability index and has measurement error. The
measurement error noted here is the lack of precision in measuring the proxy variable. The
measurement error results in the actual proxy variable (τ') being less reliable (ρ < 1) than the true
proxy variable (τ) due to the presence of systematic and sporadic errors. The lack of precision
was conceptualized as a shift in the mean of the error or an increase in the variance of the error
which is added to the generated proxy variable (~ N (0, 1) and ~ N (0.1, 1.5)).

Study Assumptions
All the covariates included in the four studies are intended to be pre-treatment covariates.
It is assumed that the treatment effect is homogeneous in the target population and that the ratio
of the treated to the untreated groups is approximately 1:1. The treatment variable was binary,
and the outcome of interest was a continuous variable. All the covariates in the study are
continuous and are not of mixed scale or binary variables; they are normally distributed. In our
simulation, we assume the linear regression and propensity score are correctly specified.
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Research Questions and Methodology Summary
Based on the four objectives and the different sample size scenarios of the present study,
the following five research questions were formulated:
RQ 1: Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including a perfect proxy of an
unmeasured true confounder covariate in the causal effect estimation model compared to not
including it?
RQ 2a: Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect
estimation model a perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but
only impacts the treatment assignment, compared to not including it?
RQ 2b: Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect
estimation model a perfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is not a true confounder but
only impacts the outcome of interest, compared to not including it?
RQ 3: Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect
estimation model an imperfect proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder
compared to not including it?
RQ 4: Relative to the sample size, to what extent is there an improvement in the
consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate by including in the causal effect
estimation model a fallible proxy of an unmeasured covariate that is a true confounder compared
to not including it?
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To answer these research question four Monte Carlo simulation studies were conducted
with two causal inference modeling approaches—linear regression and propensity score
methods—and six sample sizes (18, 36, 70, 137, 265, 1,000). Several packages in the statistical
software R were used to conduct the simulation. For the first study, the unmeasured confounder
was assumed to be a true confounder, whereas in Study 2 the unmeasured covariate only
impacted the treatment or the outcome and hence was not a true confounder. For the first two
studies, the proxy of the unmeasured covariate was assumed to be a perfect proxy (rU.P = 0.95),
whereas for Study 3, proxies of varying linear strength were included, one at a time, in the causal
estimation (rU.P = 0.80, rU.P = 0.40, rU.P = 0.20). In the first three studies, the proxy of the
unmeasured covariate was assumed to be perfectly measured whereas in Study 4 the proxy was
assumed to be fallible with error components added to the proxy covariate to mimic systematic
and sporadic measurement issues. For Study 4, the introduction of the error component resulted
in deterioration of the correlation between the proxy variable and the unmeasured true
confounder.
For each study, five causal estimation models were created using the linear regression
modeling approach and the propensity score methods. The five models had different sets of
covariates that satisfied the following covariate selection approaches: a) CC criterion; b) DCC; c)
MDCC (inclusion of proxy covariate recommendation only; MDCC*); d) MDCC (inclusion of
proxy covariate and exclusion of instrumental variable recommendations); and e) a novel
approach of controlling all measured confounders and proxy of unmeasured confounders called
Modified Common Cause (MCC) criterion. Each of the five models were compared on three
performance metrics—bias, coverage, and empirical SE—which provided insight into the
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consistency and efficiency of the causal estimator. The next section discusses the findings of the
four studies within the context of existing research.
As a quick reference, Figure 36 shows the data generation structure (DGS) for each study
in this dissertation and Table 38 summarizes the covariates included in the five causal effect
estimation models using linear regression and propensity score estimation model in propensity
score methods.

Figure 36. Data generation structure for all the studies in the dissertation
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Table 38. Covariate Selection Approaches employed for Models 1 – 5 in each study.
Variable Selection Approach
Model 1: Common Cause criterion (confounders only) [CC]
Model 2: Disjunctive Cause Criterion [DCC]
Model 3: Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion* [MDCC*]
Model 4: Modified Disjunctive Cause Criterion [MDCC]
Model 5: Modified Cause Criterion [MCC]
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P**


 
 


Note: A check mark indicates that the particular covariate was included in the causal effect estimation of T on Y
using linear regression and propensity score estimation in propensity score methods. The covariate U is not included
in this table as it is unmeasured and thus not available to be included in causal estimation modeling.
MDCC* only included the recommendation to include proxy covariate of an unmeasured confounder.
P** stands for P1 in Study 1, P2 in Study 2a, P3 in Study 2b, P4 (P4a – P4d) in Study 3, and P5 (P5a, P5z, P5b-P5f) in
Study 4

Discussion
As noted in Chapter 2, correlation is an artifact of the data, while causation is an artifact
of the underlying data generation structure (DGS). Correlation alone is not sufficient to draw
causal inferences as it resides in the first-rung of Pearl’s causal ladder (Pearl & Mackenzie,
2018). One of the main criticisms of causal studies employing observational data is the lack of
random assignment of the study participants into the treatment group, i.e., study participants selfselecting into treatment. This results in the treated and the untreated groups being potentially
different on important covariates, and hence not exchangeable with one another due to the
imbalance in measured and unmeasured covariates. Additionally, there could be covariates that
result in spurious associations (i.e., confounding) that is not included in the observational data
set. Zhang et al. (2018) note that controlling bias due to confounders has become the most
important methodological consideration in estimating true treatment effects. Richardson and
Joshy (2020) present that confounding can be addressed through proper study design such as
identifying proper stratification levels, through standardization, or through statistical adjustment.
To yield consistent causal effect estimates through statistical adjustment, some causal methods—
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such as propensity score methods and multiple regression—rely on potentially untestable
assumptions such as the underlying DGS has no unmeasured confounding (Musci & Stuart,
2019).
Unmeasured confounding is a stubborn problem and can occur due to one of the
following reasons, to name a few: a) all appropriate covariates in the underlying DGS have not
been identified and hence have not been included in the causal effect estimation model; b) all the
covariates in the DGS are correctly identified, but have not been measured or not data is
available and hence are not available to be included in the causal effect estimation model; c) the
covariates in the DGS are correctly identified, however they cannot be measured (e.g., construct
without a reliable measurement, the treatment is really a construct); and d) the covariates in the
DGS are correctly identified and are measured, but the covariates have measurement error and
hence are not reliable.
In the past two decades there has been significant attention in the causal inference
literature to tackle the menace of unmeasured confounding. Several methods have been
developed to identify the presence of unmeasured confounding bias and potentially address the
menace of unmeasured confounding in different research scenarios employing varied DGS (few
references include: Barberio et al., 2021; Richardson & Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2021; Shin et al.,
2014; VanderWeele, 2019). Zhang et al. (2018) conducted the first systematic review of over
100 articles in causal comparative observational research. They reviewed articles addressing
unmeasured confounding up to 2017 and identified 15 methods that assist with the assessment of
unmeasured confounding. They concluded that while many methods have been developed to deal
with unmeasured confounding, it seems to be under-utilized in practice due to its complexity and
applicability in narrow data generation settings.
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In some research settings where a reference sample is available that has not been exposed
to the treatment conditions, the bespoke approach developed by Richardson and Tchetgen
Tchetgen (2021) could be employed to account for residual bias. In this approach, the measured
confounding variable can act as a “bespoke” instrumental variable in regression analysis. They
apply this method to study exposure-disease causal association for survivors of atomic
bombardment in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—by comparing the radiation exposure from the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on mortality for the people who were in the city
during the time of the bombardment with ones who were not in the city—and show that their
proposed method is effective. However, having such ancillary data on a reference sample are rare
and thus this method has limited application.
For observational studies that are more commonplace, Rubin (2008) provides guidelines
so that observational studies can be carefully designed to approximate randomized experiments.
He notes that the one of the main reasons randomized control trials (RCTs) are considered the
gold standard for causal estimation is because through random assignment, in expectation, it
achieves a balance between the measured and unmeasured covariates. To design observational
studies to approximate RCTs, Rubin advises is to ensure that all key covariates are identified and
measured well. If the key variables are not measured well, he recommends even using surrogate
variables (i.e., proxy variables) instead of just omitting the variable from the analysis all together
to ensure no unmeasured confounding exists, a recommendation echoed by VanderWeele (2019).
Rubin asserts that no amount of fancy analysis would be an adequate substitute for omission of a
key variable. Thus, it can be concluded that unmeasured confounders are to be expected in the
underlying DGS, and it is vital to control them in causal estimation modeling and verify that
unmeasured confounding bias is addressed.
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Study 1
The Study 1 in this dissertation addresses a DGS where an unmeasured confounder exists
along with a proxy covariate. Study 1 results show that in the presence of an unmeasured true
confounder in the underlying DGS, all the confounding biases can never be completely
eliminated from the causal effect estimate, a finding consistent with existing literature
(VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). As noted by Witte and Didelez (2019), other than improving
the consistency of the causal effect estimate (i.e., reducing bias in the causal effect estimate), the
covariate selection for causal inference can have other aims, such as improving efficiency of the
estimator. Hence, the models employing different covariate selection strategies—Model 1 (CC),
Model 2 (DCC), Model 3 (MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC)—were primarily
compared using the consistency (reduction in bias) and efficiency (reduction in EmpericalSE)
performance measures.
Table 12 (Chapter 4) displays the results from Study 1 where linear regression is
employed to estimate the causal effect in the presence of an unmeasured true confounder.
Specifically, the results of the bias and empirical SE performance measures for Model 1 (CC)
and Model 2 (DCC) are compared. Note that the only difference between the two models is that
Model 2 includes all covariates in Model 1 (covariate C) and it also includes the covariate that
impacts only the treatment (covariate Z) in the causal effect estimation model. Results show that
when the covariate that only impacts the treatment (covariate Z) is included it adversely impacts
the consistency of the causal effect estimate without improving the efficiency of the causal effect
estimator. Similar results were also found for causal estimation using the propensity score
method (Table 13). The magnitude of bias was so large that the coverage was zero for both linear
regression and propensity score method. Thus, it can be concluded that, in the presence of
unmeasured confounding, the DCC performed worse with respect to the consistency of the
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causal effect estimate (bias) without any improvement in the efficiency of the causal effect
estimator (empirical SE) compared to the common cause (CC) covariate selection approach.
These findings are consistent with VanderWeele and Shpitser’s (2011) results in which they note
that the amount of bias is most severe using DCC compared to the other covariate selection
methods, including the CC covariate selection approach.
Additionally, Study 1 shows that, in the presence of an unmeasured true confounder,
including the unmeasured covariate’s perfect proxy (rU.P = 0.95) in the causal effect estimation
model drastically improves the consistency of the causal effect estimate (i.e., it reduces bias). For
a large sample size (nobs = 1,000), by including the perfect proxy of a true unmeasured
confounder in the causal effect estimation model, there is almost a 90% reduction in the bias
(bias: 2.01 for DCC and 0.21 for MDCC) and a strong improvement in the efficiency of the
causal effect estimator (Empirical SE: 0.06 for DCC and 0.01 for MDCC). Comparing Model 3
(MDCC*), Model 4 (MDCC), and Model 5 (MCC) with Model 2 (DCC), we conclude that the
improvement in the consistency of the causal effect estimate can be attributed predominantly to
the inclusion of the proxy covariate of the unmeasured confounder. These findings are consistent
with existing literature, in which Pearl (2013) analytically shows that excluding the instrumental
variable improves the efficiency and consistency of the causal effect estimate by preventing bias
amplification. The covariates included in the causal effect estimation modeling based on the
MDCC yielded the most consistent and efficient causal effect estimate compared to the DCC and
CC criterion, irrespective of the sample size. As the power increases (i.e., as sample size
increases), the consistency of the causal effect estimate, and the efficiency of the estimator
improve. With respect to consistency and efficiency, the next best covariate selection criterion is
the MCC, a model in which all measured confounders (covariate C) and proxies of unmeasured
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confounders (covariate P1) are controlled for. On the other hand, in the presence of an
unmeasured confounder, the DCC yields the least consistent and least efficient causal estimate,
irrespective of the sample size. These findings are consistent with findings from Rosenbaum’s
(2021) simulation study. Rosenbaum concluded that the inclusion of a proxy variable of an
unmeasured confounder in the logistic regression model significantly reduced the bias of the
treatment effect when compared to logistic regression without the proxy variable.
However, Study 1 in this dissertation only considered one unmeasured confounder in the
underlying DGS. In more complex DGS scenarios where multiple unmeasured confounders exist
in the underlying DGS, Shin et al. (2014) propose an Indirect Adjustment Technique (IAT) using
partitioned regression with a Cox proportional hazards model. This method indirectly adjusts the
effect estimates (e.g., hazard ratio) for unmeasured confounders, using information from an
ancillary dataset. The advantage of the IAT is that there are no restrictions on the form of the
measured and unmeasured variables (either continuous or categorical), and it can accommodate
multiple unmeasured variables simultaneously. However, the magnitude of the bias is impacted
by the correlation between the unmeasured confounders. Byun et al. (2022) assessed the validity
of the IAT and concluded that though it is a promising technique to reduce bias from unmeasured
confounding, it should be applied judiciously when there are multiple correlated unmeasured
confounders of the same direction. Byun et al. (2022) concluded that indirect adjustment for
multiple missing confounders at once could result in a higher bias than that for some of the
missing confounders. Simultaneously controlling for all unmeasured confounders is quite
challenging as the impact of each confounders’ effect on the bias has to be known, a priori.
These findings further indicate the complexity in addressing unmeasured confounding especially
when multiple unmeasured confounders exist in the underlying DGS.
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Study 2
However, what if the suspected unmeasured confounder is not a true confounder (i.e., it
impacts the treatment and the outcome) or has only a very weak impact on the treatment or the
outcome and a stronger impact on the other. The Study 2a and 2b investigated a scenario where
the underlying unmeasured confounder is not a true confounder at all. In Study 2a, the
unmeasured confounder only impacted the treatment and in Study 2b it only impacted the
outcome. The results of Studies 2a and 2b (Tables 16 and 20) in this dissertation together
demonstrate that controlling for the proxy covariate of a falsely suspected confounder has
obviously no impact on the consistency of the causal effect estimate as there is no confounding
bias. The proxy covariate of the unmeasured variable, which may be a true confounder or one
that only impacts the outcome or just the treatment, has no negative impact on the efficiency of
the causal effect estimator when included in the causal effect estimation model. The results from
Study 2b, in which the unmeasured covariate is not a true confounder but only impacts the
outcome and not the treatment, show that for linear regression (Table 20) and a sample size of
1,000, including the proxy of the unmeasured covariate improves the efficiency of the estimator
(95% CI: [2.82, 3.16] for models MDCC*, MDCC, and MCC, and [2.58, 3.40] for DCC) without
compromising the consistency of the causal effect estimate. However, these findings do not hold
in Study 2a in which the unmeasured covariate is not a true confounder buy only impacts the
treatment. Comparing results of models 3–5 from Study 1 to that of studies 2a and 2b (tables 12,
16, and 20), demonstrates that controlling the proxy covariate of a falsely suspected confounder
does not adversely affect the efficiency of the causal effect estimator.
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Study 3
Study 3 in this dissertation investigated situations where the unmeasured true confounder
does not have an ideal proxy (r > 0.90) but only has proxy that are more realistic in social
sciences (r < 0.80 – i.e., 0.80, 0.40, 0.20). Comparing the results from Study 3 for Model 3
(MDCC*) and Model 4 (MDCC; Tables 24, 26, 28, and 30) across the range of correlation
values of the proxy and the unmeasured confounder (rU.P = 0.95, 0.80, 0.40, 0.20) shows that, as
the strength of the proxy covariate with the unmeasured confounder decreases, the confounding
bias correction also decreases, or the confounding bias increases. These findings were consistent
with Rosenbaum’s (2021) simulation study findings which indicated that including proxy
variables in the logistic regression model improves the estimation of the treatment effect at weak,
moderate, and strong association with unmeasured confounders. The results from Study 3 (Table
24) further indicates that excluding the instrumental variable (covariate Z) from the causal effect
estimation model results in a marginal improvement in the consistency of the causal effect
estimate. This can be seen by comparing the results of Model 3 (MDCC*) and Model 4
(MDCC). However, there is no improvement in the efficiency of the causal effect estimator,
which is a finding that is consistent with the existing literature (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011;
Witte & Didelez, 2019). Furthermore, when the instrumental variable is included in the causal
effect estimation model with a weaker proxy, thus resulting in more confounding bias as less
amount of the confounding bias is controlled for, the bias amplification due to the instrumental
variable becomes more pronounced as now there is more outstanding bias that can be amplified.
Similar results were observed for causal estimation using propensity score methods (Tables 25,
27, 29, and 31). Additionally, comparing Model 4 (MDCC) and Model 5 (MCC) from Study 3
across proxy strengths shows that, irrespective of the strength of the proxy variable in relation to
that of unmeasured true confounder, controlling for the covariate that only impacts the outcome
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(covariate B) does not adversely impact the consistency of the causal effect estimate but does
marginally improve the efficiency of the causal effect estimator for most sample sizes. As the
strength of the proxy weakens, the improvements in consistency and efficiency also diminish.
Furthermore, in the presence of an unmeasured true confounder, when the proxy of the
unmeasured true confounder is a weak proxy (r = 0.20), comparing Model 1 (CC) and Model 4
(MDCC) in Study 3 (Table 30) with a sample size of 1,000 shows that there is only a marginal
improvement in the consistency of the causal effect estimate (bias: 1.92 for CC and 1.86 for
MDCC). However, in a similar scenario, DCC performs markedly worse (bias: 2.01 for DCC).
Model 5 (MCC) corrects the confounding bias comparable to that of MDCC (bias: 1.95 for
MCC). The efficiency of all the estimators is similar, as they have same EmpericalSE values.

Study 4
Measurement error in modeled as an addition to the proxy variable in the form of error
that is drawn from standard normal distributions as well as normal distributions with shifted
mean and additional variance. Results from Study 4 shows that the measurement error, as
modeled in this study, primarily impacts the correlation between the proxy variable at the
unmeasured true confounder variable. In such situations, the recommendations from Study 3
described before hold. Table 13 shows that if covariates unrelated to the outcome, but related to
the treatment variable (variable Z) are included in the propensity score estimation model, this
results in increased variance in the causal effect estimate (95% CI of bias for sample size 1,000:
[2.48, 4.00] for MDCC* and [2.56, 3.89] for MDCC) without any improvement in the
consistency of the causal effect estimate (bias for sample size 1,000: 0.24 for MDCC* and 0.23
for MDCC), a finding consistent with the existing literature (Brookhart et al., 2006).
Additionally, comparing Model 4 (MDCC) and Model 5 (MCC) in table 13 shows that including
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a covariate in the propensity score estimation model that impacts the outcome, but does not
impact the treatment (variable B) results in a slight decrease in the consistency of the causal
effect estimate (bias for sample size 1,000: 0.23 for MDCC and 0.21 for MCC); for lower sample
sizes, however, there is an improvement in the efficiency of the causal effect estimator, again a
finding consistent with the existing literature (Brookhart et al., 2006).
In the four simulation studies in this dissertation, the unmeasured true confounder is not
correlated to any other covariate in the DGS. This research scenario may be unrealistic in reallife situations. In DGSs where the unmeasured confounder is correlated to a measured
confounder, Quantitative Bias Analysis (QBA) technique of the “unmeasured” confounder
suggested by Barberio et al. (2021) can be employed. They concluded that bias due to
unmeasured confounding are typically small, in part, because the unmeasured variable was not
independent of the controlled variables. They posit that many methodological studies, tend to
over-estimate the negative impact of the unmeasured confounders as they assume that the
unmeasured confounder covariate is unrelated to the measured confounder covariate. However,
one of the major limitations of this approach is that it needs external information to specify the
bias parameters which may not be easily available. When a suspected confounder cannot be
measured in the study data, they conclude that the QBA is the most informative method for
assessing the impact. Nevertheless, the QBA technique only helps in situations where the
suspected confounder is identified but not measured, not when the unmeasured confounder is not
identified as part of the DGS, in the first place.
The results from all the four simulation studies in this dissertation, taken together,
validate the MDCC covariate selection criterion at least in certain DGS scenarios—where only
one unmeasured confounder exists in the underlying DGS and when that unmeasured confounder
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is not related to any other variable in the DGS except for the treatment and the outcome (as it is a
confounder), and the proxy covariate (by definition). The results show that irrespective of the
strength of the proxy covariate, the proxy of the unmeasured confounder should be controlled for
in the causal effect estimation model. Controlling for the unmeasured confounding variable by
including the proxy covariate in the causal effect estimation modeling improves the consistency
of the causal effect estimate without compromising the efficiency of the causal effect estimator.
These findings are true for both linear regression and propensity score methods and for a range
of sample sizes. Thus, these results indicate that the MDCC covariate selection approach
suggested by VanderWeele (2019) typically result in improved consistency of the causal effect
estimate and efficiency of the causal effect estimator, thus validating the MDCC covariate
selection recommendations.
The next section provides practical steps and guidelines based on this dissertation and the
existing literature on this topic.

Recommendations
This section offers some guidelines for covariate selection that practitioners and researchers
can use when employing observational data to draw causal inferences. These suggestions are not
comprehensive and not a substitute for covariate selection based on relevant theory, existing
literature, and subject-matter knowledge. These guidelines are a mere accumulation of good
practices suggested by various experts in this field and based on the findings of this research and
other existing studies. It can be implemented for covariate selection when employing
observational data for causal estimation. The recommendations listed below hold for both linear
regression and propensity score methods under a vast range of sample-size conditions.
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1. Grounded on theory, empirical research, or subject-matter knowledge, when the

underlying DGS is completely known, the extensive literature on DAGs and do-calculus
suggests that identifying non-causal pathways and controlling for appropriate covariates
(confounders, colliders, instrumental variables, mediators), based on back-door and
front-door criteria, is a relatively dependable way of drawing causal inferences. This
approach has the added advantage of identifying a minimal set of covariates that needs
to be controlled for to isolate the impact of one variable (e.g., treatment or condition) on
another variable (e.g., outcome). However, the biggest challenge of implementing this
covariate selection approach is that the hypothesized DGS is comprehensive (i.e., all the
covariates that should be included in the analysis have been included in the analysis) and
none of the relationships of any covariate with the treatment, the outcome, or with one
another are mis-specified (i.e., all causal and non-causal flows have been correctly
specified).
2. While conducting social science research, the underlying DGS is seldom completely
known. However, if the researcher can establish that all the covariates that could
potentially result in unmeasured confounding have been identified and accounted for in
the DGS, then covariate selection based on the DCC yields the most consistent causal
effect estimate (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011). Thus, a practical and theoretically
informed covariate selection approach would be the DCC, which suggests that any
covariate that impacts the treatment or the outcome must be included in the causal effect
estimation model.
3. Unmeasured confounding variables are common in observational data. Therefore, it is
impractical to assume that all the covariates that could potentially result in unmeasured
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confounding have been identified and controlled for in the causal effect estimation
model. Under such circumstances, biases cannot be completely eliminated from the
causal effect estimate. the DCC covariate selection approach yields the least consistent
causal effect estimate. MDCC should be employed. The MDCC approach can be
summarized as: a) include in the causal effect estimation model the covariates impacting
the treatment or the covariates impacting the outcome; and b) include the proxy
covariate for the unmeasured confounder variable; and c) exclude the instrumental
variables. When unmeasured confounding is suspected, a proxy variable for the
unmeasured confounder should be included to account for confounding bias but exclude
the instrumental variables. Excluding the instrumental variables reduces the small
amount of bias amplification that occurs otherwise. MDCC is robust to the underlying
covariate being a true confounder. Even in situations when the underlying covariate is
not a true confounder but only impacts the treatment or the outcome, it is recommended
to employ the MDCC covariate selection approach as it results in the most consistent
causal effect estimate and the most efficient causal effect estimator. Furthermore, based
on the results from this simulation study, even in circumstances when the proxy
covariate is not a strong proxy for the unmeasured true confounder, it is recommended
to include the proxy covariate with linear strength of 0.20 or more (r >0.20) as it results
in a reduction in bias. Additionally, even in situations where the proxy covariate has
measurement error (i.e., has a systematic or sporadic error in them), the measurement
error primarily impacts the correlation of the proxy covariate with the unmeasured true
confounder and hence it is recommended to include any proxy covariate with
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measurement error as long as it has a linear correlation with the unmeasured confounder
of r > 0.20.
4. When the data generation structure is not completely understood, the practitioner can
still implement covariate selection approaches that reduce biases considerably.
Nevertheless, one of the major drawbacks of DCC—and by extension MDCC—is that a
large number of covariates may satisfy these criteria and hence more variables could
potentially be included in the causal effect estimation model. With the potential of
including many variables comes the risk of measurement error, correlation between
variables and introduction of biases as discussed extensively in Chapter 2. In situations
where there are more covariates than there are observations (i.e., small sample size
situations), parsimony may be desirable to free up degrees of freedom. In such
situations, it is more important to address the confounding bias, and it is advisable to
include all measured confounders and proxy covariates for the unmeasured confounders.
Proposed in this dissertation, is the novel approach known as the MCC, and the
simulation results demonstrate that after factoring in the uncertainty of the Monte Carlo
simulation estimates, MCC provides statistically similar results to MDCC with respect
to the consistency and efficiency of the causal effect estimate and estimator,
respectively. In real-life situations, MCC may result in a smaller set of covariates that
need to be included in the causal effect estimation model which would yield a consistent
causal effect estimate and an efficient causal effect estimator comparable to the MDCC
approach. Hence, if parsimony is of concern, MCC covariate selection approach can be
employed instead of the MDCC covariate selection approach without compromising on
consistency and efficiency.
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The first four recommendations assume progressively less understanding of the
underlying DGS, accommodate the misidentification of covariates, and acknowledge the
presence of unmeasured true confounding. These situations may be more commonplace
in social science research.
5. Irrespective of the confidence in the underlying DGS, it is advisable to assume the

presence of residual unmeasured confounding and bias. Regardless of the approach
taken to identify and control for non-causal flows—DAGs, DCC, MDCC, or MCC—it
is always a good practice to employ sensitivity analysis (e.g., E-values) after the causal
effect estimate has been calculated. The sensitivity analysis using E-values show how
robust the estimated causal effect is to the residual unmeasured confounding and how
much unmeasured confounding is needed to explain away the causal effect estimated.

Step-by-Step Guidelines to Address Unmeasured Confounding in Observational Studies
Next, a step-by-step guideline is provided for the benefit of the practitioners on how to
address unmeasured confounding when employing observational data for causal effect
estimation. These guidelines to address unmeasured confounding in observational research are
inspired by, and adapted from, recommendations by Zhang et al. (2018) as well as based on the
results from the four simulation studies in this research. They are meant to be a starting off point
for applied researchers who only have partial knowledge of the underlying DGS.
1. The first step in covariates selection to draw causal inferences should be to put a
comprehensive effort to identify all the covariates that could potentially impact the
outcome and the treatment, based on theoretical evidence, existing literature, and subject
matter expertise. This exercise should not be limited by the availability of data. (Rubin,
2008; Shpitser, 2020)
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2. When possible, the unmeasured confounding should be addressed at the design phase of
the study as the study design has profound consequences on the causal estimation using
observational data. Zhang et al. (2018) suggest, case-crossover and self-controlled case
series as possible design options to consider, but a detailed evaluation of the proper study
design is outside the scope of this research.
3. At this point in the covariate selection journey, it is okay to assume no unmeasured
confounding, and to employ the appropriate measured and available covariates (including
measured confounders) in causal effect estimation using standard causal effect estimation
methods (such as, multivariable regression, propensity score methods, and others).
4. Once the causal effect is estimated in step 3, irrespective of the study design and causal
estimation method employed, unmeasured confounding should be evaluated as the next
step of the analysis using observational data. Zhang, et al. (2018) suggest asking
questions such as, “does unmeasured confounding exist in my study? Are they associated
with the outcome, the treatment, or both? To what extent are they associated with the
outcome or the treatment?” Answers to some of these questions should have been
addressed in step 1, but it is important to carefully reexamine these questions.
5. After step 4, if the investigator concludes that there is “no unmeasured confounding”,
Zhang et al. (2018) insist that thorough evidence be included to justify that conclusion.
The justification could be provided by conducting sensitivity analysis using methods such
as E-values suggested by VanderWeele and Ding (2017). E-values help quantify the
strength of the unmeasured confounding that has to exist to explain away the estimated
causal effect. Though it does not identify the unmeasured confounder, E-values can help
justify the strength of the causal effect estimated but signifying the amount of
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unmeasured confounding that will be needed to explain it away. For reference, Zhang et
al. (2018) include other sensitivity analysis methods such as the “rule-out” method
which however is limited to one unmeasured confounder at a time. Other methods
discussed there include, Rosenbaum-Rubin sensitivity analysis, Rosenbaum sensitivity
analysis.
6. After implementing step 5, if the investigator can justify no unmeasured confounding,
then the causal effect estimates based on step 3 ought to be enough. However, if step 5
indicates the presence of unmeasured confounding, then the next step is to find additional
information on the unmeasured confounders.
7. A)

If the presence of unmeasured confounding is detected, but no information on the

unmeasured confounders is available, then Zhang et al. (2018) suggests a few possible
methods such as the Instrumental Variable Method (IVM) or Regression Discontinuity
Method (RDM) that does not rely on unmeasured confounding assumptions.
B)

If the presence of unmeasured confounding is detected, the investigator has the

option to go back to the study participants to collect additional information on the
unmeasured confounders. However, caution must be exercised as this has the potential to
lead to other biases such as recall bias due to the passage of time between the initial and
subsequent data collection.
C)

If the presence of unmeasured confounding is detected and collecting data on

unmeasured confounders from the original study participants is not a feasible option, the
investigator can rely on external data sources.
The findings from the four studies in this dissertation can support the
implementation of step 7 as it shows that even data on a good proxy in lieu of the data on
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the unmeasured confounder is a good substitute. The findings from this study are
consistent with expert recommendations (Rubin, 2008; VanderWeele, 2019) and
consistent with existing literature (Rosenbaum, 2021). If no information is available on
the unmeasured confounder, instead of excluding the unmeasured covariate all together,
an adequate substitute, even a weak proxy covariate, of that unmeasured confounder
would yield more consistent causal effect estimates.
The next section discusses some limitations and delimitations of this research and some
possible research ideas to explore further.

Limitations, Delimitations and Future Research
The current simulation study was designed to specifically examine the consistency and
efficiency of the causal effect estimation process using observational data in the presence of
unmeasured confounders. One of the limitations of this study is that the covariate selection
approaches evaluated—DCC, MDCC, and MCC—are all “knowledge-based” approaches that
assume that most of the underlying data generation structure is known to the researcher a priori.
This research is thus limited by the functional form of the variables and the predefined
relationships between the variables. Witte and Didelez (2019) compared knowledge-based
approaches with other parametric and non-parametric covariate selection approaches, and
scholars should refer to their work for additional insight on those methods.
Another limitation of the study is that only one unmeasured confounder is assumed in the
underlying data generation structure; however, as discussed before, in practice, residual
unmeasured confounding variables are ubiquitous in social science research. Note that Pearl
(2013) showed analytically that controlling for the confounder covariate reduces bias, whereas
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controlling for the mediator covariate increases bias. It would be valuable to investigate whether
or not causal effect estimation yields a consistent causal effect estimate when the proxy covariate
of the unmeasured confounder also happens to be a mediator variable between the treatment and
the outcome. This would expand on the primary findings of this study, which validate the
recommendation to include the proxy for the unmeasured covariate. It would also provide
insights into whether these recommendations hold under different data generating structures.
Additionally, this study assumes that there is only one proxy covariate for the unmeasured true
confounder. In practice, there could be multiple proxy covariates, and their relationship with one
another, and with other covariates, may have an impact on the causal effect estimation.
A third limitation of this research is that the data generation structure assumed for all the
studies is but one of the many functional forms that are plausible. In practice, several functional
forms between the variables (i.e., interaction between variables, nonlinear quadratic, or higherorder terms, etc.) can impact the causal effect estimate, especially when the covariates in the
model are continuous. Though the propensity score estimation modeling considered all the
higher-order terms, including interactions, the linear regression models did not. Conducting a
similar study for higher-ordered regressions would be beneficial to this area of research.
Additionally, all the covariates were drawn from a standard normal distribution which,
though consistent with simulation studies in the covariate selection sub-domain, is not consistent
with what is found in reality. Rarely do covariates in the social sciences follow normal
distributions. As noted by Mooney (1997), the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of a
distribution function are often important for work that uses Monte Carlo simulations (Mooney,
1997). Though this research is consistent with drawing covariates from a standard normal
distribution, which is what is typically done in the covariate selection Monte Carlo studies, a
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general limitation has been that the variable distributions have not been consistent with what is
encountered in practice. A valuable future contribution to this field would be to evaluate whether
the MDCC recommendations and the DCC recommendations are still valid under conditions
where covariates are drawn from non-normal distributions. It is vital that the shape of the
distribution from which the covariates are drawn resembles the shape of the distribution
encountered in social science disciplines. These different distribution shapes could be achieved
by altering the parameters of a particular distribution or by changing the distribution families
altogether. It would be valuable to assess whether or not the findings of this study hold for
skewed and kurtotic distributions. Additionally, it would be helpful to examine whether or not
the findings hold when the covariates are drawn from the Chi-square distribution with varying
degrees of freedom (c) values or from a lognormal distribution with varying a and b parameter
values; these distributions are more commonly found in the social sciences. Morris notes that
lognormal and Chi-square distributions are extremely useful in describing a range of economic,
social, and biological phenomena (Mooney, 1997). The overreliance on the recommendations
based on Monte Carlo simulation studies with variables drawn from a standard normal
distribution could lead to erroneous conclusions; hence, there is a pressing need to expand the
scope of these findings. If future work on this topic is pursued, it is highly advisable to include
variables drawn from a Beta distribution, which Mooney suggests is the most flexible
distribution that is bounded by zero and one and is useful in social science simulations.
The fourth limitation of this research is that the treatment variable in this study is
assumed to be dichotomous with a homogeneous treatment effect for the entire population that
does not vary with time. Future work should consider factoring in treatment variables that are not
dichotomous but that are treated as continuous values. Also, treatment effects that are not
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homogeneous in effect or that vary over time are not uncommon in social science disciplines.
Validating the findings of this study in such situations is a valuable contribution to research
practitioners in this field.
The fifth limitation of this study is that the strength of the confounder with the treatment
and the outcome was not altered. Though the strength of the correlation between the proxy
covariate and the confounder variable was varied—and in Study 2, the confounder was turned
into a variable that only impacts the treatment (Study 2a) or the outcome (Study 2b)—the
strength of the confounder was held constant. Prior research shows that when the strength of the
confounder is varied, it impacts the efficiency of the causal effect estimate (Brookhart et al.,
2006). It will be worthwhile for future researchers to alter the strength of the confounder by
changing its impact on the treatment and outcome variables to determine whether or not the
recommendations from this study hold in such situations. The logical question would be: Is it
better to include a strong proxy for a weak unmeasured confounder variable, or a weak proxy for
a strong unmeasured confounder?
Another limitation of this study is that for propensity score methods only the matching
heuristic was employed to find matched pairs. The recommendations of this study should be
evaluated using propensity score stratification and propensity score weighting techniques..
Additionally, the assumption of independence may have been violated when estimating the
treatment effects for PSM, since matching with replacement was employed without weighting
the outcome. Finally, the balance of covariates was not examined before and after each covariate
selection procedure was employed, just the bias of the average treatment effect was estimated.
This is something that could be further examined in future research.
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Finally, similar to other research on this topic (VanderWeele & Shpitser, 2011), it is
assumed that the linear regression and propensity score methods employed here are not affected
by a lack of sufficient overlap. The proportion of the treated and untreated in the overall
generated population are comparable (i.e., was approximately 50%), which results in enough
matched pairs to accurately estimate the causal effect. However, it is not uncommon for the ratio
of the treated to the untreated to be lopsided, i.e., one of the treatment or the control groups could
be disproportionately larger than the other resulting in insufficient overlap. It would be a
valuable contribution to the field of covariate selection to draw causal inferences from
observational data to investigate whether or not the recommendations from this study hold in
such situations.

### 𝛷𝜑 ###
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 4 TABLES
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U5, P5, P5a ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5a ~ N (0, 1.00)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5a) = 1.00 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5a) = 0.70
(actual)
Cor (U5, P5a) = 0.66 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3a
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5a ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4a
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5a ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5a
[ Y ~ T + C + P5a ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.90
5.00
4.84
4.94
4.92
4.92
4.91
5.06
4.95
5.04
5.00
5.01
4.30
4.32
4.17
4.23
4.19
4.17
4.25
4.26
4.12
4.18
4.13
4.12
4.29
4.32
4.09
4.16
4.14
4.12

1.90
2.00
1.84
1.94
1.92
1.92
1.91
2.06
1.95
2.04
2.00
2.01
1.30
1.32
1.17
1.23
1.19
1.17
1.25
1.26
1.12
1.18
1.13
1.12
1.29
1.32
1.09
1.16
1.14
1.12

(0.02 , 9.78)
(1.65 , 8.35)
(2.45 , 7.23)
(3.25 , 6.64)
(3.70 , 6.14)
(4.30 , 5.55)
(1.67 , 8.14)
(2.93 , 7.18)
(3.47 , 6.44)
(3.99 , 6.09)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.63 , 5.40)
(1.45 , 7.16)
(2.52 , 6.12)
(2.94 , 5.41)
(3.36 , 5.10)
(3.58 , 4.80)
(3.86 , 4.48)
(1.57 , 6.94)
(2.52 , 6.00)
(2.93 , 5.32)
(3.33 , 5.02)
(3.53 , 4.73)
(3.81 , 4.42)
(-0.58 , 9.16)
(1.06 , 7.58)
(1.79 , 6.39)
(2.54 , 5.78)
(2.98 , 5.30)
(3.52 , 4.71)

85.8%
76.5%
65.2%
40.4%
13.7%
0.0%
76.6%
52.0%
27.6%
3.2%
0.0%
0.0%
82.6%
68.0%
53.9%
21.2%
3.7%
0.0%
82.4%
68.9%
54.7%
22.6%
4.1%
0.0%
89.6%
87.3%
85.0%
71.3%
51.4%
4.6%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
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U5, P5, P5z ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5z ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5z) = 1.00 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5z) = 0.56
(actual)
Cor (U5, P5z) = 0.54 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3z
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5z]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4z
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5z]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5z
[ Y ~ T + C + P5z ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI Coverage

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.86
4.90
4.92
4.95
4.90
4.91
4.99
4.95
5.04
5.01
5.00
5.00
4.62
4.55
4.58
4.53
4.50
4.49
4.52
4.49
4.50
4.46
4.43
4.43
4.47
4.53
4.48
4.49
4.42
4.42

1.86
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.90
1.91
1.99
1.95
2.04
2.01
2.00
2.00
1.62
1.55
1.58
1.53
1.50
1.49
1.52
1.49
1.50
1.46
1.43
1.43
1.47
1.53
1.48
1.49
1.42
1.42

(-0.01 , 9.72)
(1.54 , 8.25)
(2.54 , 7.30)
(3.25 , 6.66)
(3.68 , 6.12)
(4.28 , 5.54)
(1.77 , 8.21)
(2.82 , 7.08)
(3.56 , 6.53)
(3.96 , 6.07)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.62 , 5.39)
(1.53 , 7.71)
(2.58 , 6.53)
(3.23 , 5.93)
(3.58 , 5.48)
(3.82 , 5.17)
(4.15 , 4.84)
(1.61 , 7.43)
(2.59 , 6.38)
(3.19 , 5.81)
(3.54 , 5.39)
(3.77 , 5.09)
(4.09 , 4.76)
(-0.46 , 9.4)
(1.21 , 7.85)
(2.14 , 6.81)
(2.82 , 6.15)
(3.23 , 5.61)
(3.82 , 5.03)
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86.4%
80.5%
63.2%
37.9%
12.9%
0.0%
74.8%
58.1%
23.4%
3.4%
0.2%
0.0%
80.0%
64.3%
37.3%
11.4%
0.6%
0.0%
79.5%
64.8%
39.4%
12.6%
0.9%
0.0%
89.0%
84.9%
76.2%
58.0%
34.8%
0.3%

Empirical
SE

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05

U5, P5, P5b ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5b ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5b) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5b) = 0.56 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5b) = 0.52 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3b
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5b ]
Modified Disjunctive Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model4b
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5b ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5b
[ Y ~ T + C + P5b ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.90
5.00
4.84
4.94
4.92
4.92
4.91
5.06
4.95
5.04
5.00
5.01
4.59
4.67
4.54
4.60
4.55
4.56
4.55
4.60
4.48
4.53
4.48
4.49
4.60
4.63
4.45
4.52
4.49
4.49

1.90
2.00
1.84
1.94
1.92
1.92
1.91
2.06
1.95
2.04
2.00
2.01
1.59
1.67
1.54
1.60
1.55
1.56
1.55
1.60
1.48
1.53
1.48
1.49
1.60
1.63
1.45
1.52
1.49
1.49

(0.02 , 9.78)
(1.65 , 8.35)
(2.45 , 7.23)
(3.25 , 6.64)
(3.70 , 6.14)
(4.30 , 5.55)
(1.67 , 8.14)
(2.93 , 7.18)
(3.47 , 6.44)
(3.99 , 6.09)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.63 , 5.40)
(1.46 , 7.72)
(2.69 , 6.66)
(3.17 , 5.91)
(3.63 , 5.56)
(3.87 , 5.23)
(4.21 , 4.90)
(1.62 , 7.48)
(2.68 , 6.52)
(3.15 , 5.81)
(3.59 , 5.47)
(3.81 , 5.14)
(4.15 , 4.83)
(-0.37 , 9.57)
(1.30 , 7.96)
(2.09 , 6.80)
(2.85 , 6.18)
(3.30 , 5.67)
(3.88 , 5.10)

85.8%
76.5%
65.2%
40.4%
13.7%
0.0%
76.6%
52.0%
27.6%
3.2%
0.0%
0.0%
79.9%
62.8%
40.0%
10.5%
1.1%
0.0%
78.6%
62.9%
41.8%
10.8%
0.9%
0.0%
86.7%
82.5%
76.6%
58.1%
31.3%
0.4%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
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U5, P5, P5c ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5c ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5c) = 0.90
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5c) = 0.50 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5c) = 0.47
(actual)
Common Cause
Criterion: LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3c
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5c]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model4c
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5c]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5c
[ Y ~ T + C + P5c ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI Coverage

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.86
4.90
4.92
4.95
4.90
4.91
4.99
4.95
5.04
5.01
5.00
5.00
4.72
4.62
4.67
4.61
4.60
4.59
4.62
4.54
4.60
4.54
4.53
4.52
4.59
4.58
4.56
4.57
4.52
4.52

1.86
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.90
1.91
1.99
1.95
2.04
2.01
2.00
2.00
1.72
1.62
1.67
1.61
1.60
1.59
1.62
1.54
1.60
1.54
1.53
1.52
1.59
1.58
1.56
1.57
1.52
1.52

(-0.01 , 9.72)
(1.54 , 8.25)
(2.54 , 7.30)
(3.25 , 6.66)
(3.68 , 6.12)
(4.28 , 5.54)
(1.77 , 8.21)
(2.82 , 7.08)
(3.56 , 6.53)
(3.96 , 6.07)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.62 , 5.39)
(1.57 , 7.87)
(2.60 , 6.63)
(3.29 , 6.05)
(3.64 , 5.59)
(3.91 , 5.29)
(4.24 , 4.94)
(1.66 , 7.59)
(2.60 , 6.48)
(3.25 , 5.94)
(3.59 , 5.48)
(3.85 , 5.20)
(4.18 , 4.86)
(-0.36 , 9.55)
(1.23 , 7.92)
(2.21 , 6.91)
(2.89 , 6.24)
(3.32 , 5.71)
(3.91 , 5.13)
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86.4%
80.5%
63.2%
37.9%
12.9%
0.0%
74.8%
58.1%
23.4%
3.4%
0.2%
0.0%
78.1%
64.2%
33.6%
10.4%
0.8%
0.0%
77.8%
65.9%
35.2%
11.7%
0.8%
0.0%
87.6%
85.5%
73.7%
54.8%
29.7%
0.0%

Empirical
SE

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05

U5, P5, P5d ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5d ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95 (defined)
Cor (P5, P5d) = 0.85
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5d) = 0.48 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5d) = 0.45 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3d
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5d ]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model4d
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5d ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5d
[ Y ~ T + C + P5d ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.90
5.00
4.84
4.94
4.92
4.92
4.91
5.06
4.95
5.04
5.00
5.01
4.63
4.74
4.63
4.69
4.65
4.65
4.58
4.66
4.56
4.62
4.58
4.57
4.64
4.69
4.52
4.61
4.59
4.57

1.90
2.00
1.84
1.94
1.92
1.92
1.91
2.06
1.95
2.04
2.00
2.01
1.63
1.74
1.63
1.69
1.65
1.65
1.58
1.66
1.56
1.62
1.58
1.57
1.64
1.69
1.52
1.61
1.59
1.57

(0.02 , 9.78)
(1.65 , 8.35)
(2.45 , 7.23)
(3.25 , 6.64)
(3.7 , 6.14)
(4.3 , 5.55)
(1.67 , 8.14)
(2.93 , 7.18)
(3.47 , 6.44)
(3.99 , 6.09)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.63 , 5.4)
(1.45 , 7.82)
(2.71 , 6.76)
(3.23 , 6.02)
(3.71 , 5.68)
(3.96 , 5.35)
(4.29 , 5.00)
(1.6 , 7.56)
(2.71 , 6.61)
(3.21 , 5.92)
(3.66 , 5.58)
(3.9 , 5.26)
(4.23 , 4.92)
(-0.36 , 9.65)
(1.35 , 8.03)
(2.16 , 6.88)
(2.94 , 6.27)
(3.39 , 5.78)
(3.96 , 5.19)

85.8%
76.5%
65.2%
40.4%
13.7%
0.0%
76.6%
52.0%
27.6%
3.2%
0.0%
0.0%
79.6%
60.3%
36.8%
7.8%
0.5%
0.0%
77.9%
59.4%
38.3%
8.3%
0.7%
0.0%
87.3%
82.7%
73.7%
52.4%
26.1%
0.4%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
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U5, P5, P5e ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5e ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5e) = 0.80
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5e) = 0.44 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5e) = 0.44 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3e
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5e ]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model4e
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5e ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5e
[ Y ~ T + C + P5e ]

Sample
Size

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

ATE

Bias

4.90
5.00
4.84
4.94
4.92
4.92
4.91
5.06
4.95
5.04
5.00
5.01
4.73
4.77
4.67
4.74
4.70
4.69
4.67
4.69
4.60
4.67
4.62
4.62
4.72

1.90
2.00
1.84
1.94
1.92
1.92
1.91
2.06
1.95
2.04
2.00
2.01
1.73
1.77
1.67
1.74
1.70
1.69
1.67
1.69
1.60
1.67
1.62
1.62
1.72

4.74
4.56
4.65
4.62
4.62

1.74
1.56
1.65
1.62
1.62
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ATE 95%
CI

(0.02 , 9.78)
(1.65 , 8.35)
(2.45 , 7.23)
(3.25 , 6.64)
(3.70 , 6.14)
(4.30 , 5.55)
(1.67 , 8.14)
(2.93 , 7.18)
(3.47 , 6.44)
(3.99 , 6.09)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.63 , 5.40)
(1.51 , 7.95)
(2.72 , 6.82)
(3.26 , 6.08)
(3.75 , 5.74)
(3.99 , 5.40)
(4.33 , 5.05)
(1.65 , 7.68)
(2.71 , 6.67)
(3.23 , 5.97)
(3.70 , 5.64)
(3.93 , 5.30)
(4.27 , 4.97)
(-0.25 ,
9.69)
(1.37 , 8.11)
(2.19 , 6.93)
(2.98 , 6.33)
(3.42 , 5.82)
(4.00 , 5.23)

Coverage

Empirical
SE

85.8%
76.5%
65.2%
40.4%
13.7%
0.0%
76.6%
52.0%
27.6%
3.2%
0.0%
0.0%
78.4%
59.7%
36.9%
6.9%
0.2%
0.0%
77.2%
60.9%
37.4%
7.8%
0.3%
0.0%
86.1%

0.10
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10

82.0%
75.2%
52.2%
26.3%
0.3%

0.08
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05

U5, P5, P5f ~ N (0, 1.00)
e_P5f ~ N (0.1, 1.50)
Cor (U5, P5) = 0.95
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5f) = 0.75
(defined)
Cor (P5, P5f) = 0.39 (actual)
Cor (U5, P5f) = 0.35 (actual)
Common Cause Criterion:
LR_Model1
[Y~T+C]

Disjunctive Cause
Criterion: LR_Model2
[Y~T+Z+C+B]

Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion (proxy
recommendation only):
LR_Model3f
[ Y ~ T + Z + C + B + P5f ]
Modified Disjunctive
Cause Criterion:
LR_Model4f
[ Y ~ T + C + B + P5f ]

Modified Common Cause
Criterion:
LR_Model5f
[ Y ~ T + C + P5f ]

Sample
Size

ATE

Bias

ATE 95% CI

Coverage

Empirical
SE

18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000
18
36
70
137
265
1,000

4.86
4.90
4.92
4.95
4.90
4.91
4.99
4.95
5.04
5.01
5.00
5.00
4.82
4.72
4.79
4.74
4.72
4.72
4.71
4.64
4.70
4.66
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.68
4.67
4.69
4.64
4.64

1.86
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.90
1.91
1.99
1.95
2.04
2.01
2.00
2.00
1.82
1.72
1.79
1.74
1.72
1.72
1.71
1.64
1.70
1.66
1.64
1.65
1.66
1.68
1.67
1.69
1.64
1.64

(-0.01 , 9.72)
(1.54 , 8.25)
(2.54 , 7.30)
(3.25 , 6.66)
(3.68 , 6.12)
(4.28 , 5.54)
(1.77 , 8.21)
(2.82 , 7.08)
(3.56 , 6.53)
(3.96 , 6.07)
(4.25 , 5.75)
(4.62 , 5.39)
(1.59 , 8.04)
(2.66 , 6.79)
(3.37 , 6.20)
(3.74 , 5.74)
(4.01 , 5.43)
(4.36 , 5.09)
(1.67 , 7.75)
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